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Pollution-induced contention is usually thought to be driven by concerns over 
pollution. This dissertation challenges this assumption. Drawing on ten 
months of field research in Zhejiang province of China, I suggest that in places 
where local villagers themselves drive rural industrialization, when villagers, 
as entrepreneurs, are also perpetrators of pollution, pollution-induced 
contention can be more than victims resisting pollution. By taking the 
perspective of local villagers, this dissertation seeks to shed light on the 
following three research questions: 1) Why does industrial pollution persist? 2) 
Why has contention around pollution persisted? 3) What explains the varied 
responses of local villagers over industrial pollution?  
 The reality that villagers are both victims and perpetrators of pollution 
forces us to understand the above questions in a different way. First, villagers 
do not simply passively endure pollution but accept it as inevitable through 
various experiences with the state. This mentality contributes to pollution’s 
persistence and an inflated tolerance of pollution even when the local 
economy has achieved a certain degree of development. Second, pollution 
plays a minor role in some contention and thus often used as a smokescreen to 
achieve other ends. On one hand, villagers exploit the loopholes of the system, 
frequently petitioning the state for non-pollution purposes. On the other hand, 
they depend on mediation to solve pollution-induced conflicts. Both ways of 
involving the state in the contention result in the persistence of pollution-
induced contention. Third, who causes the pollution instead of the pollution 
per se is more decisive in shaping local villagers’ reaction. The 
outsider/insider distinction that explains varied villagers’ responses, not only 
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applies to trans-boundary pollution and outsider pollution in local 
communities, but also operates in the form of village factional politics. In the 
end, besides arguing we should not take rural contentious action at face value, 
this dissertation attempts to highlight the mode of rural industrialization to 
understand pollution-induced contention in a wider context. It is also meant to 
offer some insights into the role of people’s mentality in sustaining an 





















Glossary of Chinese Terms 
chaxu geju the differential model of association 
chi ku eat bitterness 
cheng zhong cun villages inside cities, urban village 
chu tou niao                                        the bird ahead of the flight 
diaomin                                               cunning people 
dingzihu nail household 
dashihuaxiao, xiaoshihuawu               
 
turn a big problem into a small one 
and a small one into nothing                          
dayiqiang huanyidi                          fire a single shot in one place and 
then move to another 
di sushi  low quality behavior 
chexian shequ ying zhibiao   revoke the county and establish the 
district                                                                     
chebing xiangzhen dismantle and merge towns and 
townships 
fa bu ze zhong    the law does not punish all the people 
feishui buliu wairentian rich water should be kept in one’s 
fields 
guanxi network 
gei mianzi give a face  
guo jin min tui the state advances, the private sector 
retreats 
ying zhibiao hard target 
hukou  house registration 
jieneng jianpai energy conservation and emission 
reduction 
kaoshan chishan, kaoshui chishui those living on a mountain live off the 
mountain, those living near the water 
live off the water 
lazha xiandian switch off power to limit electricity 
supply 
lishang wanglai courtesy called for reciprocity 
qing ,li, fa emotion, reason and law 
qin guan clean official 
san tongshi three at the same time, three 
synchronizations 
shangtou youren have people above in the government, 
have political connections 
shang you zhengce, xia you duice for every edict from above, there is a 
counter-measure from below to 
circumvent it 
shunmin obedient people   
si xiang gong zuo ideological work, thought work 
waidi   non-local places 
waidi ren   people from non-local places 




xiao yelian  small smelting 
xiaoshi bu chucun, dashi bu lixian, 
maodu bu shangjiao 
Small matters don’t leave the village, 
large matters don’t leave the township 
and conflicts do not rise to higher 
authorities 
xiangbao guardian in the township 
xinfang  letters and visits 
yichang daicun  use the factory to replace the village 
yuanqu guanweihui  park management committee 
zhaoling xigai  
 
issue an order in the morning and 
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Angry protests against pollution in China have frequently made international 
headlines. From international organizations to the New York Times, these 
sources seem to concur that China’s pollution and the increasing violent 
citizen response against it is a worldwide environmental concern as well as a 
formidable challenge to the country’s stability.1 Within China there has been 
the limited media coverage because of tight press controls. Yet everyone 
recognizes the topic’s sensitivity in the context of stability maintenance; the 
image of desperate victims fiercely locked in fierce protest against 
unscrupulous, polluting enterprises is entrenched in society’s consciousness.  
 Scholars of China have not been blind to the magnitude of the problem. 
These eye-catching protests certainly have a place in the literature (Jing, 2000; 
Ma, 2008; Deng 2010). The use by citizens of institutionalized channels such 
as petitioning government agencies or bringing the case to the court figure 
prominently (Dasgupta & Wheeler, 1996; Yang & Zhang, 2012; Moser & 
Yang, 2011; Stern, 2010, 2011, 2013). Examples of inaction or conditioned 
indifference are also readily available. Migrant workers, for example, who are 
                                                             
1 For International Organizations’ projects, see for example, United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP)’s Cleaner Production in China, 
http://www.chinacp.org.cn/eng/cpdonors/cp_unep.html, accessed on May 24, 2014; 
World Bank report “Cost of Pollution in China: Economic Estimates of Physical Damages”, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/Resources/China_Cos
t_of_Pollution.pdf,accessed on May 24, 2014.  Regarding New York times reports, see for 
example, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/13/international/asia/13cnd-riot.html, accessed on 
July 21, 2013; http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/05/world/asia/chinese-officials-cancel-plant-
project-amid-protests.html, accessed on July 21, 2013; 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/world/asia/chinese-protesters-accuse-solar-panel-plant-
of-pollution.html; accessed on July 21, 2013; 




capable “of eating bitterness” (chi ku) suffer silently in dirty factories (Tilt, 
2010, 2013a). In “cancer” villages, villagers attribute lay aetiology to non-
pollution factors and resign themselves to living in a polluted environment 
(Lora-Wainwright, 2010, 2013a). From violent confrontation to helpless 
acquiescence, from repeated petitions to prolonged litigation, victims and 
polluters are often portrayed in opposition to each other (Jing, 2000; Tilt, 2007, 
2010; Deng, 2010; Stern, 2011; Van Rooij, Lora-Wainwright, Wu, & Zhang, 
2012; Lora-Wainwright, Zhang, Wu, & Van Rooij, 2012). 
 At the outset of my research, I too saw contention around pollution 
through this dichotomy. In the autumn of 2011, when I first entered the field - 
the highly industrialized and thus heavily polluted countryside of Zhejiang - I 
expected to find pollution victims protesting against unscrupulous polluters. 
Instead, I was struck by people’s indifference to pollution. To be sure, 
villagers complained about environmental degradation, but they did not seem 
to realize that their own manufacturing activities were contributing to the 
problem. In private auto parts workshops, for example, villagers flushed waste 
water onto the ground and left their metal dust unattended. At the acid pickling 
plant, villagers assured me that the strong smell of acid was as normal as 
cooking-oil smoke. Unconcerned villagers passing by a burning heap of 
plastic waste along the side of country paths was a common occurrence.    
 Then it dawned on me: Villagers too are perpetrators of pollution. Let 
me be clear: They are victims of pollution, but their environmental suffering is 
also in part caused by their own production activities. Villagers in 
entrepreneurial rural Zhejiang are neither anxious farmers who mourn over 
withering crops poisoned by pollutants (Lora-Wainwright et al., 2012), nor 
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industrial workers who rely on polluting enterprises for employment and 
suffer in silence (Tilt, 2010). On the whole, they are private entrepreneurs, 
taking the initiative to engage in production activities of low technology and 
high pollution. Tilt (2006) differentiates perceptions and responses of three 
occupational groups, namely industrial workers, commercial and service 
sector workers and farmers. We need to add another – the villager 
entrepreneur.  
 Indeed, the research locations of the existing literature share a common 
but underappreciated feature: Rural industrialization is driven by outsiders. 
Instead of being a boss like their counterparts in an entrepreneurial 
countryside, local villagers are either recruited into “foreign” factories or are 
excluded from the industries. In Jun Jing’s work (2000), the fertilizer factory 
against which Dachuan villagers protested was run by the Gansu provincial 
government and none of its salaried employees were from Dachuan. In the 
Baocun village visited by Benjamin van Rooij (2006) and followed by 
collaborative investigation by others (2012), the largest chemical plant 
Linchang, with its genesis as a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and its current 
setup as a joint-stock company, was certainly beyond local villagers’ reach. As 
a large number of migrant workers swarmed into the village, local residents 
that once enjoyed employment were squeezed out of formal jobs. In Bryan 
Tilt’s fieldwork site, Futian (2007), the major polluters - zinc smelter, coking 
plant and coal-washing plant - were all purchased by outsider private investors. 
The bosses of these plants then laid off the local workforce and brought in 
outsider workers with prior experience under their management. That is to say, 
the current understanding of pollution-related problems is mainly based on the 
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observation and analysis of places where rural industrialization is outsider-
dominant.  
 Moreover, focus on the single mode of outsider-driven 
industrialization has undervalued the potential of the mode of rural 
industrialization as a theoretical tool. In their attempt to explain why former 
protest leaders and veterans of the 2005 famous violent protests against 
thirteen chemical factories owned and staffed by outsiders chose silence in 
face of severely polluting plastic waste recycling factories run by fellow 
villagers in Huaxi village of Zhejiang province,2 Yanhua Deng and Guobin 
Yang (2013) read the contrast as the difference between economic dependency 
and community relations. However, I argue that it is the mode of rural 
industrialization from which pollution originates that influences how the same 
group of local villagers is related to polluters and depends on the polluting 
industries. 
 When villagers themselves are perpetrators of pollution, when almost 
all relatives, friends and neighbors are running polluting enterprises, and when 
these villager entrepreneurs also suffer from pollution caused by outsiders, it 
may cast a cloud over findings based on outsider-driven industrialization. The 
study of pollution-induced contention needs to accommodate this reality. By 
pollution-induced contention, I follow Charles Tilly’s definition of contentious 
politics (2008, 5) and define it as contention stimulated by industrial 
                                                             
2 Phoenix Weekly. May 18,2005,. “Large scale police-people conflict in Dongyang.”  
http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/ china/2005/05/200505182308.shtml, accessed on March 
17, 2012;  
China Business News, May 10, 2005. “Pollution starts with planning: Probe into the 
Dongyang incident.” http://finance.sina.com.cn/ chanjing/b/20050510/03131572813.shtml, 
accessed on March 17, 2012;  
Zhejiang Daily .December 30, 2005 “Seriously punishing those responsible for the Dongyang 
incident.” accessed on March 17, 2012. 
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contamination, in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s 
interest, in which different levels of government appear either as targets, 
initiators of claims, or third parties. Meanwhile, in this study, I foreground 
mode of rural industrialization, limiting the scope of my study to places where 
industrialization is undertaken by local villagers. I pay particularly close 
attention to villager entrepreneurs and their social relations.  
 
Questions, Literature and Arguments 
This dissertation seeks to shed instructive light on the following three 
questions: 1) Why does industrial pollution persist? 2) Why has contention 
around pollution persisted? 3) What explains the varied responses of local 
villagers over industrial pollution? These three questions per se are not novel, 
but the fact that villagers are both victims and perpetrators of pollution in the 
entrepreneurial countryside forces us to understand these questions in a 
different way.  
 
1) Why does industrial pollution persist in rural China? In the conventional 
narratives, local governments, in collusion with unscrupulous polluting 
enterprises, are chief culprits of China’s massive and long-term pollution. 
Meanwhile, victimized villagers are powerless to regulate pollution from 
below.  
 Arguably, local governments are weak in environmental enforcement. 
Objectively speaking, local Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) remain 
understaffed and poorly equipped and are regularly subject to interference 
from local governments (Schwartz, 2003; Beyer, 2006). But there seems little 
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controversy over local governments’ reliance on polluting enterprises (Tilt, 
2010; Lora-Wainwright et al. 2012). The latter contribute handsomely to local 
revenue and also generate jobs, which is crucial for the former’s political 
career. Local officials typically respond not out of concern for the 
environment but out of fear of rating poorly in performance records - 
evaluations are conducted by their superiors - for failure to maintain social 
stability (Heberer & Senz, 2011; Wang, 2013). In many poor areas, local 
governments relax environmental regulations and lower environmental 
standards to attract industrial investment. When the protected enterprises 
pollute, local governments just turn a blind eye. In some places local EPBs are 
known to have spearheaded the local protectionism.  
 As cadre evaluation system demotivates government officials, the 
market does not reward a more environment-friendly mode of production. 
Green products do not sell well; the installation and operation of pollution-
control facilities are financial burdens. Enterprises have to pay the high costs 
of compliance themselves. Meanwhile, fines are sufficiently low to make it 
financially expedient to pay penalties rather than invest in pollution abatement 
(Ma & Ortolano, 2000). In short, enterprises have little incentive to curb 
pollution. However, compared to accusations of unfavorable objective 
conditions for pollution control, explanations implying bosses’ subjective 
malice are more popular. Whether powerful state-own SOEs or ordinary 
private enterprises, the analysis concerning their illegitimate political 
connections better conforms to the people’s imagination of collusion between 
government officials and businessmen.  
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As poor victims of pollution, villagers are forced to suffer pollution 
and have limited opportunities to engage in collective action to resist pollution 
(Tilt, 2013b; Lora-Wainwright, 2013b). Scholars have rightly gone beyond 
simplistic answers derived from general assumptions about peasants in 
authoritarian China like ignorance to pollution or structural barriers such as 
legal obstacles to sue a polluter. These studies highlight more nuanced reasons, 
including heavy dependence on polluting industries for a living, self-sacrifice 
for a wider goal of national prosperity, prior bad experience with protests and 
relationship maintenance in the neighborhood (Lora-Wainwright et al., 2012; 
Deng & Yang, 2013). The terms like “dying for development” and “starve or 
poisoned” reflect the dilemma faced by many pollution victims. They yearn 
for industrial development but seem fated to suffer from its negative side 
effects. 
These useful insights, however, sit askance in more developed areas 
where industrialization has been based on rural entrepreneurship. First, in the 
industrially developed areas of Zhejiang, local governments’ reliance on 
polluting industries has declined substantially. The revenue derived from 
polluting workshops in early years of the reform has allowed these local 
governments to have more options in attracting investment today. While in 
poor areas attracting the import of polluting enterprises is an important means 
to alleviate poverty, industrial upgrading and restructuring is more urgent in 
wealthier areas. This includes replacing low technology and high polluting 
industries with high technology and low polluting factories. In addition, after 
years of early development, the effects of pollution have manifested 
themselves gradually. This has resulted in increasing public complaints and 
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stricter cadre evaluation criteria. Compared to their counterparts in poorer 
areas, under the dual pressures from the masses and their superiors, local 
officials in Zhejiang have more incentives to curb pollution. 
Second, in places thick with private enterprises, enterprise owners are 
no longer faceless strangers but familiar “one of us”. As entrepreneurs, they 
know perfectly well the benefits and costs of pollution. The black-hearted, 
polluting behavior condemned by villagers is the key to primitive 
accumulation. Admittedly, villager entrepreneurs rely on their own polluting 
industries, but not in the sense that they are forced to do dirty jobs. Instead, 
they start low-threshold, high-pollution businesses, mobilize family members, 
relatives and friends to join the big army of production and try every means to 
expand their production scale. Moreover, the abovementioned dilemma caused 
by poverty has been much alleviated due to capital accumulation through 
entrepreneurship over the years. Quite a number of villager entrepreneurs can 
afford some degree of pollution control or switch to relatively cleaner 
industries.  
However, even with such favorable factors for pollution reduction in 
industrialized Zhejiang, pollution persists. In fact, studies that test an 
environmental Kuznets curve for Zhejiang, despite dissenting views, have 
shown that the situation there does not follow an expected, inverted U shape 
curve (Song, Zheng, & Tong, 2007; Yang, Yuan, & Sun, 2012). As the 
province’s income has grown, which reached USD11,000 Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capital in 2013, the province’s environmental quality 
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seems not to have improved appreciably.3 This begs the question: Why has 
industrial pollution persisted in industrializing rural areas when the local 
economy has achieved a certain level of development? Why do villagers 
commit pollution violations knowingly and tolerate others’ polluting activities 
in these areas? Put differently, in the relatively affluent Zhejiang countryside, 
when dependence on polluting industries has significantly declined, how do 
we explain the persistence of industrial pollution?  
I argue that answers lie with the mentality of the villagers. The 
mentality of viewing pollution as inevitable is a major reason why villagers 
seemingly take a permissive attitude towards industrial pollution. Mentality is 
a habitual or characteristic mental attitude that determines how people will 
interpret and respond to situations. People may hold different perceptions 
towards industrial pollution but tend to share a similar mentality in the same 
environment. Anna Lora-Wainwright and her colleagues (2012) twist Arun 
Agrawal’s idea of environmentality (2005a), exploring how governments’ 
environmental discourse and practice are distorted in the creation of new 
subjects that accept pollution and even become complicit in pollution. In their 
study, the perception of inevitability is a result of subject making, mainly 
derived from dependence on polluting industries. But as these scholars admit, 
this form of environmentality does not necessarily extend to all polluting 
industrial plants (2012, p123). Although the concept of “inevitable pollution” 
seems similar, the formation of this mentality in my study takes a different 
path, going beyond the dependence on polluting industries. 
                                                             




Instead, I place people’s lived experience in everyday politics at the 
heart of my analysis. As sociological classics have theorized, power is 
relational and entails subordination. Concepts such as governmentality, 
hegemony, legitimacy and habitus all pertain to the subjective experience of 
subordination. For the state, I care about how the state practice of power is 
received and interpreted by local villagers. Here the state can refer to officials, 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and levels of government that local 
villagers might encounter in their daily life. I look at the state as it is reflected 
in society, as Rachel Stern and Kevin O’Brien put it (2012), who also see 
“popular experience with state power”. It means seeing the state from the 
below, from the perspective of local villagers. For society, I examine local 
villagers’ subjective experience of subordination. When Ching Kwan Lee and 
Yonghong Zhang (2013) highlight the experience of subordination, they mean 
to theorize state domination. Here I attempt show the shaping and molding 
effects of these experiences on the subordinates’ mentality.   
I contend that popular experience with state power is fundamental in 
forming the mentality of inevitable pollution. More specifically, I will 
examine seven fields - 1) environmental education, 2) media coverage of 
pollution, 3) environmental impact assessment, 4) pollution prevention, 5) 
pollution treatment, 6) environmental petitions and 7) environmental litigation 
- in which villagers interact with government agencies. While Stern and 
O’Brien (2012) optimistically argue that the back-and-forth of state-society 
communication has pushed the boundary of tolerance, I wish to illustrate the 
gloomy side of the governing process that facilitates the vicious cycle of 
incessant pollution. People not only act on their immediate readings of what 
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power holders can put up with, but may also unconsciously submit to the long 
existing governments’ representations of the environment.  
Thereby, ultimately, this study privileges the perspective of local 
villagers, which is interactive and relational, incorporating the analysis of the 
state. Importantly, I do not further differentiate within and among local 
villagers, since this mentality is encompassing. Regardless of their identities as 
village cadres or ordinary villagers, private entrepreneurs or salary labors or 
the cadre-entrepreneur combination, villagers, without exception, have to cope 
with as the uncertainty, ambiguity or ambivalence of the state, whatever you 
prefer to put it. In a sense, the formation of this mentality can be seen as a 
reaction to this salient feature of the Chinese state. Whether villagers might be 
acutely aware of permissible political boundaries or confused with mixed 
signals, they accept the uncertainty of state preferences and develop strategies 
to deal with it accordingly.  
 
2) Why has contention around pollution persisted? As many studies have 
shown that awareness or grievance does not necessarily translate into action, 
the increasing number of pollution-induced contention is not necessarily a 
natural and logical consequence of environmental deterioration. In places like 
entrepreneurial Zhejiang, it seems that villagers’ relationship with polluting 
industries and to each other should inhibit petitions or protests against 
pollution. Not to mention villager entrepreneurs who are directly involved in 
the polluting. Even if villagers are not immediate perpetrators of pollution, 
they may be connected to polluting industries in various ways - as family 
numbers, employees, customers or suppliers. They do not have justice on their 
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side to complain about the pollution, especially given that maintaining good 
relationships within the community is paramount.  
 Additionally, as a tactic, the effectiveness of petitioning in solving 
problems has been questioned in villagers’ actual interaction with the state by 
in-depth field studies. Little headway can be made if local governments are 
not responsive. For example, in Baocun (Yunnan province), after years of 
fighting pollution, villager action has shifted from petitions to blockades. 
Villagers eventually opted to solve the matter directly with the factory rather 
via government agencies (Lora-Wainwright et al., 2012). 
 However, official data shows that petitions regarding the environment 
in Zhejiang, in forms of letters, telephones, emails and visits, have increased 
from 14,100 in 1998 to 70,800 in 2008. 4 What explains this paradox of the 
growing number of petitions? Put differently, if it is state practice that makes 
the villagers believe pollution is inevitable, and thus if villagers already 
perceive pollution as inevitable, why would villagers, as frequently as they do, 
still bother to engage the state by protesting (or petitioning) against the 
pollution?  
 To answer this question, we need to dispel the myth that contention 
around pollution is solely driven by concerns over pollution. The existing 
literature tends to see pollution-related petitions as genuinely anti-pollution, 
even if villagers have financial gains in mind. However, as I discovered in the 
field over time, many seemingly pollution-related petitions are filed for non-
pollution purposes. In fact, often many villagers’ demands are wildly 
unreasonable and have little to do with pollution per se.   
                                                             





 As a result, the idea of “inevitable pollution” can coexist with 
contentious actions around pollution. Villagers simply repackage their 
concerns with the environment and learn to know what goals are realistic and 
how to achieve them. In the Baocun case, the change in the mode of collective 
action from petition to blockades was a mechanism of securing compensation 
rather than a form of subversion (Lora-Wainwright et al., 2012). Likewise, 
petitioning local EPBs can be effective in engaging government agencies for 
other ends, although it may be useless in preventing pollution.  
 Pollution as a “problem” is a valid and thus easy reason that can be 
used to hide impure motives. Petitioning government agencies acts as a 
legitimizing process through which the local state is now forced to deal with 
non-pollution issues. Local cadres’ sensitivity to environmental mass incidents 
also encourages villagers to frame their non-pollution-related demands as anti-
pollution claims to increase the chance of being attended to. In addition, the 
advantages of anonymous petitions are manifest. People can lurk behind and 
have local EPBs take the lead. Petitioning against outsiders of unfamiliar 
backgrounds can reduce the risk of being avenged; against acquaintances in 
the community, it can avoid harming relationships; against opponents in 
factional struggles, it can make trouble for intended targets. These non-
pollution-related demands masked as anti-pollution petitions have contributed 
significantly to the increased number of petitions regarding pollution.   
 To be sure, the situation is more complicated than simply making use 
of anti-pollution claims as a cover-up. Using pollution as an excuse to achieve 
other ends does not deny pollution as a source of genuine grievance. In some 
cases, the concern over pollution is real. To be more precise, villagers act out 
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of mixed and complex motives; merely focusing on the most visible – that is, 
pollution - may lose the point of things, however. Pollution can serve as a 
smokescreen; it masks other real and multi-faceted problems. 
 Exploring the loopholes of the environmental petitioning system that is 
unable to filter ill-motivated claims is just one way to engage the state. 
Academic attention on petitioning has given the impression that petitioning is 
the most frequent measure of conflict resolution (Minzner, 2006; Brettell, 
2007; Chen, 2012). Environmental lawsuits, on the edge of allowable legal 
actions in an authoritarian state, also have received scholarly attention (Stern, 
2010, 2013). However, the most common way – mediation – is largely 
overlooked. This oversight might stem from the fact that the literature on 
environmental mediation in China follows a rigid definition that limits the 
forms of mediation to people’s mediation, administrative mediation and court-
performed mediation.5 The common societal tradition of mediation in rural 
communities, however, has unfortunately been overlooked in related studies of 
environmental mediation.  
 We need a more inclusive definition of mediation. As Michelson (2008) 
points out, when a Chinese villager lodges an appeal, he or she often does not 
ask for a neutral mediator, but expects the authorities to take his or her side 
and thereby put pressure on other parties. More importantly, in the countryside, 
it is hard to separate the Party’s people's mediation from the societal tradition 
of community mediation. Village and township cadres are actually Janus-faced, 
at once representatives of society and agents of the state. When they serve the 
intermediary function in mediation, they not only draw on personal influence 
                                                             
5  To be precise, there is limited literature on environmental mediation in China. 
Environmental mediation is seen as a sub-type of mediation, following several fixed forms.  
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executed through delicate networks of interpersonal relationships, but they 
also rely on state authority vested in the administrative bodies. In this sense, 
when a villager looks for an acquaintance in the government for help, he or 
she (consciously or unconsciously) engages the state in conflict resolution.  
 Once again, I investigate mediation from the perspective of local 
villagers, as perpetrators or victims. For enterprise owners, paying pollution-
related fines means extra costs and should be avoided if possible. Attending 
the mediation organized by local EPBs that urge compliance is an opportunity 
of negotiating for better terms of compliance. As victims, villagers also seek 
better compensation through mediation. In the context of social stability as 
paramount, to engage the state in both law enforcement and conflict resolution 
is important to capitalize on the cause of maintaining stability. This also helps 
to explain the prevalence of pollution-induced contention.  
  
3) What explains the varied responses of local villagers over industrial 
pollution? Who causes the pollution, I argue, rather than the pollution per se is 
more decisive in shaping local villagers’ reaction. In reference to different 
modes of rural industrialization, whether insiders or outsiders drive rural 
industrialization, or in other words, produce pollution, matters greatly. This is 
even evident when everyone is a perpetrator of pollution. In this way, the 
outsider/insider distinction emerges as a key variable that sheds light on 
variation.6 Specifically, I first adopt the outsider/insider distinction along the 
line of hukou to differentiate modes of rural industrialization; and then within 
                                                             
6 With the mode of rural industrialization as our baseline, I limit the scope of study to places 
where it is driven by insiders. This means the situations in which outsiders dominate rural 
industrialization regardless local villagers being excluded from the benefit sharing of polluting 
industries or reliant on polluting industries for employment and social welfare will not be 
discussed.   
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the single mode of rural industrialization under study, it is used to understand 
varied villager response to industrial pollution. 
 This outsider/insider distinction mainly indicates how local villagers 
view their relationship with polluters, which influences, in turn, their modes or 
forms of contention. As an entrepreneur, the insider status usually means less 
resistance from locals when his or her factory pollutes. The embeddedness of 
the local context allows for further manipulation of that context to his or her 
interests. But it also implies a high probability of being constrained by local 
communities. When pursing profits, the entrepreneur has to consider his or her 
community relations. Local villagers generally welcome insider-run 
enterprises from which they can squeeze benefits. The more successfully 
villagers are able to embed the enterprise locally, the more benefits they gain 
from industrialization. Yet, this brings a high level of dependence on polluting 
industries, resulting in an inflated tolerance of pollution. It is hard to expect 
thorough resistance against pollution or sweeping changes to the 
developmental model when villagers have a stake in polluting industries.  
 Since the outsider/insider distinction deals with relations, it is dynamic, 
never static. First, the identity of people can flexibly interchange as situations 
move among different scales at which the outsider/insider distinction operates 
- from the family to the province. For example, when facing people from other 
provinces, strangers from the same province can be insiders. But fellow 
villagers can also be considered outsiders compared to one’s own family. In 
the case of pollution-induced contention, neighboring villages in dispute can 
unite to fight pollution from a common outsider polluter. Second, the 
outsider/insider identity can transform to each other to some extent since a 
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particular status as an outsider or insider can be achieved by interaction with 
local villagers. The transformative nature is rooted in the distinction also being 
an emotional feeling or psychological perception. What matters is not the 
actual identity of a person, but what identity he or she can be considered as. 
Immigrating into local communities or including locals in benefit-sharing can 
be useful in changing how local villagers perceive the relationship. Similarly, 
however close a person by blood ties is, he or she can also possibly be labeled 
an outsider if they pollute without any scruples.  
 The most visible dividing line between outsiders and insiders is the 
political boundary for place and people, as reflected in administrative division 
and the hukou system (household registration), respectively. A place 
belonging to another administration unit is waidi; a person registered his or her 
hukou in waidi is waidi ren. This study will address both: local responses to 
pollution spreading from waidi (non-local places) and caused by waidi ren 
(people from non-local places) in local areas.  
 The waidi situation is in essence a case of trans-boundary pollution, 
albeit in reference to administrative divisions within a country. The literature 
on trans-boundary pollution in China, with its premise of crossing national 
borders, often addresses international rules and principles governing trans-
boundary pollution and related cooperation mechanisms (Drifte,  2006). Yet, I 
am interested in understanding internal trans-boundary pollution with 
complicated administrative hierarchies and divisions. However, I approach 
this problem through the lens of outsider vs. insider for the sake of consistency 
in my conceptual framework. First, the dynamic nature of the distinction 
makes it possible to engage the literature on political opportunity structure and 
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resource mobilization. While operating across different administrative 
hierarchies materializes political opportunity structure, the process of resource 
mobilization is actually an effort of turning outsiders into insiders. Opposition 
to trans-boundary pollution involves a politics beyond the villagers’ reach. Not 
to mention the competition and coordination at the government level,7 the 
prospect of finding government support from within and social alliances in the 
bordering county is also uncertain. The success of village protests in this 
scenario is highly contingent. It relies on the openness of higher-level political 
opportunity structure and resource mobilization at the state and societal level 
on both sides.  
 Second, the outsider/insider distinction also concerns the local political 
economy. When polluting enterprises are not in the villagers’ backyard, there 
is usually no direct source that may activate social networks between villagers 
and enterprises in an adjacent county. Then the local political economy plays 
an important role in overcoming the obstacle of weak ties: economically, 
whether victimized villagers have their own business to support themselves 
taking some bold action; politically, whether there are responsive village 
cadres who join villagers in opposing dirty enterprises or take the lead in 
negotiating with government agencies; socially, whether local villagers’ daily 
association with each other can be crystalized into organized action.  
 In terms of the waidi ren situation – outsiders in local communities - 
the current scholarship focuses on migrant labors who work in construction 
sites or rural factories for others, and occasionally, outsider investors that 
drive industrialization. Tilt (2010) described the above two as “strategic risk 
                                                             
7 The diversification of sector interests and the competition on resource allocation in China 
have been extensively studied. For example, see Su & Yang (2000).  
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repression” practitioners who ignore or downplay the threats posted by 
pollution within the calculus of outsized remuneration from factory jobs. But 
the composition of outsiders in local communities can be more complicated. In 
the entrepreneurial countryside, outsiders also start up small businesses like 
locals, legally or illegally. Specifically, I explore local responses to two kinds 
of outsiders running formally registered enterprises and illegal, unlicensed 
workshops respectively. I term the former as immigrant entrepreneurs and the 
latter as entrepreneurial migrant workers. Immigrant entrepreneurs seek long-
term development in the local community and thus generally try to keep a 
spotless record as far as formal procedures are concerned. Entrepreneurial 
migrant workers are the ones who are discontented with simply being 
employees and emulate locals to engage in low-threshold production. They 
run unlicensed workshops in a guerrilla style and may switch to salary jobs if 
needed. Both are outsiders, but the ways local communities respond to their 
pollution are quite different and thus should be studied separately.  
 Besides demarcation along political boundaries, further differentiation 
within the village or neighboring close villages is necessary. The general 
statement that villagers are more tolerant to pollution by local fellows is 
accurate but simplistic (Deng & Yang, 2013). Villagers also apply the 
outsider/insider distinction among community members as seen in factional 
politics, including cases of one-faction domination and evenly-matched 
factional contests. A polluting industry, as disputable as imaged, is also a 
major battlefield for factional politics. Extending the above argument that 
pollution is a secondary a reason for petitions or protests, I argue that the logic 
of factional politics dominates the pollution-induced contention and its 
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resolution. Villagers apply different standards to factional members (insiders) 
and non-members (outsiders) in sorting out pollution-related disputes. 
 Here the outsider/insider division is usually directly reflected in the 
distribution of industrial benefits. In places of uneven distribution of wealth 
among villagers, the well-off are typically those with kinship ties to political 
officials, especially cadres who are believed to have benefitted illegitimately 
from their privileged position of power. Economic patronage is scarcely 
extended beyond privileged groups – usually kinship factions to which cadres 
or entrepreneurs belong. Within the privileged group, economic patronage 
may be used to comfort the discontented or counterbalance clan influence. But 
outside the small coterie, the key to embed enterprises is whether villagers can 
hold cadres accountable through either formal or informal institutions, 8which 
implies significant variation in village response across places.9Such socio-
economic polarization usually occurs in villages where rural industrialization 
is based on resource exploitation or enterprises are inherited from the 
collective economy through insider privatization. Resource development 
requires a relatively large upfront investment and the attainment of a 
concession, which typically leads to the concentration of wealth in the hands 
of a politically connected few. Similarly, those who are able to buy collective 
enterprises at knockdown prices, or even illegally usurp public assets, are a 
                                                             
8 On informal institutions, see Tsai (2007a), (2007b). 
9  One extreme variant is that unaccountable cadres and a criminal syndicate control the 
polluting industries. The local state farms out essential government functions to criminal 
gangs. It is not simply that mafias do evil openly such as robbery, burglary, vandalism and 
murder. In fact, many of them are engaging in legal business, since only these people can get 
the project contracts in the village. Moreover, many villages appear superficially to be 
peaceful: social order is maintained through coercion and administrative tasks are 
accomplished without significant social disruption. See Hurst, M.Liu, Y.Liu & Tao (2014) 
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small number with political ties, since local cadres often control the 
privatization of collective enterprises. 
 The two situations above can be insider-driven industrialization, but 
they are not my main focus. I am more concerned with rural industrialization 
that demonstrates a sense of entrepreneurship: Instead of relying on a natural 
endowment or the legacy of collective economy, villagers create their 
businesses from scratch. This form of production is widespread in numerous 
specialized villages of the Zhejiang countryside. Specialized villages refer to 
the villages where almost all villagers undertake the same profession or 
similar economic activities and thus gradually develop the reputation as 
specialized production bases.10  
 Often economic development in these areas features a relatively 
equalized class structure with a large number of well-off people. The fairly 
equitable distribution of wealth in some sense has rendered the use of 
economic patronage to embed fellow entrepreneurs or co-opt villagers difficult. 
Hence, the ascriptive status of an entrepreneur stands out when local people 
differentiate between outsiders and insiders. Specifically, the outsider/insider 
distinction can stem from a variety of ascriptive structures, including kinship, 
religious groups and territorial grouping. Although many ascriptive features of 
social life may become attenuated by differentiation and technological 
advancement, ascriptive elements do in some form retain their functions as an 
integral component of modern social structure, especially in China’s rural 
society (Perry, 1985; Liu, 2000).   
                                                             
10 Definition come from 
http://define.cnki.net/WebForms/WebDefines.aspx?searchword=%E4%B8%93%E4%B8%9A
%E6%9D%91, accessed on November 28, 2013 
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 The emphasis on ascriptive status does not deny the impact of wealth 
accumulation through industrialization. In fact, local political and economic 
institutions that are evolving in rural industrialization have fused with 
indigenous institutions including kinship ties, folk beliefs, religion and semi-
autonomous associations; they even have injected new life into these 
traditional customs. In other words, economic power operates through pre-
established ascriptive structures and facilitates the rise of other authorities than 
political clout. It is no surprise to see a revival of lineage identity and religious 
principles with the great financial support from native-born entrepreneurs who 
seek to glorify their family name (Yang, 2007). In addition, as more and more 
entrepreneurs enter political office, rivals between their respective kinship 
groups and clans have formalized into the competition in village elections and 
daily decision making in village politics (Pastor & Tan, 2000; Takeuchi, 2013). 
Fierce competition can consume the village, but villagers would rather see a 
close contest than a monopoly as discussed above. While the former provides 
some degree of checks and balances, however unsatisfying, the latter makes it 
difficult to ensure accountability.  
 I attempt to use the cases of pollution-induced contention in 
specialized villages to show how factional politics determines local villagers’ 
response to industrial pollution. Additionally, these case studies will also 
exhibit how my research questions are addressed together. Local villagers’ 
experience with the state leads to the mentality of viewing pollution as 
inevitable, which mainly explains the persistence of pollution. Accepting the 
inevitability, villagers keep involving the state in pollution-related contention, 
despite pollution functioning as a smokescreen. Villagers are generally 
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discontented with environmental deterioration but respond differently in 
specific situations according to their flexible outsider/insider labels.  
 
A Single mode of rural industrialization and a single province 
Readers may have noticed that mode of rural industrialization play a central 
role in my explanations. By contrasting with the existing studies on outsider-
driven industrialization, this dissertation focuses on insider-driven 
industrialization based on rural entrepreneurship and further attempts to show 
how the answers to the same three research questions might be different in this 
single mode of rural industrialization. But skeptics may question why this 
dissertation does not follow the structure “from a general typology to specific 
categories” to better promote the idea “mode of rural industrialization” and if 
the inference concerning mode of rural industrialization is valid when the 
main body of the thesis only discusses pollution-induced contention in one 
particular mode of rural industrialization.  
 For the former, it is mainly an analytical choice between breadth and 
depth - a tension that pervades the social science enterprise. As the current 
shape of the dissertation will show, the data I painstakingly collected in the 
field on a single mode of rural industrialization is more than adequate 
empirically to fill the whole dissertation. If the dissertation is made to cover as 
many scenarios as possible, the depth of the analysis will be sacrificed to a 
point that I find unsatisfactory. Listing a series of shallow examples in fact 
does a great injustice to the complicated reality of what is actually transpiring 
on the ground.  Moreover, the most important contribution I can make with the 
dissertation is this single mode of rural industrialization. The fact that the 
24 
 
perpetrators and victims of pollution can be the same group of people in this 
mode of rural industrialization opens us a new window into pollution-induced 
contention. 
 Once the emphasis is determined, I decide not to use the structure 
“from a general typology to specific categories” to avoid the possible attacks 
arising from a general typology but without all sorts of supporting cases. If 
one does not accept the typology, the resulting analysis on specific categories 
will be questioned as well. Meanwhile, to avoid the part-to-all mapping, I do 
not mean to make a general typology out of one specific category. My strategy 
is using mode of rural industrialization as a reference point to compare one 
specific category with other categories in existing studies. In the end, I would 
like to show the suggestive value of mode of rural industrialization and other 
theoretical perspectives to serve as a basis for future comparative studies.  
 For the latter question concerning the validity of inference, I argue that 
the study on a single mode of rural industrialization can be validated when it 
has. In isolation, a single observation cannot produce a valid estimate of the 
causal effect. Social science is a collective enterprise, however. As King, 
Keohane and Verba (1994) argue, a single observation can be useful for 
evaluating causal explanations when there are other observations gathered by 
other researchers, against which it can be compared. I am not working in 
isolation but have the benefit of others having collected many prior 
observations. Prior researchers had either focused on rural industrialization 
driven by outsiders or open resistance against pollution, which presented a 
marked contrast to my observation. By using data from my own fieldwork in 
combination with that which came before, a valid inference is possible.  
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 Then comes the question if the cases from a single province Zhejiang 
can well support my arguments. Although the whole Chapter Two will be 
devoted to discuss how the characteristics of industrialization based on rural 
entrepreneurship in Zhejiang may influence the pollution-induced contention, 
here I still spare some pages explaining the relationship between the 
entrepreneurial mode of rural industrialization and its representative case 
Zhejiang province to better situate the case of Zhejiang in China in general. 
 Like all other provinces, the economic forms in Zhejiang are complex. 
The proportion of certain economic forms may vary across provinces, but they 
all exist in the geographical area. Despite private enterprises run by locals are 
the mainstream, Zhejiang still accommodates many state-owned enterprises as 
well as outsider-run enterprises that arrive for preferential investment policies. 
In places where these enterprises are located, rural industrialization is driven 
by outsiders. Therefore, I do not overstate that the thesis covers all sorts of 
industrial patterns in Zhejiang. Even if the dissertation is based on cases from 
Zhejiang, it is imprecise to title the thesis as “pollution-induced contention in 
Zhejiang”. As the adjective entrepreneurial in the title indicates, mode of rural 
industrialization comes first in this thesis, while I select Zhejiang province as a 
representative case of industrialization based on rural entrepreneurship.  
 How representative is Zhejiang for this particular mode of rural 
industrialization? The province is widely acknowledged in political economy 
literature on China. 11  However, choosing Zhejiang is not only for the 
availability of huge literature and sophisticated analysis. The meaning of 
Zhejiang as a case in comparative perspective is also important. On one hand, 
                                                             
11 The details of literature can be found in Chapter Two.  
26 
 
the developmental problems concerning pollution that arose in Zhejiang point 
to the defects of the political regime. On the other hand, the more returned 
migrants started their businesses in their economically backward home 
provinces. Considering China’s slow political reform and the trend of rural 
industrialization, these less advanced regions will in most likelihood encounter 
Zhejiang's current developmental problems. Owing to the first developed 
countryside, Zhejiang provides a useful trial field to see how the 
developmental problems might be relieved, either by local governments and 
rural communities. In addition, even within a single mode of rural 
industrialization, significant spatial variations exist within Zhejiang. It is easy 
to find county and town-level divisions of Zhejiang comparable to their 
counterparts in less advanced provinces, either historically or contemporarily. 
For example, the Changyuan county in Henan province is dubbed as “North 
Wenzhou”, whose developmental model is largely drawn from Wenzhou’s 
industrialization experience.12 Therefore, there is little fear of “misusing the 
best known place” here when taking the time dimension and spatial variation 
into account (Snyder, 2001b). 
 
Data and Methods 
Obtaining data is a great challenge for studying pollution in Chinese villages. 
Official statistics do not include pollution-related data at a level as low as the 
village. Making industrial pollution-related information public is a political 
minefield. Of the sometimes available sources, EPBs’ petition records and 
official mediation reports rarely reflect the complexity of the situation or offer 
                                                             





a comprehensive picture. Therefore, this study draws on an eclectic mix of 
sources. I used online/filed petition records of local EPBs, handwritten 
mediation reports of township offices and press reports to locate possible sites, 
understand incident backgrounds, collect interview clues, and formulate 
research questions. At the same time, I relied on on-site observation as well as 
formal and informal interviews to verify hypotheses, modify my research 
design and develop arguments.  
 My perspective was shaped by ten months of interactions with 
villagers, government officials and other related professionals. Villagers 
include petitioners/protestors and those who were affected by the pollution but 
did not participate in contentions, village committee heads, village party 
secretaries, village group leaders, respected elders in the village and people 
who played a key role in village associational life either in the form of 
traditional kinship, folk beliefs and religion or more modern enterprises and 
mutual aid organizations peasants of different vocations (business owners, 
migrant workers, farmers/fishers and so on).13  The bureaucratic officials I 
interviewed ranged from provincial to township levels, especially those 
connected with the policy areas related to this study, e.g. environmental 
protection, industrial management, sannong 14  affairs and xinfang (literally 
letters and visits, referring to petitioning), as well as some deputies of the 
People’s Congress and members of the Political Consultative Conference. 
Other related professionals I spoke with were scholars, party school teachers, 
                                                             
13 Categories may overlap, but they emphasize different aspects that may influence villagers’ 
attitudes and behaviors towards pollution and contention. 
14 The San Nong (Three Rural Issues) refers to three issues relating to rural development, 
specifically, agriculture, rural areas and peasants. At the 2006 National People's Congress, the 
Three Rural Issues were especially emphasized throughout the then Prime Minister Wen 
Jiabao's speech on the workings of the government in 2005 and the direction of the 
government for the year 2006.  
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journalists, lawyers, judges, environmental consultants, market analysts, 
engineers conducting environmental impact assessment and countryside 
planning.  
 I conducted over ninety open-ended interviews, including group 
interviews and repeat interviews, which were largely conducted during my 
longest field stay in Zhejiang from November 2010 to July 2011. Initially, I 
choose Zhejiang because of its spatial variations in rural industrialization and 
my personal connections.15 But it turned out to be an excellent site, because 
Zhejiang is the earliest, most developed, most representative place for 
industrialization based on rural entrepreneurship. While the first two months 
of interviews with provincial and county governmental officials was useful, 
my research did not “take off” until delving into the countryside, where I 
chatted with all kinds of people on all kinds of informal occasions. Upon 
returning to Singapore to write, I frequently contacted key informants to 
receive updates and fill in missing data. This has involved lots of telephone 
calls, on-line chatting and email exchanges. In addition, I made short trips to 
other parts of the countryside: Hunan province in May 2010, Anhui province 
in July 2012, and Yunnan province in July 2013. The information collected in 
those places is not directly reflected in the writing here, but it has helped me to 
view the topic in a comparative perspective and bolster my argument of 
different modes of rural industrialization.  
 Another significant part of data collection was personal observation. 
Regarding the state, I held a two-week internship in the office of policies & 
regulations and propaganda & education at the EPB of prefecture-level city 
                                                             
15 See my proposal submitted for the defense of the Ph.D. qualifying exam. 
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Jiaxing, a four-day stint at the Xinfang Hall of the municipal government in 
the county-level city Yiwu, and made frequent visits to the township 
government and following to dispute scenes during my three-month stay at the 
township Z of Taizhou prefecture. My observations on society attempted 
immersion, to the extent permitted, in local life. In the first best access area – 
township Z and second best township K, both in Taizhou prefecture, I lived 
with local villagers, took part in various activities with them and observed 
different kinds of regular events and special occasions. The intent was to 
establish mutual trust and to learn to understand the linguistic and ideational 
world of the villagers. While the former aimed to get the villagers to speak 
freely and without trepidation, the latter tried to communicate questions in a 
way that was intelligible to villagers while maintaining validity. During that 
period I was based in the countryside and set off to other parts of the counties. 
If unable to find local hosts, I lived in the urban area but travelled to the 
townships and villages every day as I did for investigation in Township H of 
County Yuyao. Other observations included many short visits to townships 
and villages in Huzhou and Zhoushan prefectures.  
 
Roadmap  
The structure of the dissertation follows the line of reasoning sketched above. 
Chapter Two uses Zhejiang province as an example to discuss the 
characteristics of insider-driven industrialization based on rural 
entrepreneurship and their implications for pollution-induced contention. How 
I differentiate modes of rural industrialization will be introduced here. 
Chapters Three to Six are organized around my three research questions. 
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Chapter Three expands the idea of inevitable pollution. Beginning with a 
discussion of local villagers’ awareness of industrial pollution, the chapter will 
explore different village experiences with the state in empirical terms. Chapter 
Four tries to answer why local villagers involve the state in the contention 
from two angles. First it offers an elaborate account of pollution as 
smokescreen, examining how villagers petition or protest for non-pollution 
purposes. Second, it provides a fresh way of looking at mediation as a measure 
to solve pollution-induced conflicts. Chapters Five and Six are devoted to 
understand varied villager responses to industrial pollution through the lens of 
the outsider/insider distinction. Chapter Five contains local responses to trans-
boundary pollution and outsider pollution in local communities, two kinds of 
pollution caused by outsiders defined by political boundaries. Chapter Six 
turns to the outsider/insider distinction within factional village politics. By 
studying the grassroots cases in specialized villages, I hope the perspective of 
local villagers can be fully displayed. The conclusion (Chapter Seven) has two 
themes: theoretical contributions and policy implications. For the former, the 
chapter mainly explores the theoretical potential of mode of rural 
industrialization in a comparative sense. It should become an important 
theoretical perspective to challenge the dominant environmentalism in 
explaining pollution-related problems.  In the meantime, it attempts to provide 
a new understanding of contentious actions in contemporary China from the 
perspective of mentality formation. Due to various constraints, I limit my 
scope of study in one mode of rural industrialization in one country. But I do 
believe the China case fits into a broader research agenda on comparative 
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politics. My hope is that the potential of mode of rural industrialization and the 



























Rural Industrialization in Zhejiang and Its Impacts on 
Pollution-induced Contention  
 
This chapter aims to lay out the foundation of my enquiry into insider-driven 
industrialization based on rural entrepreneurship and its implication for 
pollution-induced contention. When local villagers undertake rural 
industrialization themselves, when structural change of rural society is mainly 
accomplished through intensive and extensive participation on the initiative of 
local villagers rather than the push of external forces, and when industrial 
pollution is caused by acquaintances and friends, how does this effect  
pollution-induced contention?  
 As Tarrow (2008) has noted more broadly, a striking disjunction in the 
Chinese politics literature is the gap between studies of political economy and 
those of contentious politics. Few scholars have tried link economic 
development or economic inequality to contentious action. Hurst’s explanation 
of regional variations in protests by laid-off workers is an attempt in this 
regard. He uses regional political economy and the regional legacies of 
industrialization as major explanatory variables. But he limits his discussion to 
how these broader structural factors affect grievance and claims, frames, 
mobilizing structures and political opportunities (Hurst, 2009). The causal 
relationship between economic growth and contentious actions is not 
addressed: How does economic growth influence people’s propensity to 
engage in contentious politics? Do the economic resources produced by 
development satisfy people’s demands or offer them organizational and 
financial resources with which to engage in protest activities, or both? 
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Pollution-induced protests or petitions in rural China serve a potential topic 
area to bridge the gap as our attention is diverted from economic take-off to 
developmental problems. In my case, I would like to examine how this 
particular mode of rural industrialization shapes the local political economy 
and further influences local villager’s willingness and capability of engaging 
in pollution-induced contention.  
 This chapter starts by defining this insider-driven rural industrialization, 
in which some misunderstandings of rural industrialization in China will be 
clarified. What follows is the core content as the chapter’s title indicates. 
Using Zhejiang, my fieldwork site, as a concrete, spatial example to illustrate 
the characteristics of the mode of rural industrialization has good reasons. 
Conducting fieldwork is to recognize that relevant knowledge is situated in 
space (Sæther, 2006). The mode of rural industrialization in one specific place 
is shaped by its natural endowment, historical legacies and other more recent 
changes. Any difference of the above can lead to a divergent path of rural 
development. Only identifying concrete manifestations of different modes of 
rural industrialization can a valid comparison be generated. I term the core 
feature of Zhejiang’s particular mode of rural industrialization as “villagers as 
entrepreneurs.” Its four concrete manifestations are: 1) intensive and extensive 
villager participation in production activities, 2) doing business with less 
reliance on the state, 3) relying on social networks to industrialize and 4) 
developing in form of industrial clusters and production chains. In addition, 
the impact of rural industrialization on village elections and informal 
indigenous institutions will be examined.  
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Defining the Mode of Rural Industrialization 
Before investigating Zhejiang’s mode of rural industrialization since the 1978 
reform, it is necessary to briefly review China’s history of rural 
industrialization. As Bramall (2006) puts it, contemporary Chinese rural 
industry is not novel. Moreover, misunderstandings of rural industrialization 
have persisted over the years of rural development. Even the concepts adopted 
in the existing literature cannot capture the recent change of rural industries in 
scope and content. In a country where industrial development of a particular 
province is profoundly influenced by political decisions, only by shedding 
light on the general picture of rural industrialization can we better understand 
the strategic position of Zhejiang for further comparative studies. 
 The CCP’s first systematic attempt to industrialize the countryside 
could date back to Mao’s disastrous Great Leap Forward beginning in 1958. 
The party established hundreds of thousands of backyard steel furnaces at the 
expense of agricultural output. The Leap’s failure imposed a short break on 
the process. The loss of the early 1960s was soon made good when the second 
wave of industrialization in the late 1960s continued until 1978. During this 
period, the major industrial forms were defense-focused Third Front industries 
in the mountainous areas of selected regions and the five small industries (iron 
and steel, chemical fertilizer, machine-building, coal mining and cement) 
(Naughton, 2007). Both of these categories focused on a narrow range of 
heavy industrial goods. While some rural industrialization in Third Front areas 
led to the creation of urban centers, five small industries run by counties as 
well as communes and brigades coexisted in rural areas, despite different high 
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growth phases. Even at that time, it was not easy to define the bounds of rural 
industry in terms of geographical locations or ownership (Bramall, 2006).  
 The abandonment of Maoism and the adoption of major policy reform 
further accelerated rural industrialization, fostering new forms of rural 
industry. Scholars believe that the Township and Village enterprises (TVEs), 
seen as the successors of commune and brigade enterprises, spearheaded the 
massive rural industrialization drive in the post-1978 reform era. Jean Oi 
(1999) concentrated on this TVEs phenomenon and explained how public 
ownership could paradoxically make rural China take off economically. But 
accompanying the success of private enterprises, especially in Zhejiang, 
people gradually began to notice the removal of restrictions on private 
entrepreneurship among the reforms. Susan Whiting (2001) explained why 
privatization occurred by examining variation and change in property rights 
and extractive institutions in the rural industrial sector. In fact, an extensive 
literature on the growth of rural industry in China follows the line of TVEs or 
private enterprises (Unger, 2002; Naughton, 2007). However, simply using 
ownership status to delineate rural industries has its limitations. Yasheng 
Huang (2008) has persuasively argued that TVEs are not completely collective 
and should be treated as a locational concept. TVEs, as a geographic 
phenomenon, are businesses located in rural areas, including those that are 
believed to be owned publicly by towns and villages as well as substantial 
private entrepreneurship across the countryside. Moreover, the customary 
distinction among state-owned, collective and private enterprises operating 
alongside each other in towns and villages is artificial. All types of industry 
can be found in rural areas and should be treated as such (Bramall, 2006). 
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 Recognizing that rural industrialization is a geographical phenomenon 
is the first step. But classifying the “rural” or “urban” is not an easy task, 
given that new conditions arise in the ever-evolving process of urbanization, 
not to mention the confusion and contradictions inherent to the Chinese data. 
Reviewing the abundant literature on the conceptualization of China’s 
urbanization is beyond the scope of this study (Guldin 1997; Zhou and Ma 
2003, 2005; Chan, 2007, 2010; McGee et al., 2007; Hsing, 2010). Here I just 
briefly address some empirical challenges in conceptualization by evaluating 
Bramall’s application of county-level data that includes enterprises of various 
types of ownership. Bramall chose county-level data because counties were 
largely “rural” in outlook and the overwhelming majority of their residents 
had more in common with the peasantry than the citizens in urban centers 
during the 1970s and 1980s.    
 However, counties today are recognizably urban in appearance and 
many rural places where Third Front Enterprises were located have been 
upgraded into urban areas administratively. In short, distinguishing between 
urban and rural areas has become increasingly difficult. The term cheng zhong 
cun (villages inside cities) describes the phenomenon of villages being 
progressively enveloped by the ever-expanding city.16 The situation is made 
more complicated by frequent administrative adjustments, such as chexian 
shequ (revoke the county and establish the district) and chebing xiangzhen 
(dismantle and merge towns and townships). A seemingly urban Street17 may 
only have jurisdiction over rural villages. It is, therefore, difficult to 
                                                             
16 On urban villages, see Zheng, Long, Fan & Gu eds. (2009); Wu, Zhang, & Webster eds. 
(2013). 
17 Please note that the area with the title Street here is not a physical street but a township-
level administrative area. While it is called township in rural areas, it is named as a Street in 
urban areas.  
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differentiate rural from urban areas by appearance or by designation in the 
context of rapid urbanization, not to mention defining the exact scope of rural 
industry. In fact, there is no corresponding category of rural industry in official 
statistics: Lower-level data (township and village) do not count in high-level 
industries (county and above) operating in the rural areas; high-level statistics 
always contain industries in the urban areas.  
 Hence, to avoid conceptual confusion, this study will adopt the most 
stable hukou (household registration) of local residents in a specific 
geographical area as an identifier for rural areas. Despite the changes 
described above, the hukou system that differentiates between urban and rural 
population since the system’s birth in 1958 remains relevant for people’s life 
and continues to be used to date  (Chan, 2010; Young, 2013).  Although the 
central state has relaxed control over rural-urban migration and individual 
peasants can also change their hukou from rural to urban through various 
means, the registration status of a particular area stays constant. That is to say, 
as long as most indigenous residents in the area hold rural hukou, this area is 
theoretically rural whatever its current designation or appearance is. The fact 
that many rural areas today are not nominally or substantially “rural” just 
shows that these areas have undergone or are undergoing a process of 
industrialization.  As such, rural industrialization here is a geographical 
phenomenon, highlighting the location of industries rather than the ownership 
of enterprises. Rural industrialization in one particular area can be initiated by 
local private entrepreneurs, by “foreign” enterprises, or by SOEs. What 
matters is that their factors of production – land, labor and capital - are utilized 
in local industrial sectors. It is arguable if entrepreneurship can be added to the 
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classic list (Clark, 1899; Knight, 1921). After all, entrepreneurship is the 
engine that combines other factors of production to fuel rural industrialization. 
But leaving the debate aside, the insider/outsider status of entrepreneurs in 
rural China is the key to distinguish among different modes of rural 
industrialization.   
 In places where insider enterprises dominate rural industrialization, 
local villagers either start from scratch or inherit the enterprise from a 
collective economy. Businesses range from small household processing 
conducted by several family members to large-scale manufacturing factories 
that hire hundreds of salaried laborers. Outsider entrepreneurs and migrant 
laborers may be common in these places, but they are minor players in the 
local political economy. In contrast, in areas of outsider-driven rural 
industrialization, local villagers are either recruited into “foreign” factories or 
are excluded from the industries. Non-local bosses, relying on their economic 
advantage, can access local power and consequently influence the local 
political and economic landscape. Local government usually plays a role in 
this mode through investment inducement and industrial land acquisition.  
 In a larger geographical region, such as a county, these two modes may 
co-exist. As we narrow the scope to the township level, however, the dominant 
mode of industrialization typically becomes more pronounced. This is 
important because villager response to pollution is still in large part 
constrained by the main structural mode of industrialization. Which mode 
predominates in a specific area can often be traced back in time - for instance, 
the collective assets of the village were sold to an outsider in the initial 
transaction of property rights (Li & Rozelle, 2003, 2004); the village happened 
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to be the site of an old factory subordinate to a SOE; the former so-called 
collective enterprises of the village were essentially larger private businesses 
wearing red hats (Tsai, 2007; Chen, 2007). 18 Whatever the past was, the 
insider/outsider is a useful identifier for the industrialization mode of the time.  
 This insider/outsider distinction has at least four merits. First, it 
differentiates between economic development of a particular rural area and the 
economic capacity of its inhabitants. After all, one rural area’s wealth does not 
necessarily spread to ordinary villagers. Moreover, the broad-based, economic 
data cannot reflect wealth differentiation within the area. Agency matters here. 
Whether villagers profit from local industries and how they achieve it will 
influence their perception of industrial pollution, on one hand, and options 
available for villagers in possible pollution-induced contention are largely 
limited by their economic capacity given the lack of systematic support for 
pollution victim redress, on the other hand.  
 Second, insider/outsider distinction reveals the source of industrial 
pollution. In the endogenous-mode area, pollution comes natural to local 
villagers; it is not an alien invasion. Expectedly, villagers have a tacit 
understanding of polluting behaviors and tend to trivialize the harm of 
pollution. But outsiders may be also active in the local economy, and actively 
cause serious pollution. Neither does pollution respect administrative 
boundaries. Local villagers can suffer pollution from neighboring counties. 
Similarly, in the exogenous-mode region, whether the polluter is villagers’ 
boss before whom they have to bend their knees, or some unsympathetic 
stranger who does not care about their living, matters. Self-run polluting 
                                                             
18 Wearing a red hat refers that the enterprises are privately-owned in essence, but registered 
as a local government controlled collective enterprise. 
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business may not be condemned but be desirable since it offers alternative 
options to disengage from the dependence on external polluting industries and 
further resist outsider pollution. To look at the real perpetrator helps us to 
identify where the pollution comes from, which is the prerequisite 
consideration of villagers in deciding on how to respond to industrial pollution.  
 Third, the dichotomy captures the importance of everyday interaction. 
In a country that stresses personal relations, people care about who is polluting 
the land. If the culprit is a faraway abstract someone, people will likely to take 
forthright actions. If the wrongdoer is a tangible specific acquaintance, people 
may think twice about the possible impact on their relations with the polluter 
if action taken. To native villagers, the land is not only where industrialization 
occurs, but it is also their home. They certainly do not like outsider 
entrepreneurs or migrant workers making money at the expense of insiders’ 
environment, even if they themselves may not be innocent of producing 
pollution.  
 Last but not least, the distinction also offer hints on the availability of 
possible means for local villagers to tackle pollution. If polluting enterprises 
are not in the villagers’ backyard, locals typically lack relational resources, 
such as personal networks, community norms and economic reciprocity, to 
constrain polluting enterprises. Opposition to trans-boundary pollution 
involves a politics beyond the villagers’ reach. Similarly, local villagers may 
keep targeting outsider entrepreneurs with fewer scruples. But they cannot 
oversee all outsider producers, especially those practicing guerrilla-style 
production, given that outsiders are not subject to indigenous institutions. The 
contention collective action among insiders is distinctive. Apart from personal 
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relations, it involves complex village politics that resonate beyond the problem 
of pollution. 
Rural Industrialization in Zhejiang 
Zhejiang, with an area of 101,800 square meters (close to the area of Iceland), 
is an eastern coastal province of China. According to National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (NBS), the population of Zhejiang has reached 54.89 
million in 2013 and the per capita GDP of that year is 68,462 yuan (equivalent 
to USD 11,055).19 In two national appraisals of the top 100 counties in terms 
of social and economic development in 2004 and 2005, 30 were located in 
Zhejiang, or one third of its total number of counties. 20  This outstanding 
record of economic development occurred only after the 1978 reform through 
massive industrialization based on privatized household production. During 
the Mao era, Zhejiang was not the central state’s favorite that enjoyed 
preferential policies for industrial development, due to both demographical 
and political reasons – too close to the frontline of possible regional or world 
wars in Mao’s vision.  
  As the heartland of China’s private economy, almost every aspect of 
Zhejiang’s private sector development after 1978 and its well-known 
Wenzhou model has been thoroughly discussed in the literature - empirically, 
from industry clusters to private lending, and theoretically, from institutional 
innovation to geographical culture.21 In this study, rural industrialization itself 
is not the heart of discussion. I wish to build my arguments on these 
                                                             
19 Data come from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhejiang, accessed on April 23, 2014. 
20 1643 counties and 377 county-level cities and 43 county-level districts were included in the 
national appraisals in 2005. see http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2005-
10/25/content_3682654.htm, accessed on July 9, 2013 
21 The literature will be stated when discussing specific points below.  
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sophisticated analyses and move one step further, examining how the 
consequences of rural industrialization – the changing economic structure and 
social relations of the village – will possibly influence villager response to 
industrial pollution.  
Extensive and Intensive Mass Participation   
Industrialization in Zhejiang features a disproportionate number of 
entrepreneurs. From the early years of “each village sets up factories and each 
household has a smoking chimney” to today’s industry clusters scattered in 
profusion, a real-life “everyone is a boss” is operative in rural Zhejiang.22 
According to Zhejiang Industry and Commerce Bureau (ICB), in December 
2006, the number of individual household operations for every 10,000 people 
was 316.  This was tops in the country, whose national average was 197. By 
April 2011, the number of market participants (formally registered with the 
government) reached three million, meaning one in every eighteen inhabitants 
is an entrepreneur, and some 85% of the domestically funded, registered 
enterprises were privately owned. 23  
 Mass industrialization is widely dispersed in Zhejiang, giving rise to 
significant spatial variation within the province. First in the areas of Wenzhou 
and Taizhou, then in Shaoxing and Ningbo, later expanding to Jinhua and 
other prefectures, small private enterprises abound. Usually they cluster and 
specialize in a certain manufacturing sector. Save for some state monopoly 
industries, industrial clusters in Zhejiang cover nearly all everyday products 
                                                             
22 This is what People’s daily described Zhejiang phenomenon. There are Chinese books titled 
with Zhejiang phenomenon, e.g., Zhang,  Sheng &  Lan (2006).  
23Data come from http://gsj.zj.gov.cn/zjaic/jrgs/gsyw/200712/t20071228_61752.htm 




imaginable, from buttons, screw caps and drinking straws to more advanced 
medical, chemical fiber and electronic machinery.  
 This pattern suggests several things. First, pollution is widespread, 
enduring, and closely connected to subsistence activities. In an atmosphere of 
inflated tolerance for pollution, local villagers understand the tradeoff between 
pollution and subsistence, although they may have different views on 
contention over pollution. Second, economic affluence is also widespread. The 
majority of residents in rural Zhejiang have experienced substantial 
improvement in their financial circumstances. According to Zhejiang 
Statistical Bureau, the net income per capita of rural residents in Zhejiang has 
achieved 16,106 yuan (equivalent to USD 2662) in 2013, ranking 1st 
nationally for 29 years. 24 Inequality exists across regions, but within a typical 
industrial village, a relatively equalized class structure with a large number of 
well-off people is common, as most households do similar work. This in part 
has rendered the use of economic patronage to embed fellow entrepreneurs or 
co-opt villagers less effective. Malicious gossip and character assassination 
may be more useful in pressuring related parties into corrective action. Finally, 
when pollution-related disputes occur, money and pollution decrease in their 
relative importance due to the general affluence and tolerance for pollution. 
Economic compensation or pollution treatment may only materialize when the 
polluting behavior impacts key social relations.  
 In addition, villagers’ rising or stable economic conditions have 
enhanced their capacity to resist risks from pollution. Rich villagers may 
install air purifiers at home, use purified water to cook meals, take vitamins to 
                                                             
24 Data come from http://zj.sina.com.cn/news/m/2014-02-05/0747165597.html, accessed on 
April 2, 2014 
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increase resistance, and even buy apartments in the city. With expedient 
options available, the demand of reducing pollution becomes less urgent. In 
fact, many villagers believe that the environmental situation can only be 
improved after accumulated wealth is sufficient to afford a sewage treatment 
system. For instance, Mr. Lu introduced to me the wastewater pipeline 
connecting to the river in his garden-like residential quarter and proudly 
attributed the nice village environment to its profit-making industries.25 Such 
opinions resonate among villagers who once took contentious actions against 
pollution because petitioning to Beijing, hiring a good lawyer and organizing 
protests are all money-consuming. 26  To fight a protracted war against 
pollution, one needs to prepare a bigger purse.27 
Less Reliance on the State  
People in Zhejiang are proud that they have prospered in a land with poor 
natural resources and slacking transportation networks and without help from 
state capital or foreign investment. This bottom-up industrialization has 
achieved wealth accumulation through the multiplication of small ventures. 
The state’s neglect during Mao’s era left Zhejiang behind industrially. Without 
a strong SOE sector, the gross and added values of its industrial output in 1978 
only accounted for 3.1% and 2.9% of the country’s total, respectively, ranking 
14th and 15th out of 29 nationally. 28 In this way, the private sector, when given 
the opportunity to do so, expanded initially in the absence of formal regulatory 
institutions or top-down directives. Villagers also had no intention to lobby for 
                                                             
25 TZLHH2, personal communication, June 13, 2011 
26 TZZX, personal communication, May 8, 2011 
27 For detailed examples and further discussion, see Chapter Five and Six. 
28Data come from 
http://hztb.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/zhuantdy/200812/20081205973053.shtml 
http://www.raresd.com/brownew.asp?n_ID=5551, accessed on August 8, 2013. 
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policy or institutional change that would create favorable operating conditions 
for the non-state sectors. Whether it is because of an entrepreneurial tradition 
or simply lacking alternative income-generating options, Zhejiang peasants 
threw themselves onto the great tide of the market economy, overcoming 
many operational disadvantages along the way.   
 Consider Zhejiang’s industrialization in comparative perspective. In 
Jiangsu province, the most representative development path relying on 
collective enterprises, the “Sunan model” (Sunan, the southern portion of 
Jiangsu province) prevailed. Here the government played a heavy sponsorship 
and operating role in enterprise management. Andrew Walder (1995, 1998) 
argued that the local government resembled a business corporation 
coordinating economic enterprises in its territory. This point was later 
examined extensively by Jean Oi (1999) through the lens of “local state 
corporatism.” A number of writers have pursued similar themes in examining 
the local state as developmental or entrepreneurial, either providing an 
enabling environment or participating in businesses directly (Blecher, 1991; 
Blecher & Shue, 1996; Duckett, 1998). Others have been critical of local state 
corporatism, arguing that the local state has been in fact quite predatory 
(Saregeson & Zhang, 1999). Regardless, the economic role of local 
government officials was undeniably important in the development of 
collectively-owned enterprises. In the subsequent privatization of public 
enterprises, local party-state representatives controlled the transfer process and 
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ensured a stable social order. Sunan’s private entrepreneurs have depended on 
the ruling regime for their material prosperity (Wright, 2010).29 
 While foreign investment might not be directly sunk in rural areas, 
enterprises pursuing OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) in the vast 
countryside grew up on the back of foreign capital. In the earlier years of the 
open-door reform policy in the Pearl River Delta area, for example, it was said 
that overseas Chinese’s investment in one factory could provide subsistence 
for a whole village. Ethnic Chinese networks facilitated Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) inflows into China, especially in Guangdong and Fujian 
provinces, which are the ancestral home regions of many overseas Chinese 
(Leung, 2008; Peterson, 2011).30 But it only happened when the central state 
relaxed the restrictions and intentionally pushed for the experimental reform. 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were established to absorb and utilize 
overseas capital; preferential treatment including tax exemptions and refunds, 
cheap land and reduction of all kinds of management expenses were provided 
to foreign investors; financial resources were invested in infrastructure or at 
least maintaining a reputation for rapid completion of infrastructure projects 
(Smart & Hsu, 2004).31 For foreign investors, venturing into such an uncertain 
environment needs assurance from local government. Operational problems 
also usually have to involve government agencies because they concern 
themselves with foreign affairs. In a sense, development based on foreign 
investment inherently relies on the state.  
                                                             
29 A detailed comparison of private sector development between Jiangsu and Jiangsu 
provinces, see Wang (2008).  
30 On overseas Chinese and inward FDI in China, also see Gao (2003), Tong (2005), Huang, 
Jin & Qian (2013). 
31On overseas investment attraction policy, see http://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/yjytt/160/1771.shtml, 
accessed on July 9, 2012. 
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 Natural resources are legally monopolized by the state.32 Many places 
were selected as sites of SOEs because of their rich mineral deposits. Until the 
1990s, in some places villagers were allowed to exploit a mine or cut trees 
under collective management arrangements. But as the state regulated the 
rights to access these resources, the wealth quickly concentrated in the hands 
of a few with political connections. Unlike businesses with low barriers to 
entry, resource development requires a large upfront investment and the 
attainment of the concession. Besides prospecting and mining rights, the 
government interferes in the transactions of mines with a heavy hand. All of 
this has created massive amounts of rent seeking. In fact, some symptoms of 
the resource curse have been identified at subnational levels (Paler, 2013; 
McGuirk, 2013; Zhan, 2013). Due to the special property of natural resources, 
the resource-reliant development is closely associated with the state, for good 
or for ill. 
 In Zhejiang, besides lacking favorable central policies and financial 
support, less reliance on the state has been also reflected in its local 
governments’ laissez-faire style of governing and the ordinary villagers’ 
generally weak connections with local government officials. County 
governments in Zhejiang were not as proactive as their counterparts elsewhere 
where development was motivated by collective enterprises, foreign 
investment or natural resources. Instead, they were often one step behind, 
responding to grassroots innovations after they were well established. Doing 
                                                             
32 The state monopoly applies to all resources. For example, the Mineral Resource Law (1996) 
stipulates that the state has ownership over all mineral resources in China, regardless of the 
ownership or user rights of the land to which the resources are attached, and that the 
prospecting and extraction of mineral resources must be authorized by either the State Council 
or provincial-level governments. As the agent of the central and provincial governments, local 
officials in charge of the authorization process at sub-provincial levels are entrusted enormous 
power to allocate the prospecting and mining rights.  
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nothing, as it turned out, was boon for villagers. Accordingly, many of the 
original entrepreneurs appreciate the “vision” of local leaders who did not 
impose onerous restrictions on their ventures and gave them space to grow. 
Unlike entrepreneurs who relied on the state, villagers involved in small-scale 
manufacturing did not feel the necessity and urgency to establish or maintain a 
close relationship with local officials.  
 The lack of reliance on the state has had important implications for 
pollution-induced contention. For local governments, a small SOE sector 
means less intervention from higher authorities and thus more discretion in 
dispute resolution. Moreover, it is easier for environmental officials to handle 
cases in which local governments have no direct interests. On many occasions, 
for local governments prioritizing economic development, patching up 
disputes that might harm production is much important than reducing pollution.  
 From the villagers’ point of view, because fellow villagers do not 
garner riches through the connections with the state, they are more likely to be 
treated equally by local governments if none of the disputants have political 
connections. Sometimes villagers even involve the relatively neutral 
government to achieve their hidden agendas. Interestingly, local villagers tend 
to attribute negative or unsatisfying government responses to unjust or corrupt 
practices through political connections. Meanwhile, the opposite of political 
connections – self-performance – is highly regarded by local villagers, even if 
their very production activity causes pollution. I heard a story about an 
ironsmith who had severely damaged his left hand in an accident but still 
managed to forge the wok on his own. His crude, unlicensed shack discharged 
toxic gas and water for months. But most villagers appreciated that he could 
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stand on his own feet again and therefore downplayed the pollution. Some 
even interceded when local EPB staff came to confiscate his equipment. 
Although the pollution was stopped, the snitch who informed EPB became an 
outcast for ripping the bread out of another man’s mouth.33 
 This relatively independent form of rural industrialization has brought 
about a new pattern of authority - “depoliticized authority” which arises from 
the influence of private entrepreneurs rather than political office (Chen, 2007). 
Still, private entrepreneurs in Zhejiang today are trying to reach men in high 
places in order to enter privileged circles. After all, in China, the state has 
retained control of key economic resources. Co-opting private entrepreneurs 
into the CCP has been a regular occurrence on a fairly large scale in rural 
areas (Dickson, 2003, 2008). Meanwhile, competition for village cadres or 
party representatives is fierce among rich private entrepreneurs. This fusion of 
cadre entrepreneurs and entrepreneur cadres will pose new challenges to 
possible collective action related to pollution (Chen, 2007). 
Industrialization through Social Networks 
If less dependence on the state – in some sense, lacking support from formal 
institutions - is one side of the coin, the other side is informal institutions – 
personal networks, community norms - on which villagers rely to develop 
industries. As McNally (2008) argues, the role of network in the Chinese 
variant of bottom-up capitalism is especially pronounced.34  Many scholars 
have owed China’s emergent capitalism to informal institutions by studying 
the most representative private sector in Zhejiang (Sato, 2003; Tsai, 2007; Nee 
                                                             
33 YWZJL, personal communication, April 8, 2011 
34 On China’s network capitalism or guanxi capitalism, also see Boisot & Child (1996), Brook 
& Blue (1999), Guthrie, D. (1999), Gold, Guthrie, & Wank eds. (2002). 
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& Opper, 2012). Without contract law, property rights protection, and in spite 
of discriminatory government policies, villagers have built businesses on the 
basis of social norms enforced through sanctions embedded in multiplex 
networks. Within business communities, multiplex networks provide the 
sinews of enforceable trust and the conduits of information flow that allow for 
cooperation in competitive markets. 
 In China where the playing ground is heavily tilted in favor of state 
interests or interests closely aligned with the state, guanxi (literally, 
relationship) networks with government and party officials are desirable to 
compensate for institutional uncertainty (Wank, 1996). However, the general 
friendly orientation of local governments in Zhejiang towards the private 
sector, including openly or implicitly providing convenience, has largely 
reduced market risks faced by entrepreneurs and thus the importance of 
investing in guanxi with local governments, especially when the enterprise 
scale is small. In fact, networks among ordinary villagers and norms fostering 
trust and cooperation within close-knit communities are more essential in 
forming and sustaining endogenously developed economic institutions such as 
private capital market and industrial clusters. 
 A powerful example that illustrates the centrality of networks is 
informal financing. At the outset of reform, the vast majority of private 
enterprises were excluded from the formal financial market (Tsai, 2002). To 
overcome the difficulty of denial to official sources of credit, grassroots 
financing mechanisms ranging from interest free loans between friends and 
relatives to sophisticated financing arrangement such as rotating credit 
associations, money houses and credit cooperatives were practiced to provide 
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start-up and working capital for cash-starved entrepreneurs (Tsai, 2000, 2002; 
Hu, 2007).  
 Extensive multilateral clusters of private firms self-organized in 
industrial niches represent another important self-reinforcing dynamics of 
economic development. The competitive advantages of industrial clusters and 
production chains, such as ensuring a constant market of skilled workers, 
economizing on investments through subcontracting and facilitating 
innovative activities, have been thoroughly discussed in the literature (Porter, 
1990; Krugman, 1991).35 In recent years local governments have swarmed into 
building all kinds of industrial parks to integrate existing industrial clusters 
(Hsing, 2010). But again, at the very beginning, little government planning or 
initiative was involved in Zhejiang. In fact, as marginalized, semi-legal 
entities located at the low end of the pecking order in the industrial system, 
private firms only had inferior raw materials and delayed delivery from 
government suppliers. It was dense networks and norms of reciprocity among 
ordinary villagers that have over time created specialized clusters and 
production chains, which allowed private firms to take advantages of 
agglomeration and decouple from government-controlled suppliers.  
 The fact that villager entrepreneurs rely on networks and norms to 
survive and thrive outside the state’s production system is quite telling. First, 
local private enterprises are deeply embedded in business communities and 
thus subject to endogenous institutions, both time-honored traditions and 
adaptive innovations. Within these close-knit communities of like-minded 
economic actors, such mechanisms as common and universal as social 
                                                             
35 For concrete examples of industrial clusters in Zhejiang, see Fleisher, Hu, McGuire & 
Zhang (2009); Bellandia & Lombardi (2012).  
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approval (good reputation, high social status) and punishment (bilateral 
sanctions, negative gossip, and community sentences), play a pervasive and 
important role in conflict resolution. The strong endogeneity implies that the 
contention around pollution will most likely follow the inner logic of the rural 
community’s politics and economy, which may explain the variations in 
villager responses to pollution when the same local government is in place. 
 Second, how business networks might be influenced is usually the 
paramount concern of villager entrepreneurs. When pollution occurs, they 
might first think if it is worth raising it as an issue. If things evolve into a 
dispute, people may consider whether private settlement or involving the 
government is more beneficial. The long-term business relationship is the last 
thing villagers would like to harm. Pollution is not a deciding factor. 
Sometimes people think the perpetrator deserves a punishment so as to 
balance interests of different parities. Other times the complainant might 
instead be blamed for not giving face to neighbors for such a trivial thing. To 
maintain good ties with other economic actors, the environment can be 
sacrificed is a common refrain. But in the meantime, they are also ready to 
improve the environment if the coordination outcome points to pollution 
treatment.  
 Last, as an extension of the above two points, the minor importance of 
pollution plus the autonomy of rural communities in problem-solving often 
have made pollution a stepping stone for other purposes. If pollution is an 
accomplished fact, why not try to profit from it?  Whether a specific pollution-
induced contention has to concede to other competing agendas, or it can stand 
out and gain momentum, depends on its value of advancing interests of 
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respective parties for the moment. The situation is even more complicated in 
light of the involvement of local governments. The state mandate of protecting 
the environment provides the legitimate basis for villagers to invite the 
government into environmental disputes. However, the request for government 
inspection may not be sincere and environmental officials may hence 
unknowingly act as a deterrent or an external punishment enforcer. 
Industrial Clusters and Production Chains 
No other region than Zhejiang has a comparable density of multiple cluster 
productions. Initiated spontaneously and constructed deliberately by the 
government, 519 industrial clusters located in 85 districts in 2000. 49 percent 
of the total provincial industrial production was effectuated by the 237,000 
enterprises grouped together in these industrial clusters. 36 Thousands of small 
businesses are well connected with upstream and downstream markets, 
exhibiting fine divisions of labor. Attention usually concentrates on the 
advantage of specialization and differentiation, while its potential impact on 
the environment tends to be ignored. Indeed, the factors contributing to the 
successful economies of scale are responsible for severe pollution situations as 
well. 
 Industrial clusters evolve from mimicking the successful early start-up 
firms in the industrial niche, which unavoidably leads to high homogeneity of 
products and consequently fierce competition within and among similar 
clusters. Apparently, investing in pollution reduction will substantially 
increase costs and may result in a competitive disadvantage. This has nothing 
to do with producers’ economic capacity to afford pollution control facilities. 
                                                             
36 Data come from Zhang, Sheng & Lan (2006). 
54 
 
They would rather invest in expanding production scale and increasing output. 
Meanwhile, villagers believe that the law cannot punish if almost everyone is 
part of the problem and thus discharge pollutants with less hesitation. In this 
way, a great number of rational producers jointly create the tragedy of the 
commons.  
 The network effect of industrial clusters may exacerbate pollution by 
spreading so-called technology innovations. The supposedly good practices 
are usually only defined in economic terms and cannot guarantee reduced 
emissions. It is highly probable that some efficiency-boosting but 
environment-unfriendly measures spread and diffuse rapidly through imitation. 
For example, when shuttleless water jet looms first replaced the shuttle looms 
in Jiaxing prefecture in the early 2000s, they were welcomed by villagers. 
Even the local government enthusiastically promoted them among rural 
households. The new machines proved to be economically efficient, but also 
brought unwanted water pollution. 37 The cluster effect does have the potential 
to change behavior pattern. But unfortunately, the current market, complicated 
by China’s political realities, does not provide incentives for villager 
entrepreneurs to switch to green production. Instead, the adverse effects of 
pollution multiply through strong production networks extending to the remote 
countryside. 
 The advantages of industrial clusters and supply chains may turn 
against environmental enforcement. Spatial proximity in cluster locations 
facilitates information sharing, including the news of a possible spot check. 
Many times producers can easily escape from government inspection due to 
                                                             
37 JXXZX, personal communication, December 19, 2010; also see reports, 
http://www.efu.com.cn/data/2011/2011-09-29/400822.shtml, accessed on August 12, 2012. 
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advance preparation or cover-ups for each other. Besides such silent resistance, 
environmental officials may encounter greater non-cooperation on the spot. 
Not resorting to violence, villagers gather in industrial clusters simply to force 
back environmental enforcers by sheer weight of numbers on many 
occasions.38 In fact, local governments are reluctant to suppress household 
business too much unless they have to respond to expectations of wiping out 
pollution from both above and below. In view of a series of jobs closely tied to 
supply chains, crushing one segment will possibly affect the livelihoods of 
people working in the upstream and downstream segments. The 
interdependence among economic entities indeed prohibits local governments 
from taking harsh measures. 
Village Elections and Indigenous Institutions 
So far, we have discussed the major features of village entrepreneur-driven 
rural industrialization in Zhejiang and their implications for pollution-induced 
contentions. In fact, the impact of rural industrialization is far more profound 
and complex than its direct effect on people’s minds and behaviors.  
 From rural industrialization to village elections, indigenous institutions 
to pollution-induced contentions, there are constellations of complex causal 
chains. The relationships between each pair of variables deserve a book-length 
analysis and remain unsettled in the existing literature. For instance, scholars 
have not reached a consensus on the relationship between economic 
development and the quality of village elections.39 Different perspectives of 
                                                             
38 JXCYY, personal communication, December 27, 2010 
39 Take the relationship between economic development and village election as an example. 
Shi (1999) suggests the relationship appears to be a concave curve: economic wealth increases 
the likelihood that a village will hold semi-competitive elections, but its impact diminishes as 
economic wealth increases. The result of Niou (2001)’s study on the quality of village election 
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contentious politics in rural China also offer hypotheses related to village 
elections and indigenous institutions for where we should expect collective 
petitioning incidents to occur but have yet to settle the debate. 40 Whether the 
inconsistency in findings is caused by methodological differences or simply 
regional variations, they may all reflect different parts of different the 
realities. 41  Ascribing state-society relations uncovered in one province 
(Zhejiang) to all of China may only lead to an invalid part-to-whole mapping 
(Snyder, 2001). Nevertheless, I try to provide some new thoughts on the 
possible impacts of village elections and indigenous institutions on pollution-
induced contention in rural areas where the endogenous mode of 
industrialization dominates.  
Village Elections42 
The replacement of villager leaders is a meaningful event. It not only 
acknowledges and reaffirms the change of power distribution within the 
village in the past, but may also signify the coming of a new governing 
dynamic. In a typical industrialized village of Zhejiang, the seats are usually 
                                                                                                                                                               
implementation is mixed: Jilin, Liaoning, Xinjiang, Fujian and Sichuan are ranked as the top 
five, while Yunan, Shanghai, Hainan, Anhui and Guangxi are the bottom five. Hu (2005) 
shows that collective revenue and the relative living standard of the village is crucial for the 
implementation of competitive elections. 
40  Bernstein & Lü (2003) argue that in place where economies are supported by limited 
revenues from local governments but central subsidies, is the site for the most frequent clashes 
over peasant burdens. O’Brien & Li (2006) suggest high level of contention is closely related 
to divided leadership, strained relations with higher levels of government, and more potential 
protest leaders in residence. Tsai (2007b) emphasizes that greater participation in solidarity 
organizations can help head off mobilization. Hurst, M. Liu, Y.Liu & Tao (2014) shows that 
the presence of autonomous or quasi-independent organizations may well foster good 
governance and help contain the scale of contention, but they likely increase the frequency of 
contention. Regarding village election, villages with elected cadres are more likely to have 
leaders who are receptive to popular preferences and thus arguably reduce the likelihood of 
massive uprising (Alpermann, 2001; Kennedy, Rozelle & Shi, 2004; Manion, 1996, 2006). 
41 Methodological difference refers to national survey data vs in-depth interviews; regional 
variation here stems from the original site selection.  
42 Usually village party secretary and village head represent different factions. Although I 
don’t touch the competition for village party secretary in the discussion, the examination on 
village election is sufficient to illustrate the dynamics of contests for political power within 
the village.  
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contested between private entrepreneurs. Unlike cadres in poorer places who 
value the access to collective revenues, salaries, subsidies and other material 
benefits, entrepreneurs aim for status and voice in a greater arena afforded by 
political titles. Only first as village cadres, they may be able to obtain higher 
political circles and establish stronger political connections for their 
businesses.43  
 More interestingly, instead of either consensual or competitive 
elections as some writers suggest, the contests between entrepreneur groups 
are simultaneously  both: Villagers reached a consensus on competent 
candidates before the election but this does not stop them from accepting vote-
buying from both sides regardless of their kinship identities, indicating to 
which side they are supposed to show loyalty (Takeuchi, 2009). Although 
such fierce competition usually consumes the village, villagers would rather 
see a close contest rather than a monopoly, since political rivalry provides 
some degree of checks and balances. However unsatisfying, it is an important 
mechanism of ensuring cadre accountability. 
 Whether to hold village cadres accountable is essential in village 
political life and has been used to explain variations in public goods provision 
across villages (Tsai, 2007). Its role in pollution-induced contention is no 
exception. Many authors have shown that when facing external polluting 
industries, how village cadres interact with government agencies, how they 
relate to industrial complexes, how they strategically position themselves 
between villagers and polluting enterprises in large part shapes the process and 
outcome of contentious actions. The election of a new generation of the 
                                                             
43 TZLHH1, personal communication, February 28, 2011. On the value of political office in 
rural economy, see Walder & Zhao (2006). On the importance of political connections for 
entrepreneurs to run their business, see Choi &Zhou (2001).  
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leading body usually marks a major watershed in the development of 
contention (Jing, 2000; Lora-Wainwright, 2010). In fact, in numerous self-
industrialized villages of Zhejiang where the pollution issue is internalized as 
a village affair, the competition around village leadership and power of 
decision making is usually the key to understanding the development of 
pollution-induced contention. The composition of village power reflects the 
strength of comparison between village factions. Naturally, privileges are 
given to political bases – usually kinship factions to which cadres or 
entrepreneurs belong. A closely contested election means a more balanced 
political representation in village power, which is more likely to avoid the 
imbalance of interests among disputants.  
 In addition, pollution is usually a poor option for mobilizing support. 
The strategy of piggybacking on politically favorable issues is frequently used 
when redressing environmental grievances (Deng & Yang, 2013). Even in 
heavily polluted villages, anti-pollution frames might be valid only when it is 
aligned with more attractive themes like anti-corruption (Deng, 2010). 
Exposing the incumbent villager leaders to be in cahoots with polluters is 
much more effective in pushing villagers into action than simply emphasizing 
losses caused by pollution. Similarly, cadre candidates may mention pollution 
slightly as the potential risk of introducing external industries; but again, it is 
in subordination to more urgent affairs such as land compensation and return 
on equity. While the former sounds noble to outsiders, the latter are the 
genuine concern of insiders.44  
                                                             




Putting aside the function of disciplining village cadres, the effects of 
indigenous institutions on the frequency and scale of petitioning appear to be 
mixed. According to the test of Hurst et al. (2014), membership and 
participation in solidary organizations such as temples, churches and lineage 
groups seem to make contention more likely to occur and to be of larger scope 
than otherwise might be expected, while the presence of semi-autonomous 
organizations with mediation capacities like elder people association reduces 
the likelihood of occurrence and decreases the scale of petitioning.  
 Rural industrialization has created a large group of rich people who 
would like to glorify their family names by donating to lineage halls, temples 
or churches. In other words, economic power operates through pre-established 
ascriptive structures and facilitates the rise of other authorities than political 
clout. It is no surprise to see a revival of lineage identity and religious 
principles with the great financial support from native-born entrepreneurs. 
More importantly, it seems hard to find other agencies than these indigenous 
institutions that have so much potential (as well as real power) to mobilize 
people and gather money. Solidarity organizations of this sort can be the most 
effective mobilizing structures and recruitment venues for contention at least 
as much as they resemble guarantors of good governance (Hurst et al., 2014). 
Thanks to villagers’ trust and respect, these indigenous institutions are able to 
convince villagers to restrain or withdraw from protests or petitioning through 
their intermediation. At the same time, with popular legitimacy in hands, they 
                                                             
45  Here indigenous institutions refer to lineage halls, temples, churches, semi-autonomous 
organizations with mediation capacity (for example, elder people associations). 
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can also threaten the opponents - local governments, village cadres or 
polluting enterprises – by mobilizing larger and more violent incidents. 46 
 However, the role of indigenous institutions should not be exaggerated. 
In Hualing village of Taizhou prefecture, the way that elderly people’s 
association worked to force the village head into action was to spoil his 
reputation and incessantly pester his family.47 As many elder people admitted, 
such strategy will probably not work in places where disrepute does not harm 
cadres. They even doubted its effectiveness on other village cadres. Moreover, 
the Huangling elderly people’s association did not seek a role in the 
negotiation and totally relied on village cadres for deal making.48 This highly 
personal mechanism is inherently flawed and may not survive the unavoidable 
diminishing marginal utility and leadership change. 
 Another phenomenon that warns against excessive optimism is that 
governments also try to make use of indigenous institutions to contain 
contention. Core members of solidarity organizations - lineage elders, relatives 
of village cadres and even those of higher level officials - often become the 
targets of government co-option. Inciting defection from within has proved to 
an effective way to defuse the conflict. If not being turned into an accomplice 
of the divide-and-conquer plot, they may have to suffer from relational 
repression, being importuned by relatives or friends recruited into the 
government work team (Deng & O’Brien, 2013).  
                                                             
46 As I saw in the field, the village temple/church, if any, has strong power to mobilize both 
people and money. But villagers seemed to think little of its power in organizing resistance. 
The sensitivity of the topic might be a reason for this reservation. Another possible 
explanation is that temples/churches are encompassing and thus cannot be easily used for 
collective resistance by villagers who only eye on their personal or factional interests. 
47 For activism of elder people’s association, see Deng & O’Brien (2014). 
48 TZWXX, personal communication, June 21, 2011 
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Conclusion: Villagers as Entrepreneurs 
“Villagers as entrepreneurs” is an apt phrase to summarize the characteristics 
of rural industrialization in Zhejiang. The dynamic process started with a small 
number of marginal economic actors in peripheral countryside and gave rise to 
a social movement-like growth and diffusion of entrepreneurship across the 
regional economic landscape. According to Schumpeter’s definition (1934), 
entrepreneurs are innovators who use a process of shattering the status quo of 
the existing products and services to set up new products or new services. 
Villagers in Zhejiang took early initiatives of conducting stigmatized extra-
legal activities, creating a brand new production system and related supporting 
economic institutions outside the central planning system.  
 Because most people wanted to be an entrepreneur, rural 
industrialization involved intensive and extensive mass participation. Without 
the support from the state, villagers relied on themselves, family members and 
friends to raise capital and recruit labor. Mimicking of like-minded but 
successful people gradually led to the development of norms of mutual help 
and cluster-like local business networks. Through entrepreneurial activities 
villagers were not only able to informally work out new institutional 
arrangements for cooperation outside the established system of state 
production and allocation, but also change the landscape of grassroots election 
and ascriptive traditions.   
 As this chapter shows, the characteristics of this insider-driven 
industrialization based on rural entrepreneurship have considerable 
implications for pollution-induced contention. Being an entrepreneur means he 
or she needs to worry about cost control, product upgrade and market 
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competition, all of which may come at the expense of the environment. Unless 
the market, as a political-economic complex, provides sufficient incentives for 
entrepreneurs to adopt environment-friendly mode of production, pollution as 
a fuse of contention will continue to exist.  
 This chapter is mainly a theoretical summary of the significance of 
mode of rural industrialization on pollution-induced contention. The following 
empirical chapters will further show that it is not simply a common-sense 
theory that polluters will not protest against pollution or be engaged in 
environmental protection. The characteristics of the mode of rural 
industrialization can be found in all details of pollution-induced contention. 
First of all, as an entrepreneur rather than simply a farmer, villagers tend to 
view the function of natural environment differently and have developed a 
new logic of subsistence. How exactly the complex of political economy in 
this mode of rural industrialization causes lasting pollution and further shapes 
the mentality of local villagers towards pollution will be the theme of the next 












Chapter Three  
Inevitable Pollution: The Formation of a Villager Mentality 
While the particular mode of rural industrialization of the last chapter prepares 
the stage, this chapter will address a leading cause of the persistent industrial 
pollution in this type of political economy. Approaching the question from the 
perspective of villager mentality was initially inspired by many similar 
conversations as follows in the fieldwork.  
 “Have you heard of any pollution incidents in this area?” 
 “Not particularly. It’s only because all sorts of small factories    
             discharge without treatment all the time.” 
 “Are you saying that local citizens themselves are the perpetrators of  
             pollution since most small factories are run by local people?” 
(Pause) “Actually, yes. There is no way to stop pollution. The 
electroplating industry pollutes the river, but the pillar industry of 
auto parts in our county heavily relies on metal finishing. This is how 
our economy has developed. The environmental awareness among 
local communities is low.” 
“But local people also frequently lodge pollution-related complaints 
to the government. They are not totally unaware of the deteriorating 
environment, right?”  
(Pause again) “No. People certainly realize the environment is much 
worse than before. However, they think protecting the environment is 
the government’s responsibility, not theirs. They complain about 
others’ pollution as if they themselves are not producing any. They 
just want to enjoy the rights (of clean environment) but not to take the 
responsibility (of environmental protection).” 
    -Interview with an official of Department of Organization at Yuhuan 
county, Taizhou49 
                                                             
49 TZCJZ, personal communication, March 8, 2011 
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 This snippet of conversation is a typical response to my queries about 
the awareness of the pollution problem among local residents. They know 
their environment is worsening but seem not to realize that it results from the 
accumulation of their own individual polluting behaviors. In these self-
industrializing areas, while there might not be major pollution-related 
incidents that raise serious concern, low-level pollution is regarded as a natural 
part of production processes and therefore is often ignored. In addition, the 
wealth generated by the polluting industries provides people with such 
alternatives as purchasing fresh water and air purifiers. This too mitigates the 
problem pollution poses. Locals perceive themselves as just doing necessary 
things (which may involve pollution) in order to make a living in their private 
domain. They bother little about the public environment that ought to be, for 
them, taken care of by the government.  
 This attitude of “none-of-my-business” has frustrated many 
environmental officials, which unexpectedly became a point of breakthrough 
in my interviews with them where I could show commiseration over their 
complications and hardships.50 These officials complained that EPB is unfairly 
scapegoated for the pollution problem and often ranks poorly in citizen 
satisfaction surveys on governmental service. 51  Their difficulties, such as 
limited financial and human resources, are not new (Jahiel, 1998; Ma & 
Ortolano, 2000; van Rooij, 2006; Tilt, 2007). Environmental bureaucrats may 
have made great efforts to meet the requirements set by higher authorities 
while also responding to people’s grievances. This is, however, a partial 
picture. Interviews with local villagers reveal that knowingly violating 
                                                             
50 On interviewing Chinese officials, see Solinger (2006). 
51 Interview with environmental enforcers in Taizhou, Jiaxing, Ningbo and Yiwu prefectures.  
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environmental regulations and filing pollution complaints at the same time is 
not simply because villagers do not understand the relationship between rights 
and responsibility. Instead, it points to a more profound problem of how 
common people view state policy and translate state behavior. Ordinary 
people rarely read regulations or provisions. They learn about them through 
interactions with state officialdom in the course of their implementation.  
 When fieldwork experience met with my theoretical inspirations as 
stated in introductory chapter, I decided to focus my attention on various 
popular experiences with state power. The approach is consistent with what 
Rachel Stern and Kevin O’Brien (2012) call state reflected in the society, 
arguing how society spells out the manifestations of the state rather than the 
manifestations themselves matters the most. But I want to push this one step 
further, suggesting that people not only act on their immediate readings of 
what power holders can put up with, but may also unconsciously submit to the 
long existing governments’ representations of the environment. In the case of 
legal solutions, Stern (2013) uses the idea of political ambivalence to describe 
conflicting official or quasi-official signals regarding the desirability of certain 
types of citizen actions. Mixed signals lead to both self-censorship and self-
experimentation of judges, lawyers, and international NGOs in seeking 
everyday justice. However, ordinary villagers seem more confused about the 
ambiguous political messages and tend to discern only unidimensional signals 
as the code of conduct - in my case, the impulse to purse economic growth 
dominates the will to protect the environment. While legal professionals who 
have more access to resources may translate mixed messages into new space 
for bottom up experimentation, ordinary villagers are more likely to submit to 
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the will of the local government and consequently self-regulate their own 
behaviors. They may sometimes exploit the gaps within the state to stage 
rightful resistance (O’Brien & Li, 2006); but in the end, the streak of self-
abnegation is much stronger among villagers. 
 Specifically, this chapter attempts to argue that popular experience 
with state power is a powerful cause in forming the perception of inevitable 
pollution. I will focus on the process of how industrial pollution has become 
naturalized and internalized as inevitable by local villagers in their political, 
social, economic context. I posit that the mentality of viewing industrial 
pollution as inevitable is a major reason why villagers commit pollution 
violations knowingly and tolerate others’ polluting activities. Villager 
responses to pollution may vary; but strikingly, this mentality rarely does. I 
put forth a psychological foundation of why industrial pollution in 
industrializing, rural areas has persisted even when the local economy has 
achieved a certain level of development. This analysis also provides a 
complementary explanation of ineffective environmental implementation. 
 This chapter starts with Chinese villagers’ environmental awareness – 
the very foundation of many pollution-related discussions. Then I empirically 
examine how different state practices that are supposed promote 
environmental protection paradoxically have led to the formation of the 
mentality of pollution as inevitability. In the end, I comment on the sources of 




Villagers’ Environmental Awareness 
Before discussing the subjective dimension of pollution which is more 
essential for my explanation, I would like to clarify the objective dimension of 
pollution first. In this dissertation, pollution is defined as the introduction of 
contaminants into the natural environment that causes adverse change 
regardless of people’s awareness. Emphasizing the objective dimension of 
pollution is to demonstrate that pollution is not imaginary in my field sites and 
has been noticed by local villagers. Many non-pollution factors such as using 
pollution as an excuse to be discussed in the next Chapter does not deny the 
fact that the pollution problem is serious in the Chinese countryside. 
 The best way to demonstrate the existence of pollution is to have 
quantitative data as supporting evidence. Unfortunately, the statistics of 
industrial pollution are only available at the provincial, prefecture and county 
level. The data of pollution in the rural pollution only cares about agricultural 
pollution. Moreover, it is hard to extrapolate the high level data to lower level 
data according to the way of classifying different types of pollution adopted by 
local governments that usually lay emphasis on big enterprises. So the makeup 
efforts I make here is to use qualitative data, specifically the government 
replies to villagers’ petitions and the government announcements about 
pollution control and industry upgrade for the township level.  
 Villagers may petition to local EPBs for other purposes but the 
government replies to the public are verified information after investigation. 
According to the government replies found in local EPBs’ websites, 
interviews to EPB officials, industrial pollution reported by villagers really 
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exists.52 Another piece of evidence is that the announced pollution control 
projects for the township level on local EPBs’ websites or documents are 
consistent with the main industries run by local villagers themselves. While 
petitioning records shows that villagers can clearly identify the pollution, the 
pollution control projects are good proof that pollution at the village level is 
recognized by local EPBs and included in pollution control plans. 
53Additionally, these local polluting industries are also included in industry 
upgrade plans, as I found in the websites of Economic and Information 
Technology Commission at the prefecture level.54 
 Although pollution objectively exists for a long time in rural China, the 
low level of environmental consciousness among Chinese villagers is still the 
most frequent answer given by my informants to explain recurrent 
environmental violations and high tolerance for pollution. This assertion has 
some validity, but the causal logic is not so straightforward.  As more and 
more empirical studies on China’s environmental crisis shows, villagers do not 
completely lack environmental awareness as the prevailing post-materialism 
thesis assumes, even if they are still poor and uneducated.55 These studies tend 
to trace back to China’s rich philosophical traditions, including Taoism, 
Buddhism, Confucianism and folk religions (Weller, 2006; Tilt, 2007). 
Undeniably, these ideas about the natural environment continue to influence 
people’s behaviors, but for such a modern artifact as industrial pollution, the 
                                                             
52 The local EPB websites I visited are managed by Zhejiang provincial government, Taizhou 
and Jiaxing prefectural governments. Interviews were done by myself.  
53 The Taizhou and Jiaxing EPBs are my main search focuses, accessed in October 2014. The 
government documents are collected in the fieldwork.   
54 The websites under the Taizhou and Jiaxing prefectures are the main sources of information, 
accessed in October 2014. 
55 It is often assumed that Chinese peasants lack environmental awareness, since they are too 
concerned with making a meager living to worry about environmental problems. 
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idea of taking the environment as a resource through which humans can be 
fruitful and multiply has a more profound impact.  
 The deep intimacy with the land and the age-old custom of kaoshan 
chishan, kaoshui chishui (literally, those living on a mountain live off the 
mountain, those living near the water live off the water) have endowed 
villagers with a keen sense for any harm to the environment that may threaten 
their livelihood. This suggests that villagers’ environmental awareness is 
closely related to their experience with industrial pollution. For example, 
villagers living in the flatland of Jiaxing prefecture care more about water 
pollution than those in the mountainous Taizhou prefecture. In Jiaxing 
people’s eyes, Taizhou people can build reservoirs between hills to store clean 
water, while the best surface water within Jiaxing is Grade Inferior V. Jiaxing 
people naturally feel the urgent need to tackle the threat. 56   
 For villagers embracing industrialization, they complain about their 
declining living standard because of pollution from time to time: Men have to 
deal with unpleasant smells all day long in the factory; women cannot wash 
clothes in the contaminated river; elders are unable to sleep when machines 
are making noises; children sometimes suffer eye and chest infections from 
the smoke of a nearby factory. However, more people hold the opinion that 
development does not come for free and pollution is an acceptable sacrifice. In 
fact, villagers in unindustrialized areas are quite envious of their counterparts 
whose life has been significantly improved because of industrialization. “We 
are poor since we are not allowed to develop industries. The environment is 
good, but we cannot eat it.” One villager living in the water resource 
                                                             
56 JXJZ1, JXJZ2 personal communication, December 18, 2010 
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conservation area felt sorry for his home village.57 A parallel situation is that 
some people in less developed regions gloat over the misfortunes of neighbors 
in more developed but polluted areas. “Why not complain when making 
money? It is the price they should pay.”58 Another villager from the same 
village did not avoid speaking out the seamy story in front of me. 
 In most villagers’ eyes, the adverse effects of pollution have been 
offset by material well-being provided by polluting industries. When speaking 
of their own business, they tend to flaunt the wealth it has produced and 
trivialize the harm of its pollution. Indeed, villager entrepreneurs, even those 
who have become rich and can afford expensive pollution control facilities try 
to exploit loopholes, discharge illegally and dodge fines. Investing in pollution 
reduction will substantially increase costs and may result in a competitive 
disadvantage.  Villagers generally welcome introducing big industries into 
rural communities. The case of stopping anticipated pollution in rural areas 
(Deng & Yang, 2013) is rare.59 In one of my field sites, while many local 
villagers nearby try to land a job at the pharmaceutical plant located at 
Dongdai village, the act of rejecting attempts to introduce chemical industries 
by Jianshe villagers was thought to be too conservative and short-sighted.60  
 Although villagers swarm to polluting industries, it may be unfair to 
blame them for “dying to get rich”. Chinese peasants do not exactly know 
what pollution is, but have enough experience of poverty and zhaoling xigai 
(issue an order in the morning and rescind it in the evening). For a long time, 
                                                             
57 ZSWXG, personal communication, May 26, 2011 
58 ZSSH, personal communication, May 27, 2011 
59 In big cities, there were some “Not in my back yard” (NIMBY) protests: anti-PX protests in 
Xiamen, Dalian and Kunming, anti-Nansha Petrochemical Project in Guangzhou and the 
protest against a waste project in Qidong. See case studies, Johnson (2010), Lang &Xu (2013).  
60 TZLXP, personal communication, February 27, 2011 
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peasants have borne the heaviest burden with respect to earning a living, while 
having gained the least from reforms. The strong sense of insecurity and 
marginalization deeply rooted in the political regime has made peasants 
desperate to grasp every opportunity of making money to ensure a better life, 
especially given that social welfare has not been equally distributed in urban-
rural divided China (Wong, 1998; Hebel, 2003; Chang, 2003).They incline not 
to worry about the uncertain and seemingly remote risk.  Pollution, in villagers’ 
words, shall pass away, like many other difficulties they have suffered, with “a 
bit of patience”.61  
 Even those who have been hospitalized because of pollution have an 
ambiguous and vague knowledge of the culprit. Ms. Yang, a college graduate 
from the countryside, doubted the increasing number of cancer patients in her 
village was caused by dust pollution from the cement factory. As she said, few 
villagers linked their disease to pollution at the beginning; even after medical 
research demonstrated the correlation, most of them still attributed it to bad 
luck. 62  Ms. Yang admitted that well-educated villagers like herself are 
uncertain about possible harm caused by pollution.63 
 Villagers notice the visible pollution: Garbage will vanish when 
burned; waste water will disappear when poured it into the field; awful stink 
will be blown by wind.  But they do not realize that their way of handling 
waste is producing new pollution or facilitating pollutant accumulation. This 
understanding lies in the fact that most villagers equate the environmental 
problem to a “dirty and messy” issue. That villagers use a different vocabulary 
                                                             
61 ZSLMZ, ZSGY, personal communication, May 24, 2011 
62 HZYXJ, personal communication, February 23, 2011. On self-identification of a pollution 
victim, see Munro (2014).  
63 Ibid. Also see Lora-wainwright (2013c). 
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is not important here (Weller, 2006). Dirty and messy is almost synonymous 
with the image of rural China. Villagers are quite accustomed to dirty rivers 
and messy garbage and never consider them as serious problems. As a result, 
eliminating pollution is reduced into erasing the dirty away and turning the 
messy to the tidy. One villager told me the usual way to solve river pollution 
by the township government is to sprinkle lime in order to neutralize the 
acid.64 
 In all, peasants have an ambiguous understanding of industrial 
pollution. In areas where local villagers drive industrialization, industry and 
pollution are part and parcel of their daily life. They recognize the existence of 
industrial pollution, but have little knowledge of its deep harm. They willingly 
trade pollution for wealth. So far, this seems an appropriate strategy for 
individual peasants who are able to stay healthy to enjoy a better life after 
years of work.65 In the meantime, rational self-interest calculation has led to 
the inevitable tragedy of the commons.  
 
The Mentality of Viewing Pollution as Inevitable 
Ironically, the Chinese government has never intentionally instilled an 
inevitability of pollution into citizens’ minds or explicitly championed 
economic development over environmental protection. Since the late 1970s, 
the central government has developed an impressive body of environmental 
regulations and invested large sums in environmental awareness campaigns 
(Sinkule & Ortolano, 1995; Rozelle, Huang & Zhang, 1997). Alongside laws 
and education, the discourse of sustainable development is consistently 
                                                             
64 NBYK, personal communication, March 16, 2011 
65 ZSLMZ, ZSGY, personal communication, May 24, 2011 
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incorporated into official ideologies guiding socio-economic development, 
namely, “Three Represents” under Jiang Zemin and “Scientific Development 
Perspective” under Hu Jintao. In addition, concrete signs of increasing policy 
priority also are reflected in the upgrade in status of the environmental 
bureaucracy at the central level and the increasing number of staff at local 
EPBs, including their increasing powers to sanction (Lo & Leung, 2000; Mol 
& Carter, 2006; McElwee, 2011). 66 
 Some may argue that rural areas are not on the frontlines of China’s 
fight against pollution and are thus largely ignored in all sorts of 
environmental propaganda. However, villagers have many opportunities to 
interact with the state in terms of environmental governance. In industrialized 
villages where pollution is commonplace, rural residents, as victims of 
pollution, are very likely to contact the local government when seeking 
compensation or lodging complaints. If villagers run their industrial business, 
they have more occasions to meet with government officials through such as 
daily environmental inspections and periodic environmental campaigns. The 
popularization of mass media, mobile phones or even the Internet in developed 
rural areas also makes it easy for villagers to be informed of various news 
including government initiatives on environmental protection. What matters is 
to look at why the official rhetoric of environmental protection is taken more 
lip service than real commitment.   
 The problem of an implementation gap is more relevant here. This gap 
is not unfamiliar to the Chinese people. They themselves are skillful 
practitioners of shang you zhengce, xia you duice (for every edict from above, 
                                                             
66 On 27 March 2008, the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA, founded in 
1982 as the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA)) was upgraded to the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP). 
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there is a counter-measure from below to circumvent it). But how the 
implementation gap influences the people’s mindset has been paid less 
attention. Different from rightful resistance, which is a specific behavior 
exploiting implementation gap, this study concerns the middle step between 
implementation gap and actual actions – mentality formation. Villagers’ 
attitudes towards industrial pollution are not fully formed as a priori, but are 
developing through the process of industrialization and the following 
environmental remediation.  
 On one hand, the general state discourses of modernity and 
development that shape villagers’ attitudes towards industry and pollution and 
set the limits on villager responses to what such discourses configure as 
feasible, villagers under the same Chinese authoritarian state thus share a 
similar mentality. On the other hand, villagers’ expectation of industry and 
unconscious polluting behaviors are acquired through their own lived 
experiences with the structure created by the authoritarian state. It means that 
the sources of mentality formation vary across space, since villagers have 
quite different experiences under different modes of rural industrialization.  
 Below I empirically show how the mentality of “pollution is inevitable” 
is formed through different villager experiences with the state other than 
simply relying on polluting enterprises. By examining the experiences , some 
of which are specific to the entrepreneurial mode of rural industrialization in 
eight fields - environmental education, media coverage of pollution, 
environmental impact assessment, pollution prevention, pollution treatment, 
environmental petitions and environmental litigation in China, I will illustrate 
how government discourse and practice on the environment in general are 
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distorted in the creation of villagers who accept pollution and even become 
complicit in pollution, and at the same time, how mode of rural 
industrialization play a role in villagers’ peculiar experiences.  
 
Environmental Education 
Environmental education in rural areas nearly exists on paper.67 One college 
graduate, now working as a village official, frankly told me that as long as the 
report submitted to the above is written well, no one cares about what is really 
done. Because of his well-written report, the village was awarded as the 
advanced unit of environmental education. The only thing the village did was 
to bring party members together to watch a documentary film about 
environmental protection. 68 In the words of the village head, now they have an 
intellectual who can write reports that meet the requirements set by higher 
authorities. He just asked the literati to come up with some new ideas so that 
his village can win the title of “the Ecological village” of the city in the next 
round of official evaluation.69  
 Not only do village cadres consider environmental protection as 
paperwork, but township officials also pay lip-service to environmental 
protection.  In the five-story building of the township government, there is no 
independent office for environmental protection. A town forest ranger doubles 
as an environmental publicity agent. When asked to describe his responsibility 
for environmental protection, he said it is a sinecure since little money was 
                                                             
67 Alford, Weller, Hall, Polenske, Shen & Zweig (2002) have showed the effect of 
environmental education and campaigns in rural areas is really not optimistic. 
68 TZWXX, personal communication, June 19, 2011 
69 TZCHW, personal communication, June 19, 2011  
76 
 
allocated to plant trees in villages.70 Putting aside this one-sided understanding 
of environmental protection, it does reflect environmental issues remain a low 
priority on the township agenda. In the corner of his room, from the piles of 
paper coated with dust, the forest ranger dug out two pamphlets disseminated 
to all villages on Earth Day each of the last two years. These materials were 
just transferred from the office of township government to the desks of village 
committees. So-called environmental education was not reaching villagers. 
 One pamphlet reads “turn off the light for one hour”, the other “lead a 
low carbon life”. These have been two fashionable campaigns across many big 
cities in recent years. As one township official put it, these activities are hardly 
compelling and require more time to explain why turning off the light matters 
and what is low carbon if put into practice. 71 This points to an inherent defect 
of the current environmental education: the government tends to argue from 
global generalities but rarely touches local crises that directly threaten 
people’s health and wealth (Weller, 2006). A typical brochure of 
environmental education will list many global environmental crises such as 
global warming, ocean pollution, nuclear waste, deforestation and biodiversity 
loss, none of which seem salient to the local population. Occupied by specific 
worries in life, either big or small, few people show concern for such general 
problems that do not appear as major influences on their own lives. The effects 
of such propaganda and education are thus marginal.  
 Not surprisingly, local governments that impose strict restrictions on 
media coverage of pollution crises will not allow local incidents appear on 
publicity materials since doing so is as much as admitting their poor 
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71 TZYYY, personal communication,  March 1, 2011 
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performance in environmental protection. A strong campaign showing the link 
between serious diseases and specific polluting behaviors might be more 
effective in convincing people to switch to greener production and take 
stronger action against pollution (Weller, 2006). But enterprises do not 
welcome such practice of enlightening people. If polluting enterprises are 
found culpable in causing diseases, they suffer not only financial loss by many 
claim seekers, but also moral condemnation. Local governments frown on 
such provocative education that may threaten social stability too. Local 
officials may also pay the price of their political careers if there are causalities. 
It is much safer to use locally irrelevant propaganda materials instead of 
bothering to worry about their effects. 
 Indeed, environmental education that does not resort to local pollution 
facts in self-industrialized areas has even worse consequences. The pollution 
situation in vast entrepreneurial countryside is that many a little makes a 
mickle. If local governments could give proper guidance on pollution control 
in villagers’ daily production activities, the large amount of pollution coming 
from incorrect operation or disposal by villagers who lack related knowledge 
could be avoided. After all, apart from deliberate emissions, on some 
occasions, villagers become perpetrators of pollution unwittingly due to 
ignorance. Ignorance does reduce potential village resistance that local 
officials least want to see, but increase much pollution committed 
unintentionally.  
 As empty as the slogan “everyone has the responsibility to protect the 
environment” is, environmental education in rural areas exists in name only. It 
is a political task within the circle of rural officials but means nothing to 
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ordinary villagers. Years of education campaigns have not changed the 
ingrained idea that a bad environment is a dirty and messy one.  
 
Media Coverage of Pollution72 
Despite the increasing economic independence and professional literacy that 
has come with years of media marketization, the Chinese media still cannot 
act the watchdogs of society.73 Its reporting on pollution is illustrative. Unlike 
the “positive” massive media campaigns on environmental education, the 
“negative” exposure of pollution incidents is unwelcome by local governments. 
On the surface, the rise of investigative journalism seems like a breakthrough. 
The famous investigative TV program, Focal Interview,74 on China Central 
Television (CCTV) once kindled a spark of hope among many pollution 
victims. The national TV station dared to expose local scandals, including 
sensitive officials’ corruption and their collusion with big businesses. Given 
the program’s influence among the population and possible pressure from the 
higher government authorities, local governments, in consequence, will 
usually take some remedial measures. 
  However, most investigative reports do not reach ordinary villagers. 
Rural people are rarely the target audience of the in-depth reports. While 
investigative journalists aim to pursue truth so as to promote social progress, 
common villagers just expect one more channel to make their situations 
                                                             
72 I treat Chinese media as part of the State, or more precisely, local villagers tend to relate 
their experience with the media to the state for two reasons. First, local media that report news 
on environmental protection or host the hotline for popular complaints usually have a 
government background. Second, local governments have the power to ban media reporting 
on serious pollution within their jurisdiction.  
73 More facts on media coverage of pollution in China, see Tilt & Xiao (2010). 
74 Launched in April 1994, Focal Interview gave constant exposure to official corruption and 
to the adverse social, moral and environmental consequences of market reforms and the 
grievances of ordinary people, and it became the most popular investigative program among 
Chinese audience.  
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known by upright high authorities in order to solve their specific problems. 
The significant difference in goals is also reflected in the operation of 
complaint hotlines set up by local media. There is no denying that these 
people-style programs attend to people’s grievance, but a more important 
function of such hotlines is to gather news.75 Therefore, editors and journalists 
include or omit complaints based on the so-called news value. Unavoidably, 
countless instances of minor pollution in daily life are not considered 
newsworthy and thus are ignored.  Meanwhile, major incidents are deemed too 
sensitive to be included. 
 Although local media may be just voluntarily practicing self-
censorship, villagers tend to relate media’s short shrift to government pressure. 
Mr. Liu still felt sorry that the interview with him about air pollution of the 
nearby industrial park did not go on air and he attributed the local media’s 
retreat to government intervention. “I guess the government stopped it since 
the industrial park was its darling.” 76  Similarly, when asked about his 
comments on the Deqing blood lead (Pb) incident,77  he said “if so many 
poisoning cases were not found, if local officials were not punished for this 
reason, the local media would not have reported it. What were they doing 
earlier (before the incident)? (The storage battery company had been there) for 
years.” Such suspect requires no evidence. Ubiquitous state power has made 
people believe that the government can manipulate media reporting, and it 
                                                             
75 HZZXP, personal communication, December 5, 2010 
76 ZSLQW, personal communication, June 10, 2011 
77http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/qt/201105/t20110518_210844.htm,accessed on December 
12,2012. Deqing blood lead incident happened in Deqing county, Huzhou city of Zhejiang 
province in 2011. Many workers in Haijiu Storage Battery Company and villagers around it 
were found that the lead content in their blood was much higher than standard, which 
consequently caused a series of investigations. 
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often intervenes in cases of polluting enterprises in which it has economic 
interests, whether it is true or not. 
 Even if the media receive the complaints, investigate the incidents and 
broadcast the news as villagers expect, the effects of media complaints are still 
questionable. In Taizhou prefecture, the cancer village “Yantou” closest to the 
industrial zone of the pharmaceutical and chemical industry was exposed by 
Xinhua News and News Probe on CCTV in 2003. The then Prime Minister 
Wen Jiabao even wrote instructions to prompt the Taizhou municipal 
government to relocate the village.78 The exposure did help village relocation 
get on the list of key government tasks. However, the relocation remains on 
paper since it was first requested in early 1995 when villagers realized that 
closing or relocating the polluting factories was unlikely.79  Even the exposure 
on the most desirable CCTV ends in vain, not to mention less influential local 
media. In recent years some villagers have begun to resort to new media 
platforms, posting pollution problems on online forums. But under strict 
internet surveillance, posts are usually short-lived and do not make a tangible 
difference.80  
 In fact, among villagers with experience in media petitions, rumors 
circulate that the local government bans media reporting on serious pollution 
within its jurisdiction. Villagers may not know the self-position of the media 
as the mouthpiece of the Party and the government under the tradition of 
Socialism. But after many fruitless attempts to approach the media, their 
                                                             
78See reports, http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/huanjing/412693.htm 
http://www.zj.xinhuanet.com/hottalk/2003-06/04/content_569733.htm, accessed on December 
12, 2012. 
79 See reports, http://220.191.232.22/frm/bbs/vt?thread=5498; 
http://www.lwdf.cn/oriental/community/20080117163112935.htm; accessed on December 12, 
2012. 
80 TZHZL, personal communication, Mar 5, 2011 
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disappointment with this petitioning channel has gradually turned to the 
dissatisfaction with the government. “The reports only ballyhoo big 
enterprises adopting decontamination technology but downplay their serious 
pollution. Why are apparently heavy polluters selected as advanced units in 
environmental protection?”81 Local governments do have legitimate reasons to 
award big enterprises whose investment in pollution control is much higher 
than that of small-and-medium-sized factories. But villagers read such partial 
reports as weak government commitment to environmental protection. 
Likewise, many projects like e-waste recycling and garbage power generation 
produce heavy pollution because of poor processing methods, even though 
they are labeled as model examples of circular economy by local governments. 
The act of “turning facts upside down” of course causes discontent among 
villagers. “If heavy polluters are advanced in protecting the environment, the 
so-called environmental protection promoted by the government is a lie.”82 
Moreover, villager entrepreneurs, especially those in the same industry, tend 
to have a stronger aversion to the media reports bragging big enterprises’ 
achievements in pollution control. They know the low-down of the industry, 
including the bait-and-switch tricks in so-called pollution alleviation. 
 In all, whether the petition channel provided by the media or media 
reports on pollution control unintentionally exacerbates popular discontent 
with the local government and reinforces the sense that pollution is inevitable. 
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Environmental Impact Assessment  
An environmental impact assessment (EIA) evaluates the possible impact that 
a proposed project may have on the environment. EIAs were introduced to 
China was as early as the 1970s. Through years of a complex legislative 
process, the EIA law promulgated as a stand-alone piece in 2002 marked a 
milestone of integrating EIA as a key component of domestic environmental 
management.83 For villagers, EIA is strongly marked by the characteristics of 
mode of rural industrialization. In self-industrialized areas, only villager 
entrepreneurs have such a special experience that cannot be found in other 
modes of rural industrialization. If a villager is a farmer growing crops or a 
migrant worker manufacturing products, he or she might never hear of EIA in 
the whole life. Only as an entrepreneur, he or she needs to go through EIA 
procedures and gets to know what might be wrong with it.  
 Like most ideal central initiatives, EIA suffers from poor 
implementation. According to one environmental consultant, Mr. Yang, EIA 
practice is limited to ex ante check while lacking ex post supervision.84 Hence, 
even if EIA in the design phrase is undertaken properly, it becomes a mere 
formality, without effective monitoring in place during the construction and 
operation stages. The good wish of san tongshi (literally, three at the same 
time, three synchronizations), which requires pollution control facilities to be 
designed, constructed and operated simultaneously with the main project, 
rarely materializes.  
                                                             
83 The details of the Chinese EIA system and institutional setup has been thoroughly evaluated 
and criticised in previous studies. See Wenger, Wang & Ma (1990), Lo, Tang & Chan, (1997), 
Chen, Warren & Duan (1999), Mao & Hills (2002), Wang, Morgan & Cashmore (2003), 
Lindhjem, Hu, Ma, Skjelvik, Song, Vennemo, …….Zhang (2007). 
84 HZYT, personal communication, February 25, 2011. Zhao (2009) also reports that post-EIA 
monitoring seldom takes place to ensure compliance. 
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 Even ex ante check is problematic. One planning officer at Zhejiang’s 
development planning research institute admitted that the opinions of 
environmental specialists are not a prior consideration in project design and 
many sentiments towards pollution were actually caused by bad planning.85 
Another young environmental consultant Mr. Wu commented that the alleged 
senior experts invited by some local government agencies are stuck in old 
ways of thinking and are below EIA standards.86 Putting aside the possible 
problem of EIA quality, EIA is underappreciated by both the government and 
the people. 
 Although EIA regulations stipulate that EPBs have veto power over the 
launch of new industrial facilities, EPBs sometimes is bypassed in the EIA 
process (Zhao, 2009). Mr. Fu, one official of Zhejiang Ministry of Water 
Resources provided me with an example. One project was supposed to collect 
stamps from several bureaus before getting the final approval of the local 
government. When the application form reached their office, it had already 
obtained the endorsement of the highest authority. “How can we say no in this 
situation? Turn against our boss?  EIA is an empty shell.”87 In this way, many 
projects, regardless of their actual impact on the environment, are able to pass 
EIA with environmental officials whose career is tied primarily to how well 
their county meets the political goals that are defined overwhelmingly in 
economic terms.  
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approved by the land management department prior to registration with the EPB. 
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 More cases are post-registered: Enterprises only report after the project 
has been completed. 88  Light sanctions facilitate this practice. Even if the 
make-up assessment is not submitted within the designated time, the possible 
fine is a tiny fraction of the overall cost of major projects. In fact, delaying 
tactics can work because of the tacit permit from local governments. Mr. Yang, 
the environmental consultant mentioned above, told me that enterprises in 
some industrial parks have yuanqu guanweihui (park management committee) 
as their shield. Production without waste control facilities is preferential to 
attract investment. Local EPBs can do nothing except impress a seal.89  
 Meanwhile, villagers blame the direct authority in charge – local EPBs. 
Villagers’ understanding of an EIA, if any, largely comes from their own 
experience of starting a business, since an EIA has become the standard 
procedure of obtaining a business license. For villager entrepreneurs, this is an 
extra burden. An EIA is not only costly but beyond villagers’ knowledge. 
They cannot see its use except as license application because EPB will not 
conduct the so-called acceptance test. They can escape the punishment in most 
cases if they do not follow the standards stated in the EIA report. Indeed, 
villagers view it as the government’s new tool of hoarding money since many 
organizations qualified for conducting EIAs are attached to EPBs. The close 
relationship between assessors and local EPBs can be demonstrated in the 
established practice of consulting local evaluators. One private entrepreneur 
introduced: “when we were planning to expand our business to Jiangsu 
province, our regular environmental consultant suggested that we find a local 
                                                             
88 Ibid. Also see examples, Stalley (2010) finds that some enterprises in new industrial parks 
may sidestep EIA requirements.  
89  HZYT, personal communication, February 24, 2011. Also see Stalley (2010), Local 




company to increase the passing rate.” 90Another environmental consultant 
added that an EIA is more likely to be approved if the entrepreneur or the 
agency conducting the EIA has good connections with the government.91   
 Villagers mostly condemn the government’s “arbitrary” decisions. 
“Isn’t it a kind of formalism? Once the leaders decide to build the project, all 
paperwork including specialist opinions is meant to support the project, right?” 
This was the honest opinion of one village cadre.92 For villagers, an EIA is an 
ornament of government behavior; it makes construction projects look 
legitimate without meaning. They do not appreciate this unnecessary 
decoration imposed on them, however. One informant reported: “We followed 
the rule and paid the money, but were rejected for some unknown reasons. I 
knew one person in the same line of work passed last month. There must be 
foul play inside.” 93 Another informant running an electroplating business felt 
fooled when local EPB officials told him that there would be no license 
granted for this type of production within this period no matter what the EIA 
result is.94 
 One environmental official, Ms. Zhang, explained that it happens that 
leaders ask not to issue specific passes for a period of time even if EIA reports 
are up to standard. But usually this practice has its basis in government 
documents - for instance, the latest notice on intensive control of the 
electroplating industry. According to her, the blame should be laid on 
impotent environmental consultants who do not carefully study government 
                                                             
90 YWCBB, personal communication, April 7, 2011 
91 HZWCZ, personal communication, April 18, 2011 
92 TZCH, personal communication, April 30, 2011 
93 TZJBB, personal communication, March 6, 2011 
94 TZJZS, personal communication, March 7, 2011 
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documents.95 Villagers do not buy this explanation. They do not have to vision 
the general situation of energy saving and emission reduction but see the 
difficulty of small enterprises surviving in an unstable policy environment. 
They may not remember the complex reasons for rejection but recall the 
discriminatory treatment imposed on their small business vis-à-vis preferential 
support for large government projects. 
 As many central initiatives represent a kind of idealism that will be 
distorted to mesh with realities on the ground, an implemented EIA only 
equips people with fancy stuff to justify their economic production. But it has 
limited effects on pollution control. An EIA is like one of the Emperor’s new 
clothes. No one believes it can stop pollution in advance but they pretend to 
believe it and implement it.96  Worse, the EIA process instills in people’s 
minds that pollution is inevitable.  
 
Pollution Prevention 
The pollution prevention approach seeks to control a pollutant before it is 
formed. As argued above, EIA in China, which is supposed to function as a 
precautionary measure, fails to fulfill the responsibility. Meanwhile, the idea 
of reducing pollution generated at its source by increasing the efficiency of 
production process, is unfortunately rarely practiced in all sorts of industrial 
enterprises. “Production causes pollution; to prevent pollution is to stop 
production,” said one retired local official. 97  This comment, on one hand, 
indicates the difficulty of pollution prevention. After all, the country will not 
easily abandon polluting industrial production that contributes to its rapid 
                                                             
95 TZZJM, personal communication, March 9, 2011 
96 On “act as if” in authoritarian states, see Wedeen’s seminal work on Syria (1999).  
97 JXCZF, personal communication, December 29, 2010 
87 
 
GDP growth. On the other hand, it reveals that the way that local governments 
employ to curtail pollution is quite crude and oversimplified: shutdown or halt 
production.  
 Usually such harsh measures as shutdown or halt production are seen 
as positive signals that demonstrate the governments’ resolve to curb pollution. 
In officials’ own words, it is “a mechanism of forced transition” that compels 
enterprises to adopt a greener mode of production, although it may harm some 
people’s livelihoods in the short term. 98  However, things are not just lack of 
local legitimacy, as van Rooij (2006) puts it. What antagonize local people are 
all sorts of irregular regulations or provisional measures that claim to be 
environmental but essentially impair normal production.  
 While staying in the field in the winter of 2010 and the summer of 
2011, I experienced lazha xiandian (literally, switch off power to limit 
electricity supply) several times. Not only domestic electricity use was limited, 
industrial and commercial electricity was also cut off in different periods of 
time for different parts of the whole city. The winter practice was to fulfill the 
targets of jieneng jianpai (energy conservation and emission reduction) set by 
the 11th Five-year plan, which required that energy consumption per unit of 
GDP should decrease 20% in five years. The year 2010 was the closing year 
of the 11th Five-year Plan with the target 6% reduction, but the whole country 
only achieved 4% in the first three quarters and thereby needed a sprint in the 
last quarter. Similarly, the accomplishment of jieneng jianpai for the first 
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quarter of 2011 - the starting year of the 12th Five-year Plan, was not 
optimistic. Remedial measures were thus taken early in the summer. 99 
 The task of jieneng jianpai was assigned to each province, and then to 
each prefecture and each county. Local government officials expected the 
outage, or say, production halt could help them fulfill the figures that were 
crucial for their political careers. The forced electricity blackout caused a very 
bad effect, especially among small business owners. “Why cut off electricity 
when there is no power shortage?”100 “Why such a short notice? At least give 
us some time to prepare. We can either fire people or take fewer orders. How 
can we finish the orders now?”101 “Isn’t jieneng jianpai a five-year task? Why 
only matters in the last few months? What has the government done 
earlier?”102 “Halt for ten days and work for five days. The government goes so 
far as to impose a fine if we are caught producing stealthily. Does the 
government want to kill us?” 103  These complaints showed villager 
entrepreneurs’ strong dissatisfaction towards local governments that sacrificed 
their interests for political tasks.  
 Tenacious villager entrepreneurs did not give in easily. No conditions 
for production? Create them. During the period of forced electricity brown-
outs, villagers turned to diesel generators and continued production. The long 
queue appeared in front of gas stations; oil tank trucks went into factories; 
business cards for diesel sale were distributed everywhere. The consequence 
                                                             
99 The five-year plans are a series of social and economic development initiatives, which are a 
heritage of the centralized planned economy. They are passed in the plenary sessions of the 
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started in 1953. The 11th five-year plan mentioned here was from 2006 to 2010. The 12th five-
year plan covers 2011-2015. 
100 TZDJL, personal communication, March 9, 2011 
101 TZCLH, personal communication, March 9, 2011 
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of large amounts of private electricity generation was no less electricity 
consumption but more serious pollution, just opposite to the original goal of 
jieneng jianpai.  
 This ridiculous farce only exacerbated villagers’ distrust in local 
governments and reinforced the impression that pollution is inevitable. 
Moreover it has an even worse consequence among villager entrepreneurs. 
Other than farmers or migrant workers, they have a more profound 
understanding of nice figures (due to forced electricity blackouts) but more 
pollution (produced by private diesel generator). For ordinary people, they 
may only feel the inconvenience when local governments force electricity 
blackouts. But as an entrepreneur, he or she knows that this energy-saving 
measure actually caused serious pollution since he or she is one of many using 
private diesel generators to continue production. Unsurprisingly, in villagers’ 
eyes, local officials only care about the figures of power grid that counted in 
statistics, while the actual economic costs, the inconvenience caused to the 
people and the deteriorating environment are nothing to them. “The 
government is playing number games. Only heaven knows how much extra 
emission after this round of lazha xiandian,” one villager entrepreneur 
commented.104  
 Even more ironically, local officials clearly knew the situation. But 
they explained that the upper level imposition of uniform targets in all cases 
regardless of energy saving potentials in different places should be blamed. 
Ms. Pan, one analyst in Zhejiang provincial policy study office said to me, 
“We have such an enormous number of small and medium-sized enterprises in 
                                                             
104 ZSWZJ, personal communication, May 25, 2011 
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Zhejiang. Even closure of many in absolute numbers contributes less, while in 
some other provinces with many large heavy industries, shutdown of several 
factories temporarily may fulfill the quota.”105 Local officials also showed 
their concern about the space for further jieneng jianpai if the higher 
authorities tighten requirements. “These years we have tried many ways to 
limit high energy-consuming and high polluting industries. But you know we 
cannot shut all of them down. Anyway, we still need to meet the hard targets 
of economic growth.” said one official in charge of a local industrial zone.106  
 However, villager entrepreneurs read it as local government’s 
reluctance to prevent pollution. “Aren’t there many jieneng jianpai measures? 
They always announced them on TV. But I’ve never seen any technical or 
financial support for us to practice jieneng jianpai.”107 For villagers, local 
governments often cannot implement policies that look good on the paper. 
“Why not just close some large oil refineries or chemical plants, but punish us? 
Don’t those large enterprises consume more energy than us? They are safe but 
we suffer,”108 one small business owner reported. This remark was verified by 
a professor of Economics from Zhejiang University. According to him, when 
setting the targets, the provincial government will reserve quotas for its key 
projects, which are usually large energy consumers or polluters, while 
subordinate prefectures have to screw powerless small enterprises within the 
compressed space.109  
 Villagers are right about the dubious effect of pollution prevention. As 
one official of policy studies admitted, the current total volume control by 
                                                             
105 HZPHH, personal communication, December 2, 2010 
106 YWYZY, personal communication, February 22, 2011 
107 TZCF, personal communication, May 7, 2011 
108 TZWMM, personal communication, June 28, 2011 
109 HZWJK, personal communication, November 30, 2010 
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region only drives polluting enterprises to economically backward areas, 
which have enough quotas to accommodate polluting enterprises.110 In the 
countryside of Anhui province where I visited in 2013, local villagers told me 
that the green lake and hilly area had been bought by a boss from Zhejiang, 
awaiting its development. 111 While villagers in those isolated areas of Anhui 
may have no sense of pollution, villager entrepreneurs in Zhejiang who have 
seen how jieneng jianpai led to more pollution tend to strengthen their belief 
that pollution is inevitable. 
 
Pollution Treatment 
Given the poor performance in pollution prevention, China is now on the 
capitalist old path of “pollute first and treat later”.112 Few are optimistic about 
future pollution treatment either. People doubt the government’s sincerity and 
determination since pollution is claimed to be treated every year but never 
reduces. Many authors attribute the ineffective treatment system to GDP-
biased cadre evaluation (Ma & Ortolano, 2000). Indeed, the introduction of the 
so-called one-vote veto in ecological treatment has not improved the situation. 
The inclusion of an environmental index is not for the sake of the environment 
but to avoid the destabilizing effects of pollution. Local leaders can still do as 
they please as long as major environmental accidents/mass incidents do not 
happen. When I asked for one village cadre’ opinion of environmental crisis, 
he asked me in reply, “Will pollution problems become important only when 
they turn into environmental crises?” He further urged me to use a dialectical 
                                                             
110 HZMB, personal communication,  December 6, 2010 
111 XCZBB, personal communication, July 11, 2012 
112 In China, from government officials to media reporters, they usually describe “pollute first 
and treat later” as the capitalist old path.  
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perspective to view the problem since “large incidents in some sense are 
positive. They can attract the attention of higher authorities and consequently 
the necessary resources.”113  
  This observation is not far from the self-judgment of environmental 
officials. “We suddenly gained status after the big incident.”114 As this self-
mockery of one environmental official shows, environmental disasters have 
ironically become an effective way to get money from higher authorities. In 
Zhejiang province, three high-profiled environmental mass incidents in 2005 
prompted provincial leaders to channel resources to cash-strapped EPBs.115 In 
daily work, environmental officials may have many treatment plans in mind 
but are aware that “special funds for pollution treatment is hard to get”. 116 
“Once pollution is under control, the money evaporates.” 117  Long-lasting 
pollution is a way of sustaining funding from higher authorities. This 
interpretation is also popular among ordinary people. 
 Similarly, as many scholars point out, the reliance on fines from 
enterprises, especially in poorer areas, also leaves environmental officials 
reluctant to eradicate pollution entirely (van Rooij, 2006). That fines can be 
negotiated is a public secret (Alford & Shen, 1997). To ensure an income 
source, local EPBs determine discharge fees by assessing the solvency of the 
firms. This differential enforcement is inevitably read by ordinary people as 
monitoring to gather fees rather than ensure compliance. Rumors circulate that 
                                                             
113 ZSWEH, personal commination, May 28, 2011 
114YWHYY, personal communication, April 8, 2011 
115 Besides the abovementioned mass incident in Huashui township, Dongyang county, the 
violent protests against a pharmaceutical factory will be discussed in Chapter Four. The last 
one was the protest against a storage battery company in Changxing county, Huzhou 
prefecture. I paid a visit to the place in July 2012.  
116 HZYS, personal communication, November 28, 2010 
117 YWFFL, personal communication, April 11, 2011 
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local EPB enforcers need to fulfill a fee collection quota for their festival 
bonus.118 
 However, the collection of pollutant discharge fees is not as easy as 
imagined, especially when the EPB is weak. In the past, EPBs could do little if 
the polluter refused or delayed payments. In recent years they have been able 
to enlist help from local courts, which can detain people and confiscate 
property, and the banks, which can stop and reject loans. But the widespread 
under-enforcement to some extent encourages the lucky escape from penalties 
among enterprise owners. In fact, enterprise owners quickly find that EPBs 
can do nothing except issuing fines, while the paying of fines can be seen as 
the license to pollute. Harsh sanctions may be imposed during the clampdown 
or image building campaigns. But the enterprises can return to old-styled 
production after government attention shifts. Campaign-style treatment is 
intended for demonstration to higher-ups relying on mobilization within the 
government. It rarely attends to ordinary people and thus does not change their 
incentive structure (Guo & Foster, 2008). Here the identity as villager 
entrepreneurs again stands out. While farmers or migrant workers may only 
learn scandals of pollution fines from anecdotes, villager entrepreneurs are 
part of many private deals. 
 Selective enforcement undermines the sense of fairness among villager 
entrepreneurs. The exercise of discretion in environmental enforcement is 
usually regarded as “cower in front of powerful polluters and spit on the face 
of weaker small enterprises”. 119  Understandably, compared to enforcement 
concerning common people, EPB enforcement personnel treat carefully 
                                                             
118 ZSWFFF, personal communication, March 23, 2011 
119 TZJZJ, personal communication,  January 3, 2011 
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among powerful polluters and local leaders. Indeed, both EPB staff and 
entrepreneurs understand the need to develop and maintain a good relationship 
with each other. Ironically, while EPBs expect mutual understanding can help 
regulate enterprises and collect fees, entrepreneurs hope to use personal 
networks to circumvent laws (Ma & Ortolano, 2000; Swanson, Kuhn & Xu, 
2001). The discharge fee system that allows for rebates to the enterprises 
directly or indirectly facilitates this situation. In practice enterprises can use 
the rebates that are supposed to be invested in pollution control for other 
purposes.  
  In the end, it is not merely a problem of measly pollution fines that 
make it financially expedient to pay penalties rather than input in prevention. 
Through paying fines, enterprise owners feel they get the permit to pollute and 
even manage to work the discharge fee system to their advantage. 
Entrepreneurs are not innocent, but local governments cannot shirk their 
responsibility of creating such opportunists in pollution treatment. If public 
participation is the hope of the way out of environmental problems, the sad 
news may be the growing indifference to daily pollution among villagers. 
Facing the dirty river across the village, villagers told me not to worry since 
the government flushes the water from the reservoir to clean the stream 
channel each year before the above authorities send the delegation of sanitary 
inspection. 120  
 
                                                             




Given limited channels for public participation, xinfang (literally, letters and 
visits), designed for controlled participation, has become an important 
mechanism of public input, helping to detect widely scattered polluters and 
identify irresponsible cadre behaviors. As Brettell (2007) observes, Chinese 
authorities do encourage environmental complaints and have standardized the 
xinfang system as a way to prevent disputes and channel grievances. Due to 
the reliance on xinfang, environmental petitions inevitably suffer from the 
inherent drawbacks of the petitioning system. For instance, the complaints 
presented to higher level authorities will be returned to the original authority 
whatever high authorities they appeal at the beginning. Even if upper-level 
authorities intervene, they still delegate investigation to local agencies among 
which cover-ups are common (Chen, 2012). 
 Hence, many environmental petitions begin with hope but end in 
disappointment and distrust in government. First, a certain number of petitions 
are rejected in the initial stage of information processing in the name of “in the 
excess of jurisdiction.” Here are some standard EPB replies. “The factory does 
not have a business license. Please refer it to ICB.” “This kind of garbage 
problems is not within the orbit of EPB. Please go to Management Office of 
Environment and Sanitation.”121 In this case, EPBs do have a point. But for 
villagers who have no idea of complex government functions and confusing 
multi-sector management, it is another piece of evidence of passing the buck 
among government agencies.  
                                                             
121 Petition records from Taizhou prefectural EPB. 
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 Second, EPB inspection teams often come and leave without taking 
any measures, for such reasons as “the workshop is not in operation during 
inspection.” “we cannot find the factory.” and “the test shows the discharge is 
within acceptable limits.”122 From the perspective of EPBs, law enforcement 
requires concrete evidence even if a judgment of “not found” is caused by the 
time lag between inspection and pollution, the imprecision of anonymous 
reports or the difference between test data and human sense. But villagers still 
think EPBs are telling lies and pollution is not found on spot because firms are 
tipped off.  
 Third, petitions are useless since pollution continues after enforcement. 
From large enterprises to tiny mobile workshops, local EPBs seem to lack 
effective measures to cope with all sorts of polluters. They do not dare to 
offend major tax-payers unless local governments give tacit consent. Small 
and medium-sized enterprises may halt pollution for a while after inspection. 
But rampant stealthy discharging is almost impossible to prevent. Enormous 
numbers of floating workshops are hard to find and soon recuperate when 
clampdown campaigns conclude. Some villagers expressed strong 
dissatisfaction when they were told by officials that the EPB cannot remove or 
shut down the polluting enterprises, “If it cannot stop pollution, is it necessary 
to establish the bureau? It is a waste of taxpayers’ money.”123 When villagers 
see numerous cases of intentional violations and poor enforcement, it 
strengthens their conviction that local government will sacrifice the 
environment for economic development. It legitimatizes their own behavior of 
prioritizing subsistence over environment.  
                                                             
122 Ibid. 
123 ZSGYY2, personal communication, May 29, 2011 
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 Lastly, petitions can incur troubles other than pollution. Pollution and 
related contentions are regarded as sensitive issues by the government. 
Officials may welcome the reporting of pollution cases, but often do not 
handle the cases as complainants request. To increase the chance of their 
misery being heard by a qin guan (literally, clean official), some petitioners 
may begin repeated, skip-level, disruptive and pestering petitioning that the 
governments try to suppress. Although not having firsthand experience, Mr. 
Wang described to me the rough receptions their fellow villagers suffered in 
the special rooms of government buildings. He also revealed some lawless 
polluters would probably hire ruffians to torture petition leaders. The sense of 
inevitability is in fact stronger after seeking redresses from authorities. 
Villagers simply do not want to suffer other hardships than pollution.  
 The implication of failed experiences with this most common measure 
of self-help can be observed from the recurring self-deprecating remarks by 
villagers. “What can little common people do against a factory backed by the 
government? The words of the lowly carry little weight.”124  More worth 
noting is that stopping pollution is not the top priority of villagers in many 
cases. Instead of pursuing the unrealistic goal of eradicating pollution, 
villagers would rather spend their efforts getting more tangible gains such as 
economic compensation. Superficially villagers’ silence can be easily bought 
off, but it may be better understood as a compromise choice or a tactical 
adjustment to achieve immediate interests when putting an end to pollution is 
regarded as impossible for the foreseeable future (Lora-Wainwright et al., 
2012). 
                                                             





It is well-known that in China the challenges of using the law for 
environmental protection are formidable. It is exceedingly difficult for 
ordinary people to overcome such legal obstacles as providing evidence of the 
damages, demonstrating the existence of a polluting act, finding evidence for 
causation and the like (van Rooij, 2010). The survey has shown that appeals to 
the judicial system are even more likely to produce disappointment than 
petitions to state agencies. Moreover, the courts’ failure to absorb complaints 
subsequently spill over to other parts of the state bureaucracy 
(Michelson,  2008). Petitioning against trial results is a very Chinese 
phenomenon. 
 Frustration with judicial outcomes contributes to the formation of the 
mentality that pollution is inevitable. Michelson and Read (2011) suggest that 
the widespread negative experience-based assessment of official justice among 
Chinese people is because they conflate procedural justice and distributive 
justice, which means refuting undesirable substantive outcomes, regardless of 
the fairness of the procedures by which they are produced. However, the 
judicial process is not just cold procedures. What I want to emphasize here is 
the humiliation it brings to ordinary villagers. Recalling the court experience, 
Mrs. Lu frequently mentioned the judge stopped their “inappropriate” acts in 
the courtroom: hooting at the lying enterprise manager was prevented; 
testimony was often interrupted for its “irrelevancy”; villager onlooker 
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wearing slippers was blocked out of the door.125 It seems backward peasants 
may break the order any instant in a different world regulated by modern 
knowledge.  
  If the details above only annoy villagers, the process of evidence 
presentation may trample on their dignity. The court is insensitive to the 
sensory descriptions, which represent villagers’ own life experiences: strong 
odour making people sick; fish disappearing from the dirty river; dust blowing 
everywhere. The life story of a person has to be broken down into pieces of 
cold and ruthless evidence such as scientific test reports and documentary 
proof. The direct victims of pollution, villagers are inevitably marginalized in 
the battle that requires professional knowledge far beyond their reach. When 
using the same kind of scientific evidence, villagers are clearly in a weaker 
position compared to polluting enterprises. Their ignorance is consistently 
taken advantage by defense attorneys and judges. Villagers are usually 
unaware of these professionals’ irregular operation. Si Kailing believes that if 
the judge who knows best of valid evidences could point the right direction of 
proof, the results of many cases might change.126 Villagers are learning to be 
professional and modern in the process, but always remain a step or two 
behind. In the example given by Si, when villagers collected the water sample, 
they were informed that the collection of evidence violated procedure: there 
was no notary present when the water was sampled.127 
 If it is only assumed that the local government colludes with polluting 
enterprises prior to the judicial process, the involvement in court hearing, 
                                                             
125 TZLMM, personal communication, February 26, 2011. On inappropriate acts in the court, a 
local judge also verified this point. HZNJL, personal communication, November 29, 2010.  
126 Si Kailing, public speech, Cross-strait Anthropological Camp “Environment and Health”  




evidence collection, cross-examination, attestation and debate actually 
confirms their conjecture in some sense: Government agencies refuse to 
provide certain documentary proof; the test result prepared by the government 
is inconsistent with the one given by the third party; government officials may 
play the role of the agent to speak for enterprises; the court bans media 
reporting that may cause wide concern. All of these reduce the credibility of 
both the law and the government. Villagers tend to believe that the 
government manipulates the law and legal procedures and intervenes in cases 
of polluting enterprises in which it has economic interests. Whether it is true 
or not is irrelevant. 
 In fact, the difficulty of litigation has become a catalyst to negotiated 
solutions. Zhao Yuhong (2004) notes that in reality many disputants 
reluctantly give up their rights and have to accept mediation agreements under 
pressure. Usually the one-off proposal of polluting enterprises deliberately 
avoids using such phrases as “compensation for pollution.” They even add 
clauses of no link found between damage and pollution or of preventing 
further prosecution. The lump-sum payment to individual villagers is 
frequently used to buy core witnesses and cause splits among the group of 
litigants. 
  In all, the court of justice and fairness, instead represents unequal 
power relations. Villagers feel humiliated when their values and beliefs are 
battered by the discourse by formal law and state power. Through the failure 
or insincerity of legal proceedings, the deeply ingrained distrust in law is 
further exacerbated. One unfortunate result is that pollution becomes 





This chapter discussed the formation of such a mentality in areas of insider-
driven industrialization based on rural entrepreneurship. Indeed, I wish to 
suggest that such a representation of pollution may be beyond this mode of 
industrialization since people may observe similar representations of pollution 
elsewhere. The point is that the sources of the mentality that pollution is 
inevitable are diverse and its formation may follow a different logic in 
different forms of local political economy. In the case of China, a country 
where state power perpetrates almost every corner of people’s life, the effects 
of government behavior on shaping people’s mind are tremendous. As this 
chapter showed, many government initiatives that aim for pollution control 
instead have fostered a sense that pollution is inevitable among ordinary 
people and such a sense of inevitability is constantly reinforced by the 
interaction with government agencies. In other words, the experience with 
state power is a fundamental reason in forming this mentality beyond mode of 
industrialization in China.  
 The peculiarity of the places where rural industrialization is driven by 
villagers themselves is that villagers are not just the sufferers of pollution. 
They interact with the government on more occasions than ex post relief. As 
entrepreneurs, they need to deal with government agencies even before the 
factory is built. The dual role of victims and perpetrators engenders the same 
mentality that pollution is inevitable. As victims, they blame the government 
for poor remedies and at the same time, as perpetrators, they “do as the 
government does” to justify their polluting behaviors. Villagers complain 
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about the deteriorating environment, but when specifying the sources of 
pollution, they may paradoxically ignore or trivialize its harm for various 
reasons.  
 More importantly, to perceive pollution as inevitable does not mean 
complete silence over pollution. Whatever action (or inaction) they take, is 
based on the premise that pollution is inevitable. Even if villagers violently 
protest against polluting enterprises, the unrealistic goal of eradicating 
pollution is usually not among their first choice. In fact, where there is 
polluting industry, there is interest. Cunning people can exploit pollution for 
other purposes even if they do not take pollution per se seriously. When 
environmental protection is a hotspot to aggregate resources, pollution is a 
good excuse to claim or take a share of spoils. Desperate victims can also 
strategically battle with pollution in order to receive as much financial 
recompense as possible. Making noise is necessary to stand out among the 
crowd, exert pressure on powerful parties and find potential alliances to fight 
the hard battle. Why local villagers with a mentality of “pollution is inevitable” 











Chapter Four  
Involving the State: Pollution-induced Petition and Mediation 
  
Through decades of industrialization, villagers have gained a sense of 
environmental consciousness, although not in the same way as national or 
global elites would care (Weller, 2006). Facing the growing threat of industrial 
pollution, villagers have pursed multiple strategies to solve their grievances, 
even if the hopelessness and helplessness that spring from inevitable pollution 
are quite strong. As Stern (2013) points out, protest and litigation occupy the 
top of the dispute pyramid, which villagers would not readily attempt. The 
more frequent and easier method is to petition to local EPBs. However, the 
petitioning system is more a consultative apparatus than a mechanism of 
conflict resolution, in which the state invites the masses to signal their 
preferences but tightly controls the forms and effects of so-called public 
participation (Chen, 2012). As was discussed in Chapter 3, many villagers 
have realized that it is up to the state to decide how such petitions will (or will 
not) influence environmental implementation.  
 Even so, environmental petitions have been on the rise in recent years. 
Nor do all villagers’ efforts end in vain. This chapter aims to explain why 
seemingly useless petitions have prevailed and what contributes to 
environmental conflict resolution. If pollution is inevitable, it is necessary to 
devise a new strategy. I argue that quite a number of villagers make use of the 
loopholes of environmental petitioning system to raise unreasonable non-
pollution-related demands, which leads to a surge in environmental petitions. 
In the meantime, I intend to rehabilitate the role of mediation in pollution-
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induced contention, which includes offering a more pertinent definition of 
grassroots mediation. Not only villagers seek mediation for pollution 
compensation, but also local governments initiate mediation to ensure 
environmental compliance. On the surface, unreasonable petitions and reliance 
on mediation are two separate topics. But both can be seen as products of the 
central government’s paramount political goal of stability maintenance. To 
avoid blotches on their records, local officials under pressure use every means 
to defuse contention at the grassroots levels. This has not only made space for 
unreasonable demands but also has renewed the emphasis on mediation.  
 This chapter will thereby address the above two aspects. For the former, 
I will explain why pollution is a popular excuse for many pseudo anti-
pollution claim making. By examining three types of ill-motivated anti-
pollution claims - on fellow villagers, nearby enterprises and local 
governments - I attempt to illustrate the causes of the widespread existence of 
such unreasonable case submissions. Regarding the latter, I will first provide a 
more pertinent definition in the rural context. Then I explore two fields where 
mediation can play an important role: environmental enforcement through 
mediation and pollution compensation negotiation. I will conclude by 
providing some insights by relating the persistence of contention to the logic 
of stability preservation. 
  
Pseudo Anti-Pollution Claim Making 
The literature on framing indicates the broad space for non-pollution factors 
being utilized for anti-pollution claims. As many social movements often 
engage in substantial drama to attract attention, post-materialistic 
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environmental claims are more likely to be honored when they piggyback on 
dramatic real-world events that may have little to do with pollution (Unger, 
1992). More importantly, pollution problems per se are interlocked with many 
more politically sensitive but favorable issues such as illegal land requisition 
and cadre corruption. This produces even more leeway for framing. In the 
well-known Huashui incident in 2005,128 the successful experience of ousting 
polluting factories was attributed to the strategic framing of environmental 
concerns as anti-corruption and land recovery claims (Deng, 2010; Deng & 
Yang, 2013). In the meantime, non-pollution factors can also be 
contextualized to dissolve the relationship between pollution and possible 
diseases. In some cancer villages, people tended to trace the lay aetiologies of 
cancer to negative emotions, smoking, consuming alcohol and preserved 
vegetables rather than visible industrial pollution, unless resorting to the latter 
was more productive in attracting attention and further obtaining redress 
(Lora-Wainwright, 2010).  
 Although non-pollution factors are not absent in the literature, one 
important variant - claim-making under the anti-pollution cloak - is rarely 
discussed. I first learned about it from Mr. Gu, an enforcer in the grassroots 
environmental supervision squadron. “You really think people purely petition 
against pollution? They just want to profit from it.”129 Here profiting from 
pollution does not mean that an enterprise implements a sound environmental 
measure compatible with company profits. Instead, it refers to the act of 
                                                             
128 For media reports on the Huaxi environmental contention, see 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/apr/15/china.jonathanwatts?INTCMP=SRCH; 
http://business.sohu.com/20050510/n225494065.shtml; 
http://blog.boxun.com/hero/200903/wmq/3_1.shtml, accessed on January 25, 2010. 
129 JXGLJ, personal communication, December 26, 2010 
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making pollution as a legitimate excuse to engage local governments (or 
threaten to do so) in order to satisfy one’s wants and whims.  
 Significantly, the above opinion is not just held by individual law-
enforcers in local EPBs. Later inquiries with several EPB officials of different 
counties also confirmed that these “environmental” petitions occur widely in 
the countryside.130 Mr. Tang, another environmental enforcer at one county 
EPB, was even more outspoken. "Many people don’t care about pollution at 
all. Just because the state says polluting the environment violates the law, 
some people want to make use of it to blackmail the enterprise." 131  The 
environmental enforcers I interviewed, based on their own experiences, 
estimated that such petitions accounted for around one-third of the total 
number of environmental petitions.132 
 Do local EPB officials make such claims to avoid their own 
responsibility? With this question in mind, I continued my investigation 
among villagers. Interestingly, when they were willing to talk about pollution-
related disputes, their focus was rarely on pollution, but on the people 
involved. For example, someone did many disgusting things, one of which 
was to leave waste water pollute the river.133 Or someone was inconsiderate, 
demanding too much simply because of minor pollution from 
neighbors.134Villagers explicitly or implicitly admitted that there existed many 
fault-finding cases for non-pollution purposes. 
                                                             
130 Interview with EPB officials in Taizhou, Jiaxing, Yiwu and Ningbo prefectures. 
131 YWTWB, personal communication, April 8, 2011 
132 Interestingly, the deputy head of one county xinfang bureau said among all the complaints 
submitted to xingfang bureau, one third of them can be solved, one third not, the last one third 
are unreasonable claim making. JXWXP, personal communication, December 31, 2010. 
133 TZLMM, personal communication, February 26, 2011 
134 TZYBB, personal communication, April 28, 2011 
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 Why involve officials in the cases? Objectively, loopholes exist in the 
current environmental petitioning system of which villagers can take 
advantage. There is no filtration mechanism to preclude such vexatious 
petitions. Except for the cases beyond jurisdictional limits or insufficient 
information, each petition is expected to be treated equally. It is hard to know 
whether they are real anti-pollution demands before expending time and labor 
performing inspection. The pressure of ensuring political stability compounds 
the situation. To detect the potential risks that will influence their performance 
records, environmental officials do not dare to trifle with all sorts of appeals. 
This not only adds extra burden to environmental enforcers but also wastes the 
energy intended for normal enforcement given the limited organizational 
resources of local EPBs. No wonder environmental officials tend to be 
annoyed by unreasonable petitions.  
 Characteristics of anti-pollution petitions also make them popular 
among villagers. First, pollution produced by the target polluter already exists. 
Accusing the target of discharging pollution can absolve complainants from 
the blame of trumping up something out of nothing. Second, reporting 
pollution to local EPBs is officially encouraged and environmental officials 
ought to respond to complaints. This makes pollution a well-justified reason to 
involve the government. Third, polluters are supposed to be inspected by 
environmental enforcers after a tip-off and punished by law when verified. 
Exposing pollution to EPBs can thereby cause such troubles as spot check, if 
not real loss – pollution fines. This renders it not only an effective way to 
make the accused suffer, but also a viable threat to force the target into 
concession. Many deals unrelated to pollution occur in this context. Finally, 
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lodging an anonymous complaint by telephone, email, or online forum is 
economical and easy. The operation of online complaint system at many 
provincial and prefectural EPBs has eased skip-level petitioning. 135  Then, 
what can be linked to the excuse of pollution? Further investigation reveals 
that there are three broad types of ill-motivated anti-pollution claims: on 
fellow villagers, nearby enterprises and local governments.  
 Quite a number of cases raised to local EPBs cannot bear scrutiny. 
Some villagers file a case simply because they dislike their neighbors. Others 
just want tit for tat. Since pollution provides a legitimate reason to make 
demands, people use it to vent their spleen, reasonable or not. Mr. Wu went to 
petition about the noisy lathe of his neighbor because the elder father of his 
neighbor occupied the public space on the roof for flower planting and left no 
room for his air-conditioner installation. Mr. Yang’s metal processing 
workshop was visited by EPB officials because he built the new roof too high, 
which brushed against a tangerine tree of his neighbor’s.136 It might be unfair 
to blame that the discontent with pollution in those cases was not genuine, but 
reporting pollution to local EPBs has been taken as a weapon for reprisal. One 
environmental officer of Jiaxing prefectural EPB, Mr. Zhang, showed me a 
quirk in the petition letters: “Usually there are several similar polluting 
enterprises around, but the complainant only mentioned the specific one – his 
or her target.”137 To remain polite and courteous in public, as well as to hide 
one’s real intentions, calling in the uninitiated local EPBs to make trouble on 
the target is a safe and convenient tactic. Even if the government intervention 
                                                             
135 For example, in Zhejiang, EPB at provincial and prefectural level set up online petitioning 
systems.  
136 Both examples from YWZJL, personal communication,  April 8, 2011 
137 JXZWZ, personal communication, December 19, 2010 
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does not result in real loss on the target, an unannounced sudden government 
inspection is a desirable result.  
 If people in the conflicts between neighborhood acquaintances try the 
chance of the target being punished by the EPB, many claims made on 
stranger enterprises are plain blackmails. The same Mr. Gu above described 
one of his experiences with what he called “wily villagers”: “There was a guy 
consistently petitioning against a factory near home in order to let the factory 
build a concrete path from his house to the main road.”138 The relationship 
between pollution and road works was incomprehensible. But this just showed 
that no logic related to pollution was required when stopping or reducing 
pollution was not on the wish list. Of course, the villager did not raise the 
request of building a path at the outset. But he soon showed his hand when 
kept asking for the sidewalk as compensation for pollution. Even if the 
petition against pollution was valid, the local EPB would not support such an 
unreasonable demand. However, the point here was not to have the backing of 
local EPBs, but to borrow the power from EPBs. With the presence of the EPB, 
the villager would not be simply ignored but win the chance to dialogue with 
the enterprise manager. In addition, he also expected that incessant pestering 
through petitions would badger environmental officials and enterprise 
managers into finally making some concessions.  
 Petitioning to local EPBs can also take the form of a verbal threat. Mr. 
Zhao, a township official, gave an example of disguised blackmail in which 
some local ruffians forced small enterprises to buy expensive yet low quality 
                                                             
138 JXGLJ, personal communication, December 26, 2010 
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tea by threatening to expose pollution to the EPB.139 To avoid trouble, many 
enterprise owners chose to accept the iniquitous deal. Frankly speaking, it was 
a bit difficult to discern whether the harassment by the scoundrels per se or the 
threat of tipping off pollution to environmental enforcers played a larger role 
here. But small bosses did not want to compound the situation by involving 
the government. While calling in the police might provoke retaliation, 
pollution was, after all, indefensible in front of the EPB. Interestingly, when I 
raised the question to different villagers of how they would behave in this 
situation, they all agreed that a wise man should not fight when odds were 
against them as one Chinese proverb put it. Nonetheless, speaking of the 
culprit, villagers attributed it to larger pressure of enterprise survival due to 
stricter pollution control and consequently difficult employment situation. “If 
people have decent work to do, who would like to loaf around and do dirty 
things,” Ms. Yang commented. 140 
 Excessive demands can also be made on the local government when 
pollution problems emerge in public infrastructure. Mr. Ye, an environmental 
enforcer dispatched to a township told me the case he handled some few days 
back when I did an on line follow-up interview with him.141 Due to age and 
poor insulation, an underground sewage pipe broke and waste water leaked 
into a village river. When the township and EPB crews scrambled to repair the 
damage, they were stopped by a group of villagers. The latter insisted they 
would not allow the pipeline maintenance team to replace the broken and 
aging pipes unless the local government paid them 300,000 RMB first. 
Apparently, the delay in leak prevention would cause grave consequences. 
                                                             
139 TZZH, personal communication, May 3, 2011 
140 TZMWY, personal communication, May 6, 2011 
141 NBYY, personal communication, May 9, 2012 
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Spreading pollution could easily spawn worries and assemble people. If the 
small leak turned to a large pollution incident, the village-scale bargain to 
cross-village appeals, the brief siege to an expansive protest, local government 
officials, including township leaders or even county cadres, would face harsh 
punishments, since a major pollution accident that affects social stability was 
counted as the goal with veto power in the cadre evaluation system. The 
failure of achieving the goal trumped all other accomplishments.142 Finally, in 
the late afternoon the local government gave in.  
 Pragmatically speaking, villagers had good reasons to ask for an 
advance on the compensation fee, even though the amount was excessive. 
Distributing government funds could entail unfulfilled promises, 
procrastination, embezzlement and other bad things. While local officials were 
afraid of taking the risk of incident escalation, villagers would not let the rare 
bargain chip off so easily. This way, from the dawn when breakage was found 
to the dusk when the restoration started, waste water ceaselessly flowed into 
the river for hours amid the clamor of the crowd. Once again, the environment 
was sacrificed for self-interest and political expediency.  
 In the eyes of government officials, villagers in the three situations 
described above are all diaomin (cunning people), making unreasonable 
demands by manipulating existing rules. In the literature, diaomin is usually 
given a connotation of slight rebelliousness against state power, as Li and 
O’Brien’s idea of policy-based resisters indicates.143 Those grassroots protest 
leaders might not be the true agents of change who dare to challenge the 
                                                             
142 Materials for EPB evaluation in both Jiaxing prefectural EPB and Huangyan district EPB. 
143  Li & O'Brien (1996) developed a typology of villagers: shunmin (compliant villagers), 
dingzihu (recalcitrant) and diaomin (policy-based resisters). Diaomin use laws and policies to 
challenge cadre misconduct in defense of their lawful rights and interests; employ their 
knowledge of government directives to protest.  
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government or the capitalist as they self-reported.144 But it is still arguable if 
their popular rights claims and related contention reflect rights consciousness 
or rules consciousness (Perry, 2009; Li, 2009). However, what I observed in 
the field suggests that the tendency of viewing all villager response to 
industrial pollution as resistance should be resisted. Diaomin here care neither 
about the central-level rule-making concerning rights, nor the misbehaviors of 
local rule-enforcement authorities. On the surface, they speak of rights, 
prescribing that the state is obligated to provide its citizens a clean 
environment. They cooperatively follow the rules of the game by reporting 
pollution to local EPBs. In the end, they do so to achieve their personal ends. 
While villagers might admire the former brave chu tou niao (the bird ahead of 
the flight), they tend to despise the latter who reaps without sowing. 145 
 Understandably, there are always opportunists that exploit the system’s 
loopholes. Nevertheless, the party-state obsessive pursuit of social stability 
lies at the heart of the abuse of anti-pollution petitioning. Diaomin have a 
masterly grasp of people’s minds like trouble saving or offense avoidance, but 
it is the local governments’ risk-averse responses that make the tricks possible. 
Local governments are not good at solving problems at point, but they tend to 
respond to all sorts of complaints when the situation is unknown. Under the 
tremendous pressure of stability maintenance, local officials would rather 
expend time and effort on unproved allegations than miss any straw in the 
                                                             
144  In Michelson’s study of Chinese lawyers (2006), diaomin are deemed more likely to 
challenge their employers and pursue labor grievances. In the meantime, diaomin are also 
more likely to challenge the lawyers they hire and to demand a refund of their fees if their 
wishes are not completely fulfilled. According to Hildebrandt (2013), his informants in 
Chinese grassroots NGOs self-identify themselves as diaomin that are strong-willed, prepared 
to challenge the government, but do so cleverly. They are true change agents and most 
difficult to be suppressed. 
145 It is considered as unwise for anyone to show openly his or her talents. “Qiang da chu tou 
niao” (It is the bird ahead of the flight that gets shot the first), says the Chinese proverb. 
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wind. The local governments’ inclination of prioritizing conflict suppression 
over problem solution is delicious fruit for diaomin who have no aspiration for 
environmental protection. In this sense, there is no moral high ground to blame 
the shrewd, unyielding people who are essentially nurtured by the system.  
 
Solving the Real Pollution Problem by Mediation 
Not all anti-pollution petitions are inauthentic. Pollution can be a real 
grievance among villagers. Nonetheless, even if pollution is a major concern 
in the dispute, petitioning, as part of the ensemble, plays a limited role in 
conflict resolution. After all, it has to concede to mediation after the 
government gets involved. Excessive media and academic attention on 
petitioning in the context of prioritizing social stability has given people an 
impression that petition is the most frequent measure of conflict resolution. In 
reality, mediation is the essential part of the process if we examine the life at 
the grassroots level instead of rigidly following the legal definition.  
 There was a debate on the prevalence and importance of mediation 
between Wall, Blum (1991, 2000) and Diamant (2000). But as Michelson 
(2008) pointed out, mediation takes various forms and many of which might 
not be considered as mediation. When a villager makes an appeal, he or she 
often does not ask for a neutral mediator, but expects the authorities to take his 
or her side to put pressure on other parties. In this sense, mediation is fairly 
common in the countryside, since villagers seek intervention on a substantially 
wide range of problems. Before the issue is raised to local governments, 
mediation can be performed by kinship respectables and community leaders. 
People’s mediation committees (PMCs) are also active in different stages of 
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dispute resolution. Government agencies implement administrative mediation 
if requested. Even if the case goes to arbitration or adjunction, mediation is 
still desired and integrated into the former two processes. Analytically, we can 
see that the mediation recognized and acted on multiple competing venues in a 
way that a strict interpretation of the law might not allow.  
 Mediation has a long history in China. It was the primary mode of 
dispute settlement for thousands of years in pre-communist China when 
Confucianism, with its stress on harmony and disdain of litigation, was the 
official political philosophy and the code of conduct for the general mass 
(Cohen, 1966; Clark, 2002; Kaufmann-Kohler & Kun, 2008). Although the 
Chinese communists set themselves against the Confucian values and 
officially abolished clan institutions upon which traditional mediation 
depended, they continued the use of mediation to tackle conflicts within the 
people. 146  They have also transformed the function of mediation into 
educating the people so as to better implement party policies.147 The legal 
reforms towards the rule of law since the 1980s have made adjudication at 
court more available and more or less changed the tradition of non-litigation. 
148 However, social stability concerns in recent years have led to a renewed 
                                                             
146 Notably, in 1957 Mao linked the dichotomy between the people and the enemy to the 
theory of contradictions; conflicts between the people and the enemy are "antagonistic" 
contradictions, resolvable only by exercising the dictatorship of the people, while conflicts 
within the people are non-antagonistic and can be resolved through the use of democracy. 
Mao Zedong, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People, 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_58.htm, 
accessed on October 8, 2013. For more, see Huang (2006).  
147 Lubman (1967) argues that the politicization of mediation was reflected in its emphasis on 
class warfare, cadres serving the masses, changing the thought of disputants. The aim was to 
change disputants’ attitude, cultivate activists, and use principled dispute resolution to 
disseminate Party policies and to demonstrate the Party's solicitousness for poor peasants. 
148 In 1996, the rule of law was written into the Ninth Five-Year Plan, becoming an important 
principle for China’s modernization. In 1999, the rule of law was enshrined in the country’s 
constitution, giving it more legal clout. A socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics 




emphasis on mediation, which is intended to limit direct petitions to the 
government, precede or replace litigation in the courtroom, and prevent mass 
incidents. From village office to court room, although not obligated to try 
ways loosely clothed in the language of Alternative Dispute Resolutions 
(ADRs), Chinese arbitrators systematically take initiatives to work the process 
into mediation (Shao & Whiting, 2014).149 
 Roughly classified by state involvement, mediation in rural areas is 
usually performed by either traditional informal institutions such as the family, 
clan, village and guild or state-designated intermediaries like VCs (village 
committees), PMCs (people's mediation committees), offices of justice, courts 
dispatched to the township. But in fact, the above two types of mediation 
cannot be separated from each other at the local level. I call for a more 
inclusive definition of mediation that accommodates both.  First, the 
influential people in the clan, village and guild (if any) often overlap with 
village cadres. As the composition of the VC and village party committee 
reflects the power balance among different factions, village cadres are usually 
the representatives of respective kinship groups. A disputant goes to the VC 
for help from a more authoritative party in sorting out altercations. While the 
authority of most village cadres not only comes from the political office that 
they hold, but also their ascriptive position in the local community. In 
industrial villages, the economic power of entrepreneur cadres is an important 
source of influence as well. When these village cadres leave office, they can 
still exert influence by virtue of other forms of authority.  
                                                             
149 On dispute resolution in China, see Peerenboom & He (2009). 
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 Second, township officials are mostly selected from local villagers. 
They are part of the government but also part of the village. For ordinary 
villagers, seeking justice from the township government is more like trying 
local acquaintances who have connections with the government than dealing 
with distant bureaucracy. They can freely go to township offices and talk to 
officials without having their identity card checked, without queuing for 
reception or going through other administrative procedures that demonstrate 
state power when approaching higher-level government agencies. In my field 
sites, township officials were quite used to frequent visits by local villagers for 
frivolous quarrels. In fact, when the central leadership calls for early 
resolution before disputes escalate, they do not take conflicts raised to 
township level seriously as a real government concern. As Zhou Yongkang, 
the former Minister of Public Security put it, "xiaoshi bu chucun, dashi bu 
lixian, maodu bu shangjiao" (Small matters don’t leave the village, large 
matters don’t leave the township and conflicts do not rise to higher 
authorities). 150  Official explanation of escalation refers to local residents 
directly petitioning to county government agencies, filing suit at the county’s 
basic-level court, or holding protests large enough to necessitate a response 
from county agencies. Mr. Wang, the chief mediator at the township office of 
justice, gleamed with pride that the dispute rate “on the record of the county 
government” in 2010 and 2011 reduced substantially because of his 
mediation.151 
 Third, as a consequence of the above two points, mediation in the 
countryside combines the CCP’s promotion of people's mediation and the 
                                                             
150 See http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/200811/1125_17_894187.shtml, accessed on March 
20, 2013.  
151 TZWDM, personal communication, June 17, 2011 
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societal tradition of community mediation. It draws on state authority vested in 
grassroots administrative bodies and personal influence executed through 
delicate networks of interpersonal relationship. Although not exactly identical 
to quasi-official xiangbao in dynastic China, who were nominated by and 
drawn from local society and then confirmed by the state (Huang, 2008), 
village and township cadres serve a similar intermediary function in terms of 
mediation. They are Janus-faced, at once representatives of society and agents 
of the state. Usually county and provincial authorities prioritize preventing 
conflict escalation over resolving people's grievances, although the latter is a 
beneficial side effect (Minzner, 2011). But village and township cadres care 
about real dispute resolution since they are the closest state agency to local 
society by being part of it. Admittedly, grassroots cadres are a primary source 
of problems that may cause widespread resentment among villagers. But even 
as corrupt as such abusers of local society, village and township officials are 
still a more popular source of help than other third parties beyond the 
countryside. As one villager Ms. Yue commented, “Our village head did 
sometimes exploit his state connections for personal gains, but we cannot deny 
that he is adept at solving problems to the satisfaction of local 
complainants.” 152  This observation echoes with Michelson's survey results 
(2008) that local actors including village cadres and township governments are 
more often to be sought for help in addressing villager grievance. 
 Above all, my definition understands mediation as a mixed style means 
of conflict resolution that draws widely from all sorts of rural resources and 
can be conducted by different grassroots actors. Although the state-promoted 
                                                             
152 ZSYXP, personal communication, March 22, 2011 
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Grand Mediation in recent years also aims to mobilize different social actors 
to cope with intractable disputes, its orientation is still to suppress the conflict 
rather than solve it (Hu, 2011).153 However, the mediation I am stressing refers 
to the actual efforts of dispute resolution. In essence, environmental mediation 
in the Chinese countryside is used on two occasions: facilitating 
environmental enforcement and negotiating pollution compensation. While the 
former deals with enforcement and compliance between government agencies 
and polluting enterprises, the latter aims to settle the dispute between polluters 
and victims. Again mode of rural industrialization matters here, the cases to be 
discussed below will reflect the characteristics of this particular mode of rural 
industrialization. 
 
Compliance through Mediation 
In discussions of environmental enforcement, one striking but often neglected 
fact is that environmental compliance in many cases is realized through 
grassroots mediation: county or higher authorities rely on village and township 
cadres to digest miscellaneous and toilsome stuff in practical law enforcement. 
Although local EPBs or courts do not always quickly shrink from 
responsibility of mediation, they truly can do little without the help of the 
people who know the situation down to the ground well. Many authors have 
showed that the heavy reliance on township and village cadres in carrying out 
unpopular policies such as birth control and fee collection (Cai, 2010). 
Environmental enforcement is no exception. When local EPBs try to facilitate 
                                                             
153  As a nationally well-known experiment, Grand Mediation was initiated in Nantong, 
Jiangsu Province, in April 2003. It was one of innovative programs created by local 
governments to reduce popular grievances and maintain social stability. On the basis of the 
existing people’s mediation system, the government aims to rebuild mediation institutions, as 
a major mechanism for conflict resolution.  
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mediation or the courts help to enforce their decision, they all need the 
cooperation of grassroots cadres. That the rural cadres help to cover up the 
pollution caused by industrial enterprises in the village is not new. 154 
Moreover, in consideration of these cadres’ crucial impacts on protests, for 
instance, communicating with traditional informal institutions with mediation 
capacity, local EPBs and other government agencies surly will not take them 
lightly.155  
 As many have documented, local EPBs have no coercive power to 
force compliance (Jahiel, 1998; Ma & Ortolano, 2000; van Rooij, 2006; Tilt, 
2007). Not to mention shutting the power supply or forcing shutdown, even if 
the violator simply refuses to hand over the fine, EPBs can literally do nothing, 
given that the supplementary measures such as loans being only available to 
firms paying fines on time are of limited use. 156 But where local EPBs are at 
the end of their rope is the scope for the abilities of grassroots mediators. On 
many occasions, the effectiveness of mediation largely determines achievable 
law enforcement. 
 After several sanction orders were ignored by five plastic pellets 
granulating factories in Xiqian village, the EPB requested for a forcible 
execution by the local court.157 Even so, the polluters continued to pollute. To 
execute the production halts order, the local court and EPB called for 
mediation with the five enterprises, inviting the township and village cadres to 
be the middlemen. It proved effective to have grassroots cadres be part of the 
                                                             
154 TZZX, personal communication,  May 8, 2011 
155 On protest leadership, see Li & O’Brien (2008); also see Baocun case, Lora-Wainwright et 
al. (2012). 
156 Compared to earlier days, EPBs are more respected by enterprises now. HZTZX, personal 
communication, December 1, 2010 
157 The Xiqian case was collected from TZGY, March 4, 2011.  
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negotiation and coordination. While village cadres clearly understand the real 
demand of local bosses – new land for workshops, township officials knew the 
negotiation space that could be made within their jurisdiction – township 
quotas of land use. The alliance of polluters ultimately gave a written 
undertaking of suspending operation before factory relocation. Temporary 
compliance was achieved. Admittedly, the violators took this opportunity to 
push their own agenda, exchanging compliance for land. But this just reflected 
the cruel truth of some environmental compliance. As Ma and Ortolano (2000) 
show, some enterprises cooperatively pay fines simply because they know 
eighty percent rebates as tax exempt funds are guaranteed and the pollutant 
discharge fee system can be worked to their advantage. 158 
 For less obedient enterprises like those in Xiqian village, participating 
in mediation is to negotiate better terms of environmental compliance. In a 
sense, polluters welcome such mediation initiated by the local government, 
since they are in a better position to profit when the government wants 
something from them. 159  The factories in this case were set up close to 
residential areas without any pollution treatment facilities in the 1990s when 
the EIA was not yet a prerequisite for business registration. Allocating new 
land to the factories was in some way to correct the early mistake of poor 
planning. Unfortunately, the bosses’ commitment was fragile. When the traded 
interests – right of land use – failed to be delivered as soon as expected, the 
polluting production was resurrected with a new company name. Mediation 
was again requested for both assuaging the villagers and persuading the bosses 
to enter into new negotiations. People may easily associate the unruly behavior 
                                                             
158 Indirect forms of rebates still exist. NBYY, personal communication, July 20, 2011 
159 State-initiated mediation was also found in land disputes, see Zhang & Heurlin (2014). 
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of polluting enterprises with the connivance of township and village officials. 
Including these grassroots cadres in the mediation, in the eyes of some 
skeptics, is to let the wolf into the house. But mediation is a process that 
facilitates relationship adjustment among different parties. Grassroots cadres 
also need it to balance political pressures and local protectionism. In some 
sense, only when the protective umbrella is closed temporarily can compliance 
be possibly achieved. Since the micro political situation keeps changing, it is 
no surprise that such compliance is unstable and insecure. But even so, 
victimized villagers in entrepreneurial countryside are still lucky compared 
their counterparts in outsider-dominant industrialized villages, since they have 
channels to pressure on polluters who are tangible fellows. Although the result 
of pressure actions is uncertain, depending on the dynamics of village politics, 
it at least reveals a possibility of community-based regulation. 
 Compared to the uniformity of formal environmental enforcement, the 
secret of mediation’s relative success in achieving compliance lies that it 
involves the key stakeholders and accommodates on-going grassroots politics. 
In the Xiqian case, the critical grassroots cadres were included so that they 
could address the crucial land problem for factory relocation – an indirect way 
to relieve pollution concerns. Local EPBs, however, infrequently resort to 
mediation to pursue compliance. After all, gathering people for tedious 
bargaining is costly. Nonetheless, facing strong public resentment, especially 
when it turns to pressures from superiors - in this case, the provincial 
environmental authority had put Xiqian villagers’ petition on the list of key 
cases - local EPBs are more likely to give way to polluters so as to ensure 
compliance first. In this sense, environmental enforcement through mediation 
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can be seen as a political response to the overwhelming demand for social 
stability.  
 
Negotiating the Compensation 
The other important field where mediation plays a constructive role is post-
pollution negotiation. As mediation in compliance cases keeps reverting to the 
subject of money, not exaggeratedly, almost all real pollution disputes in the 
neighborhood become compensation issues in the end. When the causal link 
between pollution and harm can be easily established, even if it is not caused 
by human error,160 the bone of contention is the amount of compensation. The 
victims, with justice on their side, naturally want as much as possible, while 
the polluters insist that their apology should not be repaid with iniquitous 
charges.  
 Successful mediation requires a balance between demand and supply 
of this kind both materially and spiritually. This means not only the final 
amount of money shall be acceptable to both disputants, but also face and 
other emotional needs of involved parties should be taken care of. Sometimes 
one party may refuse to accept a favorable deal simply because of the 
arrogance of the opponent.  He or she would rather lose a little if he felt he 
was treated respectfully by the other party. Mr. Jin, an official of District 
office of Agriculture, recalled an incident of carp fry suffering pollution, in 
which the owner of fish pond insisted that the polluter should apologize to him 
in person before discussing the details of compensation.161 
                                                             
160 For example, in the rainy days, clogged pipes caused drain water to back up into the river. 
161 TZJYL, personal communication, March 3, 2011 
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 The skills and experience of the mediator is also pivotal. Astute 
sensitivity to people’s psychology, competence in reasoning and 
argumentation, and a mastery of related laws and regulations are useful assets. 
A proficient mediator is supposed to integrate “qing, li, fa” (literally, emotion, 
reason and law) and help disputants weigh the pros and cons. Often, in 
pollution-induced contention, the mediator explains all possible consequences 
to the offender so as to secure the payment of compensation, on one hand. On 
the other hand, he or she persuades the sufferer not to raise or stick to 
unrealistic demands that prolong cases. According to Ms. Ye, who is working 
at the township government, many polluters did intend to escape responsibility 
at the outset, especially when the pollution was not deliberately caused. Their 
responsibility is to let the polluter admit fault by conducting thought work and 
at the same time make sure that the final negotiated price will not bankrupt the 
company if the pollution is caused by a loss-making enterprise.162 
 A mediator familiar with the issue in dispute will be a powerful booster.  
For instance, in one case of grape seedlings being contaminated by acid liquid 
from the neighbor's tank truck, the mediator happened to be an experienced 
grape grower and thus identified not all cultivars were susceptible to acid 
damage without distinction. More crucially, he suggested the victim to take 
timely and adequate measures to minimize the loss, which, in the meantime, 
indirectly saved the polluter a lot of money. Therefore, both parties trusted the 
mediator and reached an agreement based on his estimate of possible output 
reduction and consequent loss.163  
                                                             
162 TZYYY, personal communication, May 4, 2011 
163 JXXGM, personal communication, December 24, 2010 
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 Apart from standing on his or her own authoritativeness, what makes 
an excellent mediator distinct from mediocrities is that he or she can find the 
appropriate persons who are able to influence the disputants. As was 
mentioned earlier, the mediator in China, mostly carrying a responsibility of 
maintaining social order, does not simply act as a neutral third party to 
facilitate the course, but tends to direct the process to the party-state desired 
harmony. Therefore, other than persuasion, mediation also rests on the 
pressure asserted by and the impact of influential people. They can be persons 
enjoying the power of distributing benefits on other issues and are thus able to 
coax or press the disputants to compromise. Or they can be ones that are 
familiar with the temperament and character of parties concerned and thereby 
know how to soften their position. Influential people vary across cases: some 
may concede to give face to township leaders, village cadres, or kinship 
seniors; others may simply buy the reasoning or emotional appeal of an 
intimate relative, a trusted friend or a close neighbor.  
 To find the appropriate influential person requires a thorough grasp of 
the vast network of social relations, both historically and currently. Such 
insider information of the grassroots complex is obtained and accumulated by 
approaching different influential people in the course of thousands of 
mediation cases. Mr. Wang, a national model mediator, proudly told me the 
secret to his high rate of successful mediation lies in his mastery of the 
intimate details of village life. He gave an example of pollution-induced 
dispute in which potted plants of a certain villager Laoli’s outside his house 
were spoiled due to improper disposal of waste water by his neighbor. It was 
supposed to be a minor issue involving a small amount of money. But Laoli 
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reacted vehemently and made excessive demands. Two rounds of mediation 
by the village committees failed before the case was passed to Mr. Wang. 
Informed by his resourceful network, Mr. Wang approached Laoli’s amiable, 
unassuming wife and learned that the unequal redistribution of housing land 
two years ago was the crux of the problem, while the polluted plants was just a 
front for pent-up rancor. A lot of pertinent thoughtful work including 
requesting his wife to tap into Laoli’s feelings of affection was thus followed 
up and eventually transformed Laoli's stance and pacified the conflict.164 
 The central government’s demand for high success rate of mediation 
has spurred mediators to employ peer pressure or official authority to push 
stubborn quarrelers into compromise. For example, the delay in signing the 
compensation agreement might be portrayed as foot dragging, which may 
stain one's reputation. Or the threat of revoking potential interests, despite 
implicitly, may be employed in exchange for compliance. While a good 
mediation based on sympathetic understanding can start a virtuous cycle of 
"giving face" and reciprocating favors, a poorly handled mediation involving 
coercion may sow the seeds of future dissonance.  
 In one round of improvement of village environment in Hujiao village, 
waste water was flushed into Mr. Su’s fish bond because of improper handling. 
The village committee accepted responsibility. However, although the 
accident ended with compensation for rent, fish loss and absence from work 
after several rounds of mediation by the township office of justice, the parties 
concerned - the village committee and Mr. Su - had quite different readings on 
the final agreement. The former complained that Mr. Su was a nettlesome 
                                                             
164 TZWDM, personal communication, July 4, 2011 
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nuisance who, relying easily on his status as the victim, sat in front of 
township office and halted the car of township leaders, just to increase the 
amount of compensation. But Mr. Su argued that he made all these efforts to 
receive the current compensation package because village cadres had forced 
him to accept a lower one. Leaving the incompatible versions of stories aside, 
interviews with township officials suggested that state sensitivity to 
inharmonious elements have spread to neighborhood issues. 165  Officials 
seemed less concerned with the financial burden the task of stability 
maintenance incurs than the effect of money in buying stability (Lee & Zhang, 
2013). But anyway, in entrepreneurial countryside, it is more probable to have 
relatively fair negotiations between polluters and victims since both parties 
involved are fellow villagers. Comparatively, as shown by Lora-Wainwright 
and others (2013), faced with a powerful outsider polluter, victimized villagers 
with much less bargaining power have to accept some unfairly conditional 
compensation package. 
 
Conclusion: Behind the Unreasonable Claim Making 
While not as dramatic as expected, this chapter has illustrated different kinds 
of pollution-related claims in daily life. The pollution problem lies at the 
intersection of the economic interest of industrial development and the 
political responsibility of environmental protection. In front of a lucrative 
prospect, no wonder that everyone would like take a slice of the cake. Many 
non-pollution issues are disguised as pollution-induced problems. Pollution, as 
a fait accompli, is frequently used to attain more pragmatic interests, since the 
                                                             
165 TZXX, personal communication, May 11, 2011 
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damage has been done. Even if villagers accept pollution as inevitable, as 
showed in Chapter Three, those long immersed in the market economy will 
not choose passive suffering but grasp every opportunity to profit from 
pollution, as they do elsewhere.  
 Is such pseudo anti-pollution claim making absent in modes of 
outsider-driven industrialization? I do not think so. But why is it not reported 
in related literature? My answer lies at mode of rural industrialization. In 
places where rural industrialization is driven by outsiders, the imbalanced 
distribution of benefits (mostly taken by outsider bosses) and costs (mainly 
borne by locals) makes the elimination of pollution an urgent need that 
overrides other demands hidden in the claims.  However, in entrepreneurial 
countryside, when villagers themselves also cause pollution and share the 
profits of the industry, the impulse to stop pollution is largely weakened. 
Instead, villagers have begun to think about how to exploit more out of 
inevitable pollution. The higher incidence of such cases makes it easier to find 
them in the field.  
 The widespread existence of opportunistic behaviors has caused a bad 
consequence. In many cases, villagers are no longer seen as the victims of 
pollution. Emphasis on compensation exceeds relief for victims. The de facto 
legitimizing and normalizing effect of compensation seems to help the 
government recover the moral ground. The deputy of the People’s Congress in 
the prefectural city Foshan, Guangdong province commented on using various 
strange excuses to capitalize on policy implementation, “the government’s 
indulgent practice of satisfying unreasonable demands produced diaomin.”  
Her comment is typical and revealing. According to her, the leniency of the 
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government is being abused by ill-intentioned people. The government should 
not give money generously to fussy claimants. It only sets bad precedents and 
inflates the arrogance of diaomin.166 She is not wrong about the important role 
of the government in shaping the people’s mentality. However, this prevailing 
opinion within the society conveys a dangerous tendency of putting the cart 
before the horse. The means of retrieving rights and interests by some people 
might be condemnable, but it cannot constitute a sufficient reason for refuting 
the legitimacy of citizens’ initial claims or justifying the governments’ 
ineffectiveness or unresponsiveness. It is a form of responsibility-shifting to 
blame the excessive measures taken by the people rather than ascertain the 
root cause of social grievances. 
 As the popular idiom puts it, the squeaky wheel gets the grease. Indeed, 
people take extreme measures or make exaggerated demands to stand out from 
numerous competing claimants. 167  Cai Yongshun (2010) argues that the 
impact of a group’s resistance is determined not only by the forcefulness of its 
resistance but also by that of other groups. This rationale also applies to 
unreasonable claim making. The more absurd or eye-catching, the more 
chances of being attended to. Disruptive, pestering and other bothersome 
measures are used to enhance one’s bargaining power.  
 Putting tactics aside, the strong tendency of referring to the 
government for help is deeply rooted in the political system. As Elizabeth 
Perry (2008) points out, in China rights are seen more as state-authorized 
                                                             
166 The news comes from http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2012/01-10/3592075.shtml, accessed 
on June 9, 2013. 
167On using extreme measures, one of my informants did mention that they should have taken 
more violent actions to pressure on local governments as their faraway counterparts whose 
story he only heard from his son. (TZLBB, personal communitication, February 27, 2011)But 




interests than as naturally endowed protections against state intrusion. When 
their rights are infringed, people tend to seek their restoration from the 
authoritative state. Even if the dispute is between neighbors, they may 
instinctively fetch help from the government, but not in the sense of 
deliberately making trouble for the government. Moreover, the party-state 
strictly enforces the Leninist organizational principles of prohibiting the 
formation of competing organizations that can challenge its rule. The absence 
of real autonomous associations also exacerbates the tendency of seeking 
government help. In addition, the party-state enjoys unparalleled access to all 
sorts of key resources, which makes itself an effective patronage machine. All 
walks of life swarm to the state for benefits (Dickson, 2010). In the case of 
pollution, appeals ultimately refer to government agencies – grassroots 
officials, EPBs and courts. Media and environmental non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), if at all, are meant to facilitate these appeals.  
 But why mostly individualized actions aiming for financial 
compensation? Building on Yan Yunxiang’s thesis of individualization of 
Chinese society (2009), Tilt (2013a) points out the villagers have to tackle 
economic and environmental risks by themselves because of individualization, 
especially as rural communities grow divided due to industrialization. Chinese 
peasants certainly struggle to keep pace with the changes in the process of 
individualization indicative of modernity as people do elsewhere. But they 
also face a severe situation given that the past three decades of reforms have 
further weakened the collective community on which peasants used to rely for 
mutual insurance. Moreover, a more general social welfare system on their 
behalf is far from being established (Wong, 1998; Hebel, 2003; Chang, 2003). 
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Self-reliance is not only a virtue promoted by the state but also the reality of 
peasants when facing a range of existing and potential risks. No wonder that 
individual villagers try all manner of means, even if groundless, to reduce their 
vulnerability. Ending pollution is a faraway, intangible benefit. Money, very 
useful in a society where almost everything has a price, is obviously more 
attractive for Chinese peasants whose strong sense of insecurity has 
accumulated over a long period of time.   
 In addition, national legislation has also strengthened the idea of 
compensation (van Rooij et al., 2012). Except for a mention of compensation 
for directly affected victims, more broadly framed environmental rights are 
absent in the Environmental Protection Law.168 Consequently, villagers have 
gradually refrained themselves from normative judgments about the unjust, 
illegal or immoral nature of pollution and taken actions that are strictly aligned 
with the search for compensation.169 
 The rising obsession with money of late has deeper reasons. Its source 
is the strategy of buying stability - the most prevalent means of pacifying 
aggrieved citizens – in implementing the task of stability maintenance by 
different levels of local governments. Villagers view the state’s sensitivity to 
possible escalation of social discontent as a chance to get what they want, 
regardless of the underlying legitimacy of their demands. The examples this 
chapter illustrated can be seen as a moderate version of the operation of this 
mechanism, in which local EPBs respond to trivial issues rather than miss the 
                                                             
168 The Environmental Protection Law of People’s Republic of China, see http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=6229, accessed on August 3, 2013. 
169  Please note that although villagers generally do not directly read or study their rights 
specified in laws, they can learn them from the mediators, lawyers or officials if they are 
involved in disputes over pollution. 
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potential risks that may threaten social stability and consequently their officers’ 
careers.  
 But environmental protection cannot be established and sustained on 
the basis of materialist expectations and exchange relations. When policy 
implementation and law enforcement come with a price tag, the respect and 
authority of the government and the law in the eyes of the people diminishes. 
The compensation trap (van Rooij et al., 2012) that routinizes pollution as a 
problem to be dealt with through redress rather than through improved 
regulation, oversight and enforcement, if not broken, may perpetuate China’s 


















Chapter Five  
Unprofitable Pollution: Outsider Pollution 
 
In keeping with the truism that where you sit affects what you see, this chapter, 
together with the following one, will explore how the outsider/insider 
distinction influences local villagers’ responses to industrial pollution. After 
all, this distinction is essentially a measure of one’s relative position to the 
other. This chapter will look at the more visible dividing line first, that is, the 
political boundary for place and people, as reflected in administrative division 
and hukou system, respectively. Although most pollution-induced contention, 
like many other interest-based claim making in China, is localized (Perry, 
2001), its peculiarity lies in pollution’s ignorance of political or administrative 
boundaries. Not only can pollutants travel through water and atmospheric 
and biologic circulation in nature, polluters can also set up factories in places 
other than the ones of their origins. Neither does this outsider/insider 
distinction play a role in vacuum. The local mode of rural industrialization 
also matters. In Zhejiang, outsider pollution occurs where local villagers drive 
rural industrialization. This chapter will also show how the local political 
economy engenders the resources that rear local villagers into particular action. 
 Empirically, this chapter centers on villager responses to two kinds of 
outsider pollution, specifically, polluting enterprises in an adjacent 
administrative jurisdiction (waidi, non-local places) and pollution produced by 
outsiders (waidiren, people from non-local places) in local communities. For 
the former, I begin with a working definition of trans-boundary pollution, 
including trans-county, trans-prefectural and trans-provincial pollution. I 
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discuss one example for each type. Pollution control across borders and the 
resolution of related conflicts requires inter-jurisdictional coordination which 
is always problematic in decentralized China. A comparison among the three 
examples shows that state-imposed boundaries, along with the government 
hierarchy, is so firm that even violent collective action only creates limited 
political opportunity. The later scenario starts with an understanding of 
waidiren in the Chinese context. I differentiate between two categories of 
waidiren, namely, immigrant entrepreneurs and migrant workers, and discuss 
their status in host communities. If outsiders cannot take their advantage as 
floating population and native-place networks, they are more likely to suffer at 
the hands of locals. Finally, I return to outsider/insider distinction, reviewing 
its relationship to outsider pollution discussed in this chapter.  
 
Contention around Pollution from waidi 
Trans-boundary Pollution 
The United Nations defines trans-boundary pollution as the following: 
“pollution that originates in one country but is able to cause damage to the 
environment in another country by crossing the border through pathways of 
water or air.”170 In China’s context, we can reasonably substitute counties for 
countries. This is not only due to the country’s enormous size, but also in 
many respects due to its “county economy”. The decision of inviting industrial 
investment into the local economy, for example, or that of closing or removing 
a polluting factory, is in large part made by the county government.171 This 
                                                             
170 The definition comes from Glossary of Environment Statistics (1997), Studies in Methods, 
Series F, No. 67, United Nations, New York. 
171 County economy refers to economy development is organized in a country space. The 
county government is responsible for developing economy, from planning to implementation. 
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lends county boundaries significance. Correspondingly, trans-county 
competition and coordination has also gained its importance in the context of 
decentralization. Moreover, county boundaries coincide with the borders of 
provinces and prefectures and thus the definition could accommodate trans-
provincial and trans-prefectural pollution as well, both of which occur in 
specific counties in reality. For cross-boundary contention above the county 
level, higher-level factories or projects included,172  before being raised to 
higher level authorities, they must be handled by county governments. While 
high-level prefectural or provincial governments intervene by giving 
instructions, the county level is usually the final agency that executes orders. 
Compared to government levels below the county, namely, villages and towns, 
county government is the only level, among the three lowest, that can be 
conceived as complete in terms of the structural and functional characteristics 
of the bureaucracy (Yang, 2006). At the village and town level, for example, 
there is no key agency that enforces environmental laws - EPB and many other 
pollution - or conflict resolution-related functionary divisions: People’s 
Congress, People’s Political Consultative Conference, People’s Court, 
People’s Procuratorate, Public Security Bureau, Xinfang Bureau. The county 
government has the deciding power over trans-town and trans-village 
contention under its jurisdiction. This dilutes the cross-boundary nature of 
trans-town and trans-village pollution. As such, following the above working 
definition of trans-boundary pollution, I will examine trans-provincial, trans-
prefectural and trans-county pollution-induced contention in which pollution 
victims are also running their own business.  
                                                             
172 Lower levels governments have no jurisdiction to address the pollution caused by 
enterprises belonging to higher levels. 
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 Trans-boundary pollution within China matters because the importance 
of administrative boundaries has increased with decentralization. The fiscal 
and administrative decentralization that has been noted by many scholars 
(Qian & Weingast, 1997; Oi, 1999; Lin & Liu, 2000) as the pivotal strategy of 
regime reform has reinforced and reproduced administrative divisions. In 
oversimplified terms, decentralization makes local governments responsible 
for developing the economy within administrative boundaries, even at the 
expense of polluting the environment of their counterparts that border it. This 
facilitates trans-boundary pollution in which local governments can extract 
revenues from polluting enterprises without bearing environmental costs. Also, 
a cadre evaluation system that only recognizes performances confined within a 
specific area encourages fierce competition among cadres, especially of the 
same level in the administrative hierarchy, which further fosters local 
protectionist behaviors (Whiting, 2001).173  
 However, in the context of decentralization, trans-boundary pollution 
control is even more difficult. The same local government agents are only 
permitted to implement environmental laws within their own jurisdiction and 
have little to do with the pollution from neighboring places. The poor 
coordination among government agencies, either cross administrative 
boundaries or along administrative hierarchy, cannot improve the situation.174 
                                                             
173 On decentralization and local protectionism in terms of environmental protection, see 
Beyer (2006), Heberer & Senz (2011). 
174 For cross-boundary pollution in specific areas, only a very limited number of mechanisms 
for cooperative enforcement or conflict resolution exist. Some examples at the provincial level, 
dispute resolution at the county level among Shanghai, Jiangsu, Anhui and Zhejiang, 
http://zjnews.zjol.com.cn/system/2014/04/28/019995676.shtm, accessed on May 20, 
2014;dispute resolution mechanism among Jiangsu, Shandong and Anhui provinces  
http://ah.anhuinews.com/system/2013/12/21/006241816.shtml, accessed on May 20, 2014; 
joint pollution treatment among Gansu, Ningxia and Inner Mongolia provinces, 
http://news.ifeng.com/gundong/detail_2013_10/19/30471801_0.shtml, accessed on May 2014;  
joint law enforcement between Guangdong and Guangxi 
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Due to the limited government control, how villagers respond to trans-
boundary pollution is more probably to yield different outcomes. Although it 
is impossible to exhaust all possibilities here, I hope the following inquiry will 
contribute to the understanding of trans-boundary pollution disputes embedded  
in this particular mode of rural industrialization, especially how local political 
economy might provide resources or set restrictions on villager action.  
 
Cutting off a border river between Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces  
The trans-provincial case took place on the border of Zhejiang and Jiangsu, 
two east coastal provinces with industrialized countryside. Having suffered for 
over a decade from wastewater discharge by the printing and dyeing industry 
in the upstream town of Shengze of Wujiang county (Suzhou prefecture, 
Jiangsu province), on 22 November 2001, angry fishermen and pearl keepers 
from the towns of Wangjiangjing and Xiyan of Xiuzhou District (county level) 
(Jiaxing prefecture, Zhejiang province) used eight bulldozers to deposit 
several thousand sandbags and sank twenty-eight boats loaded with cement to 
block the fifty-meter wide Maxigang river. 175  This extraordinary action of 
cutting off a border river pushed the resistance to a climax and finally brought 
about a settlement.  
 One defining feature of trans-boundary pollution-induced contention is 
difang baohu zhuyi (local protectionism). In a general sense, local 
protectionism refers to local governments’ policies that favor local rather than 
national interests, or take action that deviates from national law to achieve 
                                                                                                                                                               
provinces, ,http://www.mep.gov.cn/zhxx/hjyw/201312/t20131219_265224.htm, accessed on 
May 20, 2014.  
175 The news come from http://news.21cn.com/today/legend/2006/04/14/2544649.shtml, 
accessed on October 28, 2012. 
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local high performance. 176  This often means that local officials sacrifice 
environmental ideals in favor of economic imperatives by approving heavily 
polluting projects and covering repeated environmental violations within their 
magistracy (Schwartz, 2003). In the above case, the towns involved were 
competitors in textile printing and dyeing industries. The upstream Shengze 
town lowered its emission standards and thus attracted many high polluting 
enterprises weeded out by the downstream Wangjiangjing town. The 
geographical advantage further made the sacrifice of someone else’s 
environment for their own development possible. The Shengze government 
facilitated the discharging of wastewater through the flood relief channel to 
Jiaxing, which allowed the pollutants to flow out of its area. 
 Local protectionism also means that local governments may form 
temporary alliances with villagers to protect their common interests in the face 
of pollution from elsewhere. Instead of suppressing resistance, local 
governments may not interfere, or even facilitate people’s protests against 
enterprises or governments elsewhere. Again, the trans-provincial dispute 
above was a vivid example in this regard. Soon after the damming, the 
Wujiang side hung a banner, which read: “Restore my honor. Unprecedentedly, 
the local government overtly violated the law, blocking the shipping lane. Are 
you taking the central government seriously?” Although Jiaxing villagers were 
the direct perpetrators, Wujiang placed the blame on the Jiaxing government, 
suggesting that villagers would not dare to do so without the backing of their 
local government. Wujiang’s charge was not groundless. Before going ahead, 
villagers informed Xiuzhou District (equivalent to county level) officials of 
                                                             
176 Economists investigate the outcome of local protectionism as reflected in regional 
industrial specialization and fragmented domestic market. Bai et al. (2004), Poncet (2005). 
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their plans and got a non-committal answer in reply. Jiaxing policemen, 
together with many onlookers, stood idly by, as the damming proceed. Upon 
completion, Jiaxing officials gave the tacit consent to the villagers’ own patrol 
team to guard the dam and allowed thousands of villagers go on a “pilgrimage” 
to the dam. Later in the negotiation stage, many Jiaxing officials also 
expressed concern that removing the dam would undo previous efforts and 
even alleged difficulty doing ideological work to delay dam demolition.177   
 For villagers, the explicit or implicit protection by the Jiaxing 
government and its subordinate Xiuzhou district government was an extra 
bonus, since they were resolved to block water pollution regardless of 
government response. The local governments sided with villagers for good 
reason. First, it allowed them to leverage the people’s power to fight against 
Wujiang county. In the past few years, according to the former director of 
Xiuzhou district EPB, Zhang Jianming, they have tried many ways, including 
requesting the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) for 
inspection each year and inviting CCTV Oriental Horizon178 to expose the 
pollution scandal of “millions of dead fish floating on the river.” Nothing 
worked. So, the Jiaxing government expected that grassroots resistance might. 
Second, it helped to justify their protection of grassroots resistance in front of 
higher-level authorities by claiming to respect the people’s will. Local 
governments in Jiaxing meant to show that it was not their neglect or 
incompetence that caused the incident. Unscrupulous discharge of pollutants 
                                                             
177 The news comes from http://news.21cn.com/today/legend/2006/04/14/2544649.shtml, 
accessed on January 4, 2010. 
178 Oriental Horizon is a documentary television program in China Central Television, which 
attempts to investigate various news, issues, and scandals, aiming to reveal the social 




by the Wujiang side had made the situation almost unbearable and thus strong 
popular will should legitimize the defense of local interests. Third, it could 
strengthen the public legitimacy of local governments among their 
constituents. Although legitimacy has not been a major concern of local 
governments (Cai, 2010), it was still a rare opportunity to enlist popular 
support in the context of widespread distrust of local governments by taking a 
hard line on trans-boundary contention. 179 When upper-level governments 
intervene, they usually require local governments to address citizens’ 
grievances with financial resources. In this case, when asked to dismantle the 
river barrier, the Jiaxing government insisted that the Zhejiang provincial 
government pay for the expenses.  
 Because of consecutive internal circulations 180  to the central 
government from Xinhua news agency181 in both provinces, news of the river 
blockage was soon reached central government leaders. The then Premier Zhu 
Rongji and other cabinet members offered to intervene, prompting the 
Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) and SEPA to send a joint taskforce to 
tackle the impromptu dam issue with vice-governors from both provinces.  
Later another team was sent to coordinate the negotiation on pollution 
discharge and monitoring between provinces. After nearly a two-week 
                                                             
179 It is similar as directing the attention from domestic conflict to foreign policy in 
international relations.  
180 The Chinese media's internal publication system, in which certain journals are published 
exclusively for government and party officials, provides information and analysis which are 
not generally available to the public. The State values these internal reports because they 
contain much of China's most sensitive, controversial, and high-quality investigative 
journalism. Xinhua and many other Chinese media organizations produce reports for the 
internal journals. The system follows a strict hierarchical pattern designed to facilitate party 
control.  
181 The Xinhua news agency is the official press agency of china. It is subordinate to the state 
council and reports to the CCP’ Propaganda and Public Information departments. As most of 
the newspapers in China cannot afford to station correspondents abroad, or even in every 
Chinese province, they rely on Xinhua feeds to fill their pages. The agency was described as 
the "eyes and tongue" of the Party, observing what is important for the masses and passing on 
the information.  
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confrontation with government officials, Jiaxing protesters agreed to remove 
the dam on the guarantee of the central government that Jiangsu provincial 
government would take urgent actions to close polluting factories and block 
drainage pipes. A joint-monitoring scheme was set up between Jiaxing and 
Suzhou prefectures and an automatic monitoring station was installed on 
Maxigang River. Jiaxing farmers and fishermen received 7.89 million yuan 
(approximately USD 952,898 in 2001) in compensation through juridical 
procedures.182 
 The outcome of this trans-boundary pollution-induced contention is 
often attributed to the intervention of the central government. After all, such 
contention is endowed by its trans-boundary nature with more opportunities to 
involve upper level governments. This type of intervention has been 
commonly accepted as a crucial way of achieving successful resistance (Cai, 
2010). But ironically, while we might presume damming the border river as an 
effective tactic of attracting attention of the central leadership, local villagers 
saw it as a last resort of self-help after their other help-seeking attempts failed. 
To completely block upstream waste water, they ventured to expend their 
savings and tried their damnedest to prevent the dam being torn down. As the 
retired journalist who once reported the incident emphasized, the case was 
unique that few victimized villagers could afford to take such a bold action 
without the backing of their own business. 183  It was a good example to 
illustrate the general rise of villagers’ economic status through their own 
economic activities. Whereas numerous pollution victims were striving to get 
                                                             
182 The news come from Jiaxing Daily,“Conflict between Jiaxing and Shengze Escalated in 
Pollution Spill.” 24 November, 2001; The Bund “A decade-long inter-provincial water 
pollution dispute between Jiangsu and Zhejiang.” 7 March, 2003. 
183 JXTJH, personal communication, December 25, 2010 
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a tiny bit of compensation, fishermen and pearl keepers in this case gave away 
one million yuan. Economic affluence played an important role here, which, 
imaginably, could not be possible throughout most of the countryside where 
pollution victims were struggling to eke out a living.  
 
 As many of the grievances communicated to upper-level authorities are 
simply ignored, trans-boundary contention may confer a higher likelihood of 
intervention from above. Local governments do not necessarily welcome the 
high-level interposition, however. In the absence of forceful resistance, local 
governments might deter protests within their jurisdiction when facing an 
interventionist threat. The reasons for the absence of violent protests or high-
level intervention can be complicated. The following case of trans-prefectural 
pollution-induced contention may shed some light on this problem.  
 
Close Neighbors in Different Prefectures 
The two villages in the trans-prefectural pollution-induced contention are the 
upper and lower streets along a narrow border river between Shangyu county 
of Shaoxing prefecture and Yuyao county of Ningbo prefecture. Despite 
administratively of different prefectures, the two villages are quite close. In 
fact, they were once one village; villagers speak the same dialect and cross-
border bridge visits are frequent. Both sides have some enterprises that 
discharge pollution stealthily into the river, sometimes causing trans-boundary 
disputes. Understandably, local EPBs on both sides are partial, asserting that 
the other side ought to bear most of the responsibility. But they appear to pay 
lip service and do not seriously take actual actions. Both township 
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governments also tend to dashihuaxiao, xiaoshihuawu (turn a big problem into 
a small one and a small one into nothing). Instead of pursing polluters, they 
simply preferred to sprinkle quicklime into the river to neutralize the acid 
chemicals. 
 One time the quicklime tactic did not work. In August 2008, more than 
two hundred mu184of crops on the Ningbo side died because irrigation water 
from the river was contaminated by a herbicide. Crop famers’ complaints were 
answered quickly. The county and township governments in Ningbo, together 
with relevant government agencies in Shaoxing, organized to clean the river, 
arranged compensation for crop loss and offered a reward for the capture of 
the polluter. 185 On the surface, this incident was solved effectively. However, 
questions emerged.  Why were government agencies in Shaoxing so active if it 
had nothing to do with polluting enterprises within their jurisdiction? Why did 
they bother to post a reward for capturing polluters since it was easy to locate 
the polluter after the pollutant – glyphosate – was identified? Why did the 
government agencies undertake to compensate so quickly, instead of finding 
the culprit that should bear compensation responsibility? How could such 
funds be made available so swiftly given that allocating money for emergency 
pollution compensation was usually difficult? With these questions in mind, I 
raised this incident to Mr. Ye, an environmental enforcer of Yuyao county 
EPB. He implicitly suggested that the money was provided by the polluting 
enterprises in exchange for exemption from further penalties. Moreover, he 
                                                             
184 Mu, a Chinese unit of area, 1 mu = 0.16473692097811 acre 
185 See the news report, http://env.people.com.cn/GB/8178065.html; 
http://www.zj.xinhuanet.com/authority/2008-09/18/content_14428923.htm, accessed on 
September 6, 2011 
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intimated that such a tacit bargain between governments of two sides was 
normal. 186 
 Local governments do not often have strong incentives to support 
villagers and involve higher-level authorities. In this case, local governments 
on both sides choose to keep the dispute low-key and local. Apparently, it is 
much easier for local officials to dismiss local villagers than to raise the devil 
with neighboring villages in another prefecture. That they do not have the 
power to inspect pollution in other prefectures and could not rashly make an 
accusation is a convenient but legitimate excuse. Additionally, they are 
experienced in weiwen (preserving social stability), knowing how to silence 
protestors well. More importantly, because of the two villages’ special 
geographical positions – in two prefectures, if the disputes advanced too far, 
higher-level government might be forced to interfere. In the eyes of local 
officials, some villagers just want to profit from pollution by making an issue 
of it, since the pollution there is neither severe nor unique. If local 
governments assist to raise such disputes between two close neighbors to 
higher levels, it would discredit themselves in front of their superiors. As a 
result, the trans-boundary nature of the contention does not constitute a real 
advantage of attracting the attention of higher-level authorities. Rather, it 
makes local officials more cautious about avoiding intervention from the 
above.  
 In addition, when disputes in this area occur, residents of the two 
adjacent villages tend not to take dramatic actions that attract the attention of 
high-level authorities, since the other side is not just some village of another 
                                                             
186 NBYY, personal communication, March 18, 2011 
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prefecture but one in which they have a lot of acquaintances and friends.187 
The outsider/insider distinction is subtle here. It does not strictly follow the 
administrative boundaries but relies on villagers’ emotional feelings. 
Moreover, without the backing of local government, the chance of winning 
compensation from polluting enterprises in the other prefecture is low. For 
villagers, as long as their loss is recompensed, they do not care about the 
source of money. As such, Mr. Ye saw the secret dealing in the 2008 incident 
as a multi-win situation: polluting enterprises escaped the punishment, 
villagers received compensation, and local governments preserved the 
harmony. 188 
 In this case of trans-prefecture pollution, the affinity between two 
villages, combined with local government manipulation, contains the outbreak 
of forceful resistance, while the forcefulness of resistance is usually the key to 
force local governments to bother higher-level governments (Cai, 2010).  
When the contention maintains a low profile, local governments are more 
likely to manipulate it as they see fit. Once higher authorities take over, lower 
level governments lose control. The next case of trans-county pollution-
induced contention reveals some aspects of the issue. 
 
Violent protests against a pharmaceutical plant in the bordering county  
In the summer of 2005, a violent mass incident occurred between Shengzhou 
and Xinchang counties, both in Shaoxing prefecture. On 4 July, more than one 
thousand Huangni villagers in Shengzhou went to the Jingxin Pharmaceutical 
plant to ask for compensation, including free medical checkups, for ruined 
                                                             
187 NBLTX, personal communication, March 17, 2011 
188 NBYY, personal communication, March 18, 2011 
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crops. This plant, with only a partition wall separating it from the village, was 
a main taxpayer and a heavy polluter in Xinchang. Not only were the villagers’ 
request denied, but the plant’s security officers also beat the protesters. As this 
led more angry villagers to join, demands escalated to closure of the plant. 
Policemen were called to suppress the protest and violence broke out. Soon 
both Shengzhou and Xinchang county governments and their superior 
Shaoxing prefectural government intervened and called a halt to production. 
Following a lull after the first clash, villagers laid siege again on 15 July when 
the plant resumed production. Although the government explained that the 
plant was just destroying chemicals left in reactors rather than resuming 
production, more than ten thousand villagers, including ones from nearby 
counties, gathered. They broke the plant’s windows, overturned its outer wall 
and blocked its entrance with concrete pipe segments. Clashes with riot 
brigades (sent from the nearby Shangyu county) resulted in bloody injuries on 
both sides.  The public warnings issued by Xinchang county, the exhortation 
of the mayor of Shengzhou county, and finally the intervention of the vice-
governor of Zhejiang province dissuaded villagers from gathering and joining 
protests.189  
 For higher authorities, priority is always to eliminate the visible social 
unrest; the underlying problems that cause social instability are usually left to 
lower local governments. In this case, Jingxin’s pharmaceutical pollution that 
sparked the furor has been a standing problem for a decade. The trans-
boundary nature of the contention limits the space of the two lower local 
governments to control pollution. The quick retreat of the higher-level 
                                                             
189 Shangyu, Shengzhou and Xinchang counties all belong to Shaoxing prefecture. 
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governments after the riot made conflict resolution unlikely. According to Mr. 
Liang at the office of the party-mass relations of Jingxin, it was the Shaoxing 
prefectural government that held back two county governments to build waste 
treatment plants separately and prompted the plan of a Xinchang-Shengzhou 
joint sewage treatment station.190 But potential conflicts of interests and poor 
coordination made the completion of the project seem infinitely far away.191 
Although the source of the information suggested the enterprise would like to 
shed its responsibility, it still revealed the capability limits of the lower level 
local governments in front of higher authorities. 
 The attitude of the Xinchang people bears discussion. Like their 
neighbors in Shengzhou, villagers living close to the plant have also suffered 
for years and have frequently filed petitions. Some villagers admitted that they 
would not stage such a large-scale violent protest, since Jingxin contributed 
handsomely to the local economy. But they were glad to see Shengzhou 
people take extreme actions to pressure the enterprise and involve high-level 
governments. “If Jingxin’s pollution can be curbed, Xinchang can benefit 
more from it.” 192  The words of one middle-level manager of another 
pharmaceutical company in Xinchang corroborated such opinions. “The 
Jingxin incident became a large disturbance because of its special cross-
boundary location. We are safe within the Xinchang borders. Xinchang people 
won’t protest violently.” 193 
                                                             
190 See the news report, http://blog.boxun.com/hero/zanaz/139_1.shtml, accessed November 
13, 2012. 
191 The sewage treatment station was supposed to come into use in March 2005 after the plan 
was proposed by Shaoxing prefectural government in 2002. In fact, the company was formally 
open in 2011.  
192 SXZLK, SXSPF, personal communication, April 14, 2011 
193See the news report, http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20050723/15111828253.shtml, accessed 
November 13, 2012. On polluting firms’ location choices, see Duvivier & Xiong (2013). 
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 Here the outsider/insider distinction comes to the fore. The distribution 
of profits from the polluting industry is almost confined within the county.194 
In Xinchang, from government officials to ordinary people, almost all locals 
understand the pharmaceutical industry as the county’s revenue pillar. Its 
benefits are many, so people tend to tolerate its pollution. In contrast, 
Shengzhou people did not enjoy various forms of transfer payments that are 
built on the huge taxes paid by Jingxin.  This includes employment 
generation.195  Rather, they suffer loss and pain inflicted by Jingxin’s pollution. 
Thus, while pollution suffers in Xinchang may commiserate with their 
neighbors, they rather not bite the hands that feed them. 
 In all, the situation is trying when polluting enterprises are not in the 
villagers’ backyard. At the institutional level, there are no reliable institutions 
that can limit the destructive environmental effects of decentralization. At the 
grassroots level, in most cases, villagers cannot activate sources of 
embeddedness may constrain enterprises in a bordering county. Opposition to 
trans-boundary pollution usually involves a politics beyond the villagers’ 
reach. Not to mention the competition and coordination at the government 
level, the prospect of finding social alliances in another county is also 
uncertain. The success of village protests is highly contingent, relying on the 
openness of higher-level political opportunity structure and resource 
mobilization at the state and societal level on both sides.  
 
                                                             
194 It is said Jingxin once paid compensation to Shengzhou government, but villagers around 
the factory have never got money. Shengzhou government explained that the money was not 
supposed to be used as direct compensation payment , but put under the special fund for 
pollution control. SXZLK, personal communication, April 14, 2011 
195 For such profitable companies as Jingxin, more jobs are open to local people. Shengzhou 




Waidiren Pollution within Local Communities 
Waidiren 
In Chinese, waidi ren does not neutrally capture the fact that a person is from 
waidi (a place of different origin). Rather, it is a derogatory phrase. For native 
villagers, waidi ren are out of circles as understood in Fei Xiaotong’s chaxu 
geju,196 and thus cannot be trusted compared to acquaintances within their 
circles. In fact, there is strong regional discrimination in the form of overt 
prejudice against groups based on their places of origin across China. The 
country’s sheer size renders much demographic understanding tied to 
locality.197 In places inhabited by a large volume of migrants from a particular 
area, mutual prejudice might stir considerable social tension.  
 Pervasive discrimination against waidi ren is not simply an inherited 
evil of cultural psychology; it is also built on consciously erected urban-rural 
hukou systems and related policies.198 Since most migrant workers are from 
rural areas, the hostility towards waidi ren is closely related to the lower status 
of peasants. Under systematic discrimination in employment, health care, 
housing, and education, rural migrants working the hardest and dirtiest jobs 
“live in a gray zone of pay-as-you-go medical care, dingy rented rooms and 
unregistered schools where the education is middling at best”, to use Andrew 
                                                             
196  Fei Xiaotong, a renowned Chinese sociologist, described the foundations of Chinese 
society are “earth-bounded”. He further elaborated that in such an earth-bounded society the 
social structure is characterized by the order of so-called chaxugeju (the differential model of 
association), which is the basic organization principle of rural China. Chinese traditional 
society is “just like the circles that appear on the surface of a lake when a rock is thrown into 
it. Everyone stands at the centre of the circles produced by his or her own.” (Fei, 1992, p62) 
One is “differentially associated” with the inner circle of family members, then the outer circle 
of extended family members, and further the ring of villagers. 
197 Almost every province has its infamous reputation. Sometimes regional discrimination can 
also manifest itself as bias against a person or a group of people who speak a particular dialect, 
especially if said dialect has pronounced regional ties. 
198 On rural-urban equality, also see Whyte ed. (2010). 
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Jacob’s words  (Chan, 2010; Chen, 2013). 199 As the muscles that support 
urban and industrial development, migrant workers’ contributions are 
underappreciated, whereas complaints about their bad behavior (di sushi) are 
frequent and unforgiving (Solinger, 1999).  
 Even worse, local governments have little incentive to correct this 
systematic discrimination due to decentralization strategy and cadre evaluation 
system that have been discussed above in the case of pollution from waidi. 
Since decentralization only transfer responsibility to local governments 
without providing necessary financial resources, local revenues tend to be 
used only for local hukou holders. Meanwhile, providing public goods and 
services to non-local residents is not on the evaluation list. Outsider/insider 
distinction only consolidates in this context. 
 The inferior position of migrant workers also results from the 
economic disadvantage of their place of origin. In the context of “development 
is the absolute principle,”200 locations are marked according to their degree of 
development. Given that development occurs over time and spreads gradually 
across space, some areas are inevitably more economically backward than 
others (Hobart, 1993). Therefore, shaped by the desire to get rich, the flow of 
people in China follows the rules of a particular “power geometry”, to use 
Doreen Massey’s term (1994), from poor localities to rich regions, from rural 
peripheries to urban centers, from the inland to coastal areas where economic 
opportunities have been created by the penetration of market forces. Despite 
                                                             
199See Andrew Jacob “China Takes Aim at Rural Influx” 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/world/asia/30china.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, 
accessed on July 9,2013. 
200 Development is the absolute principle is one of the most significant and widespread 
statements in Deng Xiaoping Theory and has never lost its momentum in the reform period. 
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being peasants, native wealthy villagers in places that receive migrant workers 
seem to have plenty of reasons to despise their counterparts from waidi. 
 Faced with discrimination, migrants have developed survival strategies, 
relying on native-place networks, for example. People with shared geographic 
origins usually develop their own communities where they live in concentrated 
numbers when they are in waidi.201 These organizations can be good or bad. 
Good ones take care of the welfare of migrants such as helping to claim 
unpaid wages and providing protection from local bullies; bad ones may 
commit theft, robbery and other crimes.  Either way, such organizations 
further sharpen the outsider/insider distinction. Place-bound and blood-bound 
relationships that are destined to weaken as societies modernize seem to gain 
new momentum from the flow of internal migration in contemporary China 
(Mobrand, 2007). 
 
Immigrant Entrepreneurs and Migrant Workers 
The vibrant business environment in self-industrializing areas attracts many 
outsiders. But it is necessary to differentiate between two kinds: immigrant 
entrepreneurs and migrant workers.202 Attracted by an industry cluster effect, 
the former comes to start factories on the same land. They register with local 
ICBs and obtain EIA approval from local EPBs. As businessmen seeking 
long-term development in a local community, generally they try to keep a 
spotless record as far as formal procedures are concerned. In contrast to law-
abiding entrepreneurs, some migrant workers, discontented with simply being 
                                                             
201 Zhejiang village in Beijing is the most famous example, see Xiang (2005).  
202 There is no denying that migrant workers also have entrepreneurial aspirations. I don’t call 
those entrepreneurs in order to highlight the contrast between formally registered enterprises 
and illegal unlicensed workshops. 
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employees, run their own unlicensed workshops as well, engaging in low-
threshold but high-polluting operations.203 Both are outsiders, but the ways 
local communities respond to their pollution differ appreciably. While the 
former’s factories on fixed sites would be sitting targets for local villagers, the 
latter’s floating workshops could often move quickly off the line of attack.  
 Villagers tend to be more critical of enterprises run by immigrant 
entrepreneurs because of their outsider status, other things being equal. Facing 
villagers’ nitpicking, outsider entrepreneurs sometimes feel wronged since 
their infractions are nothing different from local entrepreneurs in the same 
industry. “Some villagers are just unreasonable. The EPB’s test has showed 
that pollutant discharge met the standard. They still keep complaining about 
the smell. But even cooking smells!” reported Mr. Lu, a former village cadre 
and now an office manager of an immigrant enterprise.204  
 Mr. Lu’s opinions are in concert with those of some environmental 
officials.  Mr. Ye, working in the environmental supervision team, told me a 
story about an elderly lady who complained constantly about the noise of air 
blowers in a nearby workshop that had been recently taken over by two 
outsiders, although the decibel level easily fell within the acceptable limits.  
This was evident without even employing measuring instrument. Of course, 
the lady never complained when local people ran the workshop. Still, to 
appease her, Mr. Ye proposed to the outside owners to add an outer fan 
cover.205  Environmental officials, along with outsiders, were trying to keep 
themselves from getting entangled in the perplexing world of local villagers. 
                                                             
203 Both Lee (2007) and Murphy (2002) notice that migrant workers articulate a desire to 
become their own boss back in the countryside in the future.  
204 TZLBB, personal communication, February 27, 2011 
205 NBYY, personal communication, July 17, 2011 
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For immigrant entrepreneurs, they would gladly pay a little money to keep 
trouble at bay. For their part, environmental officials preferred to deal with 
tractable outsiders than cantankerous locals.    
 Immigrant entrepreneurs are also cautious about relaxing pollution 
control. Mr. Ye showed me a petition letter that reported three local 
enterprises doing environmentally harmful business that was banned by the 
government in a recent campaign. Oddly, it was enquiring if they could 
resume the same work as well. At the end of the letter, the writer even 
appealed for “treatment without distinction”. Despite being anonymous, Mr. 
Ye asserted the letter was from an outsider enterprise in the same area as the 
three local ones, between which there was an unsettled conflict. This strange 
form of consultation to some extent illustrated the weakness of shallowly 
embedded enterprises. These immigrant entrepreneurs did not dare to return to 
the old business hastily like local entrepreneurs who might have insider 
information or backups.  
 However, migrant workers running unlicensed workshops do not share 
the passivity of immigrant entrepreneurs. Shallow embeddedness, instead, 
frees the former from local constraints. Villagers would rather report them to 
EPBs and avoid head-on confrontation since they are afraid of possible 
revenge by outsiders of unknown background. After all, rumors of criminal 
gangs of migrant workers, despite exaggerations by local media, are not 
completely unfounded. EPB officials usually find it difficult to catch them on 
the spot or even obtain sufficient evidence because of unusual working hours 
and guerrilla style operations. Migrants often work “late at night, on weekends 
and holidays when EPB does not work”. They tend to “dayiqiang huanyidi” 
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(fire a single shot in one place and then move to another). Many times when 
the EPB inspection team comes, their operation has been halted with machines 
transferred elsewhere. They will return and resume the work when the 
enforcement in the area is infrequent or relaxed for the moment. 206  The 
difficulty of controlling this kind of floating pollution is even extraordinary in 
border areas. Migrants can simply move to another jurisdiction while EPB 
enforcers can only bemoan their inadequacy. In fact, it is said that some 
migrants just shuttle between bordering counties to escape punishments from 
both sides.207 
 Uncontrolled floating pollution certainly arouses the anger of villagers. 
Unable to punish the mobile polluters, villagers vent their anger on immigrant 
entrepreneurs who have settled down in local communities. As petitions 
against them rise, whether interpreted as a result of increased environmental 
awareness or xenophobia, immigrant entrepreneurs feel more environmental 
pressures and are forced to consider relocating.  Before the government 
ordered the closure of his small metal processing factory in Pinghu county, Mr. 
Chen decided to shutter its doors and move back to his hometown. Incessant 
“trouble-making” by local villagers had paralyzed production for two months, 
costing him some twenty thousand yuan (approximately USD 3007 in 
2010).208 
 Although the government claims it only cracks down on unlicensed, 
high-polluting operations, environmental officials tighten supervision on 
businesses run by immigrant entrepreneurs in response to villager’s 
complaints. Indeed, the impact on immigrant entrepreneurs is not limited to 
                                                             
206 HZLXJ, personal communication, November 27, 2010  
207 Ibid. 
208 JXYJB, personal communication, December 28, 2010 
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environmental enforcement. Ms. Li, a staff at the management office of 
Taizhou industrial park, admitted that their main task is to encourage and 
facilitate the return of businessmen originating from Taizhou instead of 
attracting outside investment, although the official explanation is that they 
exclude high polluting factories that are incompatible with Taizhou’s current 
level of economic development.209 Meanwhile, local governments in places 
from which these immigrant entrepreneurs originate have advertised hard for 
their talented migrants to return to build their hometown’s industry.210 
 Some may argue that immigrant entrepreneurs could win over locals 
by hiring more of them. However, on the land where the process of self-
industrialization has liberated strong entrepreneurial spirits, the idea of being 
one’s own boss has taken root among local people. When possible, local 
villagers prefer to start their own business rather than work for others, even if 
the business is quite small. In fact, Mr. Jin also expressed the concern that 
outsider bosses might be at a disadvantage if there was a conflict with local 
workers. 211  Investing in public goods is not a welcome option either. 
Obviously, immigrant entrepreneurs would rather give money back to their 
hometown. In fact, many immigrant entrepreneurs prefer to hire workers from 
their hometown. Tongxiang or laoxiang (fellows from the same place) are 
more reliable and loyal to patrons who provide jobs (Robert, 2001; Mobrand, 
2007). In brief, local villagers do not rely on outsider enterprises for a living, 
                                                             
209 TZLOY, personal communication, April 29, 2011 
210 Interview with JXPXH, December 18, 2010.Also see Murphy (2002) and Jacka (2006).  
The logic is that mobility helps the rural population develop qualities compatible with the 
principles of market economy. Out-migration and return is a development strategy of using 
migrant experience as an inexpensive substitute for education.  
211 TZJZJ, April 19, personal communication, 2011 
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and immigrant entrepreneurs do not have strong incentives to develop a close 
relationship with the local community. 
 It is equally difficult to ban migrant workers’ high polluting activities 
entirely. Because of the low entry threshold, migrant workers quickly take 
over the jobs discarded by many local people. At the same time, there are 
always markets for their cheap products. Mr. Lin, a policy analyst in the 
provincial People’s Congress, explained this take-over by migrant workers as 
the superiority of market mechanisms over administrative orders: “Unless the 
market proves it does not make money any more, migrant workers would not 
voluntarily comply with government orders.” 212  In fact, the sense that 
pollution is inevitable among villagers also makes them sympathize with 
migrant workers’ polluting behavior in some way. “You can see it as a 
jealousy of wealth. If one can become rich by doing this, why not do it, let 
alone pollute in others’ land?” 213  
 A more complicated situation occurs when migrants rent workshops 
from locals. Through such tenancy agreements, outsiders establish relations 
with insiders and can be easily traceable. When outsiders pollute, villagers 
may go to complain to lessors first instead of directly petitioning to the 
government, to give their fellow villagers a face (gei mianzi). To keep up 
rental business and give back a face, individual or collective landlords usually 
ask tenants to show some restraint but will not end the tenancy for what they 
consider a trivial issue. In fact, some village collectives even charge a security 
fee to inform renters about possible EPB inspections.214   
                                                             
212 HZLL, personal communication, December 7, 2010 
213 JXYXJ, personal communication, December 20, 2010 
214 TZZX, personal communication, May 8, 2011 
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 While renters may escape the government’s punishment thanks to a 
face-saving philosophy within local communities, they may also have to pay a 
price for the conflicts that arise among insiders. A telling example was given 
by Mr. Huang, a migrant from Hubei, who rented a typical house in Yuhuan 
county with a store in the front and a workshop at the back to do auto parts 
processing. According to him, he had made no enemies in the local 
community, but once local EPB’s monitoring team came to inspect metal dust 
collection on a windy day. Later Mr. Huang found out that his landlord had 
had a vehement quarrel with his neighbor. It was his neighbor who called in 
the EPB as Mr. Wang became the innocent victim of a neighbor conflict.215 
Similarly, migrants’ production activities may be disturbed in village factional 
contentions if these involve workshop landlords. In cases when the village 
collective owns the land, ordinary villagers can also express their 
dissatisfaction towards village cadres by bothering migrants in their workshop. 
In other words, villagers hassle migrants to get revenge on landlords, or to 
simply give them a warning.  
 In addition, migrants may suffer loss or punishment when they have 
disputes with landlords. Mr. Xu, an environmental enforcer at Jiaxing 
prefecture, gave an example. 216  His colleagues once investigated an 
anonymous complaint about the noise of lathes in a migrant’s workshop and 
later found the landlord was the whistleblower. The landowner wanted to raise 
the rent but negotiations with the renter failed. So, he secretly signed a 
contract with a third person and tried to create trouble, including calling for an 
EPB inspection to drive away the renter. The landlord’s strategy worked, since 
                                                             
215 TZHF, personal communication, March 7, 2011 
216 TZXQ, personal communication, March 4, 2011 
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the lease contract was non-standard and the tenant’s rights were unprotected 
by law. From the perspective of a law enforcer, reporting pollution can be 
blamed for nothing, although the EPB was used by the landlord to win his 
personal fight. The under-resourced local EPB rely heavily on public tips to 
catch covert or floating pollution in a dispersed area.217 
 In all, the different situations of the two kinds of outsiders reflect the 
double-sided nature of shallow embeddedness. Immigrant entrepreneurs are 
more likely to be penalized or to suffer wrong due to the lack of adequate local 
bases, while migrant workers can often escape from punishment for their 
relative freedom from local constraints. Exceptions happen when migrant 
workers rent workshops from the locals; they are subject to village politics, 
albeit unconsciously or passively.  
 
The case of Yunlin village218 
The third example took place in 2008 when many Yunlin villagers were no 
longer practicing xiao yelian themselves. Either migrant workers were hired to 
do the dangerous work or workshops were leased to outsiders from other 
provinces. Since migrants assembled closely and in large numbers, they also 
formed their own community.  Although perhaps less formal, it was still 
cohesive. Such an existence ineluctably caused considerable friction with the 
local community for various reasons. Informing government agencies of the 
gambling among them, of their bathing in the reservoir, or their running of an 
unlicensed clinic, Yunlin villagers tried to rode roughshod over their migrant 
neighbors. Since they had limited ways to punish their fellow villagers who 
                                                             
217 JXCHY, personal communication, December 23, 2010  
218 This case was based on interviews with TZGY and TZKYJ on March 4, 2011. 
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invited the migrants for fear of figuratively hurting each other’s face, they 
instead vented their frustrations on the guests. Yet when dissatisfactions were 
raised concerning e-waste processing, this made them attack their fellow 
villagers, although the main victims remained the migrants.  
 The pollution produced by the migrants was certainly unwelcome, but 
what really irritated villagers was that village cadres charged protection fees to 
cover the migrants’ businesses when the local EPB came for inspection. Five 
hundred yuan per year for one workshop was not a large figure, but it did 
mean that village cadres’ lining their pockets was acceptable. Moreover, the 
production by migrants did not contribute to the wealth of the village, except 
for individual landlords who were living far from the pollution. To teach 
village cadres a lesson, some villagers secretly reported the migrants’ xiao 
yelian to the local EPB. This time, without village cadres’ cover, several 
migrants’ workshops were caught operating on the spot, causing some 
innocent fellow villagers’ to suffer too. Needless to say, both victims 
complained to village cadres. While the former were easily dismissed by the 
excuse of carelessness, the latter were acutely aware of the internal conflict 
and demanded that their losses be covered by the protection fees collected 
from migrants. It was a clever strategy of getting compensated without 
offending fellow villagers, since finding the anonymous informer was not easy 
and only brought embarrassment among villagers.  
 Over the next few days, the strategy of calling in the local EPB was 
used more carefully and no villagers, only migrants, were taken. Village 
cadres felt the pressure and agreed to discuss the matter. There were some 
objections to the earlier proposal of loss recovery, but it remained the most 
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acceptable start of sharing the money made from migrants. Finally, a tiny 
amount of money was allocated to each household that suffered loss. For 
villagers, what mattered was not the money itself, but a sense of participation 
in village affairs and a sense of equality in the community. Migrants were, of 
course, excluded from the discussion, not to mention compensation. In the 
conflict between villagers and cadres, migrants were used as a bargaining chip 
and their interests were sacrificed. Environmental protection might never have 
entered into the mind of villagers, and pollution gained meaning only when 
comparing one’s situation with others’: migrants make money, we eat 
pollution; landlords live far from pollution, we eat pollution. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
This chapter has attempted to illuminate how the insider/outsider distinction 
affects the dynamics of contentions in which waidi or waidiren are involved. 
Van Rooij et al. (2012) proposed the idea of compensation trap to refer to the 
phenomenon that civil actions against pollution finally lead to compensation, 
which seems to have a legitimizing effect, giving a license to pollute. Villagers 
are caught in the compensation trap because they are included in the circle of 
benefit sharing, even if the amounts are low in comparison with the costs of 
abatement. In the language of this study, they are becoming insiders of the 
polluting industry in some sense. But in the cases discussed in this chapter, for 
local villagers, whether polluting industry in waidi or waidiren’s production in 
local communities, pollution is almost unprofitable. In other words, money 
cannot easily break the outsider/insider division.  
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 Generally, villagers’ experiences with the local state in trans-boundary 
contention have shown that the current political system is quite beyond their 
influence. The wealth of victimized villagers in the trans-provincial case, the 
historical closeness between two adjacent prefectures in the trans-prefectural 
case and the violent protests joint by several counties in the trans-county case 
can be the uncertain variables that break the system barriers. But villagers still 
submit to local government officials who may choose to suppress or support 
their people’s claims depending on the possible impact of intervention on their 
political careers. 
 Within a specific administrative area, outsider/insider distinction is 
also stubborn as reflected in pollution by waidi ren in local communities. As 
the rise of private industries occurs mainly in rural areas, migrants do not only 
seek employment in the city but in the countryside as well. However, working 
there does not smooth the divide between outsiders and insiders, demarcated 
by their respective household registration status. Rather, migrant workers are 
treated as inferior because of their outsider status, even if they learn to be 
small bosses. Immigrant entrepreneurs’ situation is not any better, since their 
fixed investment is not as flexible as simple workshops to avoid sudden 
government visits if locals keep targeting them. Because of the weak presence 
of labor rights organizations and other civil organizations, migrants in large 
part turn to native-place organizations, including relative networks to protect 
their interests. 219  Migrants’ reliance on their own insiders in some sense 
precludes their integration into local communities.  
 
                                                             
219 On labor NGOs in China, see Ngai (2009), Chan (2013), Xu (2013). 
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Chapter Six  
Village Politics Dominates: Specialized-village Pollution 
 
Thus far, this dissertation has argued that ascertaining mode of rural 
industrialization is the key to understanding the local political economy and 
village responses to pollution. The outsider/insider distinction based on 
political and administrative boundaries further helps to explain varied villager 
responses in a particular local context. Yet, within the same village we can 
hold the political and economic setting almost constant, especially regarding 
insiders. Interestingly, within this near uniform environment, villagers still 
express various attitudes towards pollution and pollution-related incidents. 
One key intermediary step, this chapter suggests, is the outsider/insider 
distinction on a micro level. In Chapter Five, we discussed how individual 
villagers exploit pollution to make trouble on neighbors they dislike – 
outsiders in a psychological sense. In this chapter, I turn to a more salient 
outsider/ insider distinction – factions along the lines of family, kinship and 
clan – and examine how it might influence group behavior. Within a village, 
people depend on outsider/insider distinction to gauge their relationship with 
fellow villagers. In the eyes of skilled players of village politics, pollution’s 
value goes beyond pursing personal gain. It also lies in advancing group 
interests. Engaging the government in what are seemingly pollution-driven 
disputes can also be a collective choice.  
 This chapter focuses on specialized villages where almost all villagers 
undertake the same profession or highly similar economic activities. There are 
at least two main reasons to use specialized villages to illustrate the outsider/ 
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insider distinction within village politics. First, these villages represent the 
spirit of entrepreneurship, highlighting the mode of rural industrialization. 
Throughout Zhejiang province, there are various specialized production bases, 
ranging from textiles, machine parts, metal hardware to electronic apparatus 
and medical capsules. Specialized villages continue to play key roles in the 
development of local economies. Many pillar industries in Zhejiang’s counties 
grow out of specialized villages. The Zhejiang government once promoted the 
idea of “one product per village and one sector per region” to generate 
industrial clusters based on specialized villages in close proximity.220 Second, 
the effect of pollution as smokescreen can be more evident in places where 
discharging pollution is a collective activity of the entire village. In specialized 
villages, nearly all villagers are in effect pollution perpetrators by participating 
in the production activities of specialized and related supporting industries. In 
some sense, this feature of specialized villages allows us to hold villagers’ 
relation to pollution almost constant. We can thereby better identify what lies 
behind petitions and protests against pollution, leading to varied villager 
responses. 
 The two cases in this chapter are both from Taizhou prefecture. One 
involves pollution from the electronic waste processing industry, including 
examples of contention from three small villages (Xiayang, Batang and Yunlin 
villages). The other is a decade-long pollution-induced contention and its 
recent solution in Liushuwan, a village that specializes in tassel fringe 
industry. 221  In both cases, this dissertation’s three overarching research 
questions come to light. We can see the formation of the mentality of 
                                                             
220 See discussion in Chapter Two. 
221 To protect the anonymity of respondents, all the names of persons and places in this 
chapter are pseudonyms.  
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inevitable pollution that facilitates pollution’s persistence. As familiar as 
observed in individual behaviors, groups of people may petition or protest 
over things that have nothing to do with environmental protection but 
justifiably involve the government to pressure opponents. More importantly, 
other than the obvious outsiders – migrants in local communities - this chapter 
highlights the outsider/insider distinction as reflected in factional cleavages in 
village politics. Pollution, again, can be used as a smokescreen for factional 
rivalry. Villagers involve the government as a balancing power to set their 
own rules. 
 For each case, I first use information compiled from media reports to 
present the history of industrial development. Drawing on this source is not 
only meant to set the background for discussion, but also it shows what a 
standard pollution-related story permitted to appear in public by the state looks 
like. Following this, I attempt to clear the smoke, so to speak, to see what lies 
behind the sorts of pollution-related claim making and how the logic of village 
politics dominates the contention. I conclude with some thoughts on why 
village politics dominates the development or sidelining of pollution-induced 
contention.  
 
E-recycling Industry and the Persistence of xiao yelian  
That my attention became focused on Taizhou’s electronic waste recycling 
industry was the result of a paradox. The very industry is taken as a model of 
the circular economy advocated by Taizhou government and a major source of 
pollution that needs to be eradicated by the same local state. 222  Further 
                                                             
222 According to Taizhou government, it realizes the circulation by reusing the materials.  
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investigation shows that the Taizhou municipal government differentiates 
between large assembly production and small household operation. Local 
officials, on one hand, actively promote the former by building industrial 
parks for recycled metals. On the other hand, the same officials have launched 
repeated crackdown campaigns to get rid of the latter – so called “xiao yelian” 
(small smelting). 
  Xiao yelian refers to family e-recycling without environmental 
approval and waste treatment. Villagers use crucibles and other primitive 
manufacturing facilities to extract nonferrous metals. A typical village 
specialized in e-waste processing usually resembles a garbage dump. Not 
crops but all sorts of e-waste may lay on the farmland; pungent smells 
permeate the workshops; black fumes billow from the cooked circuit boards. 
Some e-recyclers do not even wear a respirator but expose themselves to the 
burners for hours. More shockingly, according to Ms. Wu, a graduate student 
who has researched Taizhou’s e-recycling industry, she once saw a woman 
place her sleeping baby right beside the workbench on which she used chisels 
and hammers to separate various types of re-sellable components. 223  To 
understand the initial paradox and related contention around xiao ye lian, a 
brief review of Taizhou e-recycling history is warranted. 224 
 The history of e-waste processing in Taizhou dates from the late 1970s. 
While the profit from the extracting precious metals and other reusable 
materials, locked up in electronic devices, was considerable, the recycling 
                                                             
223 HZWS, personal communication, April 17, 2011 
224 The next three paragraphs of the history of xiao yelian are drawn from Xiajuan Guo’s 
paper (2008) and the following media reports, including 
http://huzhu.zz91.com/viewReply493202.htm; 
http://www.luqiaodj.gov.cn/DisplayTEXT.asp?id=2381; http://paper.lqnews.cn/resfile/2007-
06-05/06/06.pdf, all accessed on August 9, 2012. 
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techniques employed were primitive. They encompassed manual dismantling, 
circuit board cooking, acid bathing and stripping, and open burning and 
dumping. There was low market entry for villagers. As a result, a large 
number of poor peasants joined the local army of e-recyclers and thousands of 
family workshops mushroomed in the countryside. The boom not only 
enriched the peasants, but more importantly, it also provided seed capital and 
cheap raw materials for other manufacturing industries. In other words, it 
acted as a powerful impetus to the local economy. Peasants found a more 
profitable and less physically demanding alternative to farming; manufacturers 
could order fresh and untaxed metals at a discounted price; and their products 
were reportedly much favored by buyers from the upper end of the supply 
chain. Local government policies also encouraged the industry. The 1980s was 
a period of complete unregulation. From government officials to ordinary 
practitioners, environmental protection was systematically ignored. 
 As the industry continued to expand its scale and its category lists of 
waste in the 1990s, it caused even more pollution. Pollution-related problems 
that had piled up over the years finally surfaced, arousing widespread 
resentment.  In spite of “no report, no action”,225 the local government began 
to respond to people’s complaints. Large and small campaigns targeted to curb 
xiao yelian were launched from time to time. In 1999 and then again in 2002, 
two industrial parks equipped with wastewater treatment and landfill were 
built to accommodate large-scale recycling enterprises so that the government 
could implement central management.  However, the usefulness of “grasping 
                                                             
225 JXCHY, personal communication, December 23, 2010. Because of limited number of staff, 
environmental officials usually won’t inspect any irregular places unless there is a report. 
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the big and discarding the small” strategy was limited.226  The large-scale 
enterprises under control were but a few. Most tiny workshops outside the 
industrial park either were left unregulated or revived quickly after the 
crackdowns. 
 By 2005, xiao yelian became more of a bane than a boon to the city. It 
contributed negligibly to industrial input but its pollution continued unabated. 
Therefore, the local government tended to rely on the large enterprises whose 
advanced assembly lines were more productive and environmentally sound, as 
officials stiffened their resolve to exterminate xiao yelian. In fact, many 
peasants were no longer practicing xiao yelian after making their own fortunes. 
They either turned to other businesses, renting their workshops to outside 
gold-seekers. Others became behind-the-scenes bosses, hiring migrant workers 
to do the dirty work.  This trend to some extent was conducive to enlisting the 
support from the local public in squelching xiao yelian. Large-scale 
crackdown campaigns on xiao yelian had been launched by Taizhou prefecture 
government and its subordinating county governments from time to time since 
2000. However, the effects of regulation were unsatisfying after years of 
efforts. Xiao yelian persisted. 
 Reviewing the history helps to clarify the paradox, but the puzzle of 
persistent xiao yelian remains. As media reports in earlier years paid warm 
tribute to xiao yelian’s contribution to Taizhou economy, they now harshly 
rebuke unscrupulous small bosses for undermining the sincerity of current 
government efforts.227  However, as discussed in Chapter One, the thread of 
                                                             
226 This strategy is frequently seen in industry policies in China, eg. the reform of State-owned 
enterprise. 




argument foregrounds villagers’ dependence on the industry for subsistence 
does not provide a satisfying answer. We still need to examine the villagers’ 
mentality in context. Besides the general sources of mentality formation 
discussed in Chapter Three, how local xiao yelian practitioners understand the 
implementation gap regarding xiao yelian is revealing.  
 In the case of xiao yelian, the main implementation gap is an 
insufficiently-staffed environmental protection bureaucracy in the face of the 
vast number of practitioners in a large area and relatively rigid mode of 
monitoring versus flexible-hours, guerrilla-style operations. But local villagers 
tend to interpret it as weak willingness rather than limited capability. Some 
villagers with strong business acumen argue that xiao yelian functioned as 
such an important raw materials supplier for small manufacturers that the 
government would not let it go since the industrial park only served the 
demand of the large-scale enterprises.228 In fact, the source of e-waste for 
many xiao yelian comes from the industrial park, which sells leftover bits and 
pieces at lower prices to surrounding villages. Others criticize the government 
connivance by highlighting that the penalty for xiao yelian was often 
negotiated between law enforcers and lawbreakers, while a standard penalty 
fee would take one-month, hard-earned money away.229  Interestingly, xiao 
yelian practitioners insisted that most of the blame should be placed on the 
government, although they themselves were major pollution makers. “If the 
local government truly wants to exterminate xiao yelian, they can definitely 




http://zj.qq.com/zt2013/xunhuan/index.htm, accessed on June 18, 2013 
228 TZLHY, TZLJF, personal communication, February 27, 2011 
229 TZLHH1, personal communication, February 28 , 2011 
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achieve this. What a powerful government!”230 In the eyes of local villagers, 
clampdown campaigns are only displays for the government to demonstrate its 
commitment, albeit doubtful, to the public and higher authorities. The signal 
of weak government resolve is well received by xiao yelian bosses; they know 
well when to keep pace with the government, and when to ignore its orders. 
To some extent, it is the local government that encourages the quick revival 
and sometimes even stronger rebound of pollution following each clampdown 
campaign.  
 Aided by self-interest calculation and government connivance, the 
inevitability of industrial pollution has been well internalized and used to 
justify the repeated violations of environmental regulations. Although the 
gradually tightened control of jieneng jianpai (energy conservation and 
pollution reduction) by the central government and ying zhibiao (hard target) 
of environmental protection that has been added into cadre evaluation system 
by the local government might improve the situation, it has yet to dent the 
mentality of inevitable pollution. 
As we see in other similar pollution cases, contention around xiao 
yelian abounds, although local villagers consider the pollution of xiao yelian 
as inevitable. Petitioning EPBs is futile in preventing pollution, but it remains 
a popular option among locals. Why? The case studies of three villages 
specialized in e-recycling I present below will hopefully help us to understand 
this question.231 
 
                                                             
230 TZSLF, personal communication, May 12, 2011 
231 Xiao yelian has been prevalent in Taizhou. The most flourishing area for xiao yelian, as 
well as the most polluted area is Fengjiang Street (township level) of Luqiao District (county 




The case of Xiayang village232 
The first example took place in the late 1990s in Xiayang village, where 
villagers were in fact the complainants rather than the accused. Villagers 
visited the local EPB to complain about the improper waste disposal of a 
nearby manufacturing factory of electronic machine parts. They claimed that 
the factory failed to pile the waste in the stipulated place. However, it proved 
to be an own goal. Instead of indecent treatment, the manufacturer began to 
transfer all the waste that used to be dumped on the open ground to a waste 
collection point. But this almost cut off the e-waste supply of Xiayang 
villagers who regularly came to this spot to gather new materials for e-
recycling. For domestic pipelines, usually each village had its own turf. It was 
not easy for Xiayang villagers to find another free feeder of e-waste given the 
fierce competition for raw materials among e-recyclers in the context of 
stricter regulations and greater enforcement efforts. The sudden cut-off of e-
waste supply thus deprived most villagers of the source of their livelihood. 
Initially they just wanted the government to correct the imaginary mistake of 
the factory in the name of improper disposition of garbage. Later they insisted 
that the local government should be responsible for the livelihood of its people 
and find a way out for villagers. 
  Apparently, villagers’ petitions had little to do with environmental 
protection. Instead, they were protesting against the adoption of a more 
environmental approach to waste management and asking for the recovery of 
waste supply for pollution-producing activities. They had no good reason or 
channel to communicate with the factory, and therefore tried to involve the 
                                                             
232 This case is based on interviews with HZWS (April 17, 2011) and HZSHS (April 19, 2011). 
They also provided some written materials.  
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government agency as an authoritative mediator.  This seemingly absurd 
practice of exposing self-pollution to the government in fact made sense in the 
atmosphere of inevitable pollution. Villagers believed that the local 
government would not turn its back on them on such innocuous matters of 
pollution. After all, there were many other villages doing the same thing. The 
government would rather find other pollution culprits to fulfill their penalty 
quota than deal with a whole village of people seeking sustenance. Due to a 
lack of raw materials to start work, villagers had much leisure time to 
incessantly complain to different governmental agencies. Finally, to rid itself 
of this unbearable annoyance, the county EPB, together with the township 
government, intervened and arranged a deal that let the factory sell e-waste to 
Xiayang villagers rather cheaply. Although villagers paid extra money, they 
now had a relatively stable source of e-waste and were thus generally satisfied 
with the arrangement. 
 The arrangement did not last long, however. A group of Xiayang 
villagers went to petition against the factory again. This time, villagers’ 
purpose was to let the factory pay garbage disposal fee to them. Their 
supporting argument came from a TV news report that said electronic product 
manufacturers were charged with garbage processing fees by e-recycling 
companies. Soon, another group of villagers went to the local government as 
well, trying to stop their fellow villagers from implementing this ridiculous 
idea. Before the government interfered, two groups ran afoul of each other.  
Each side attacked the other for the same reason: placing personal needs 
before collective interest. While the former criticized that the current practice 
of buying in e-waste not only increased the cost but also confused sellers with 
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buyers, the latter blamed the former for risking the village for something 
unrealistic, since the factory might not sell e-waste to the villagers if it felt 
offended. 
 Again, the villagers never considered environmental protection. By 
petitioning against pollution, they could justifiably involve the government to 
pressure individuals or enterprises that were beyond their reach or more 
powerful than them. In this case, the government supported the latecomers and 
rejected the unreasonable demand for an extra disposal fee. Further 
investigation showed that the origin of the contention was in fact a house fire. 
About two months before the first petition, Mr. Xie mishandled flammable 
chemicals improperly that led to the burning of his workshop. He tried many 
ways to make up for his loss, including gleaning free scraps in faraway places. 
By happenstance, he saw the news on TV and hatched a plan of asking for a 
garbage fee by replicating the strategy of drawing in the local government. 
Some villagers joined Xie opportunistically. If successful, they could have a 
prior claim as frontrunners. If they failed, there was no real loss. Others 
disliked Xie, for selfishly dragging the whole village into this mess.  
 
The case of Batang village233 
The second example of Batang village was a result of the villagers’ use of 
foreign imports as raw materials. Around 2002, introduced by a friend in the 
city, the village Head first bought back a truck of imported e-waste to the 
village. Villagers quickly recognized the utility of foreign imports – they were 
richer in valuable and re-tradable materials, and easier to be dismantled. 
                                                             




Hence, villagers decided to focus on foreign e-waste. Although its import was 
illegal,234 tons of it was still mixed into waste steel and smuggled into the 
domestic market. In extreme cases, dealers received a legal permit to import e-
waste (herein treated as metal scraps, which can be legally imported).235 
Villagers were not involved in the complexity of bribery with customs 
officials. Instead, they negotiated the price with dealers who knew where to 
unload the goods. To eliminate duplicate transport expenses and deposits, 
villagers sent one representative, the Head, who had connections inside the 
illicit trade, to purchase tons of e-waste from the dealer at the port. They 
shared the expenses in proportion to the quantity each one took. 
 At first it was a good deal for the villagers, whose incomes grew due to 
the higher quality of imported e-waste. Yet six months later, local EPB 
officials arrived and confiscated newly arrived e-waste goods. Villagers were 
upset because no word of the spot check was known beforehand. With tacit 
agreement on inevitable pollution, villagers believed, EPB officials would not 
inspect, even if they knew where the pollution was, unless someone reported it 
or during the period of environmental campaigns. At the time nor was there 
internal conflict that might incite revenge within the village. 
Suspects included those in nearby Xiezhang village who were jealous 
of Batang’s sudden and rapid accumulation of wealth. The Head of Batang 
had rejected Xiezhang’s request to share stocks of foreign e-waste several 
times. Others in Batang insisted that the Head should be responsible for the 
                                                             
234 China signed the Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-boundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal on 22 March, 1990. Basel Convention is an 
international treaty that was designed to reduce the movements of hazardous waste between 
nations, and specifically to prevent transfer of hazardous waste from developed to less 
developed countries.  
235 TZLHH1, personal communication , February 28, 2011 
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loss since it was his repeated refusal that infuriated Xiezhang villagers. In fact, 
many villagers thought having more villages join in the direct transaction was 
a good idea. The Head’s reasoning of it being too risky to take back more 
waste was untenable. His real concern was his own family’s dealer business. 
As the only person with the connections at the port, the Head knowingly, or 
unknowingly, let his brothers be second-level dealers, who resold the imported 
waste to surrounding villages. If other villages had direct access to foreign 
imports, it would cripple his family’s business. Rumors even circulated that 
the Head skimmed the top by giving the best quality e-waste to his family. All 
sorts of conflicts between the two villages and within the Batang began to 
manifest themselves after the local EPB’s surprise visit. 
 Subsequently, the EPB officials began fairly regular inspections in 
both villages. Not siding with either party, their mere presence was sufficient 
to exert pressure on opponents. Although the overall effectiveness and 
efficiency of law enforcement was inadequate, the loss incurred to specific 
individuals being penalized was real, which could hurt opponents. Moreover, 
this weapon, supposedly neutral, could be legitimately used by ordinary 
people. On the face of it, citizens were endowed with the right to complain 
about pollution and the government had the duty to respond to people’s needs 
and to fulfill the obligation of environmental protection. But in fact, EPB 
officials might unconsciously, or unwittingly, act as a catalyst or as an 
amplifier of civilian conflict. 
 Fortunately, villagers did not let anger blind themselves and rationality 
persevered. To maintain their business, villagers pursued peaceful 
conversations. In time an exploitable loophole was blocked. Xiezhang 
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villagers had their wishes fulfilled by gaining direct access to foreign imports. 
In return, Batang villagers got to choose first and thus got higher quality e-
waste.  The local EPB played a subtle part in the incident: initially its passive 
involvement, probably unwittingly, intensified the conflict; later its role as a 
common enemy facilitated dialogue between villages. For Xiezhang villagers, 
whether they were whistleblowers, the inspection did lend them negotiating 
leverage indirectly. The Head and his family might not have been pleased, but 
most Batang villagers were pleased to see the inequality of access to imported 
e-waste within the village diminished. 
 Surprisingly cooler heads prevailed, especially among village leaders. 
While this outcome did not guarantee future peace, such self-control might be 
attributed to long-term immersion in the market. Trained in the market tide, 
these small private entrepreneurs clearly understood how the uncertain 
political micro-environment would harm their business. They could invite 
government agencies for business interests, but also cooperate with opponents 
to dispel unwelcomed government inspection for similar financial reasons. In 
this case, economic consideration overrode personal grudges. As we can often 
see, prioritizing business in dispute resolution is a marked feature in 
entrepreneurial countryside.  
 
The logic of involving the state 
In these three vignettes, the pollution was real, the hate towards pollution was 
real, but petitioning against pollution was not authentic. Engaging government 
agencies in the contention were strategic choices used in the balance of local 
power. This was especially so for rule setting: the e-waste deal between the 
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village and the manufacturing factory in the first vignette; the dispute over 
access to foreign imports in the second one; the use of a protection fee in the 
third. The extent of expected government involvement depended on the gap in 
strength between opponents and the distance of their relation. The wider the 
gap, the farther the distance, the greater need to directly involve government 
agencies. In the first vignette, the village was in a disadvantage and had no 
personal network to approach the manufacturer, thus it turned to the local EPB 
into its spokesman. The two adjacent villages in the second vignette were 
close in strength and had their own way to interact with each other. While 
inviting government inspection was partly out of emotion, it still enabled 
dialogue. In the third, villagers had other resources than government 
interference to hold cadres accountable; therefore, government inspection 
might be more symbolic than real if the loss was not borne by outsiders.  
 
The Tassel Fringe Industry of Liushuwan Village236 
Behind the smokescreen237 
Liushuwan was a Liu surname dominant village but with two rival kinship 
groups. The power struggle between the two factions, more specifically, 
between the Village Party Sectary, Liu Shunyou, and the Village Head, Liu 
Fushou, was an open secret in the township. Although villagers tended to be 
reticent on the infighting in front of strangers, anecdotes could always be 
                                                             
236 The key informants of this case were TZYWQ, a college graduate as a village official in 
Liushuwan village, who is also a native of the neighboring village; TZYYY, an official in the 
township where Liushuwan village is located; TZLHH1, an official at Taizhou government. 
Other informants included people as both civil servants of that township and villagers in 
surrounding villages. Their code names will be given when referring to specific points.  
237 This part is based on my fieldwork in the township where Liushuwan village is located in 
2010 and 2011.  
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heard from people from other villages and the township government.238 Their 
conflict could at least be traced back to the period of partnership in the first 
tassel fringe factory in the village. The five founding partners included the 
Party Sectary, the Head and three other core members of the village’s power 
hierarchy, which might indicate that the entanglement of village politics and 
economy was doomed from the start. After one and a half years, the Head 
withdrew and started his own factory for some undisclosed reason. The 
village’s factional rivalry continued apace. 
 The first yarn-dyeing factory, run by the cousin of Liu Fushou, was 
born out of the dyeing workshop of the Head’s tassel fringe factory in 1998 
when factories in the village began to take orders from Europe and America. 
Initially, Liu Fushou just wanted to have a large dyeing plant to support his 
independent design. But soon the dyeing business became profitable when 
other tassel fringe factories in the village came to buy yarns and threads so as 
to save transport cost. Perhaps because the pollution was considered light by 
villagers at the time, villagers admired the Head for his business acumen. Even 
Liu Fushou’s opponents admitted this. Instead, the Party Secretary had his 
nephew start a second dying factory to break the Head’s monopoly. As a 
Chinese saying “feishui buliu wairentian” (rich water should be kept in one’s 
fields) goes, more yarn-dyeing factories were set up and managed by close 
relatives and friends of village cadres. As a result, the river became more 
contaminated by the day. Eventually, the petitions and protests against the 
pollution materialized.  
                                                             
238 Interview with TZWS, TZYCH, TZZH and informal chats in the village temple. 
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 Not surprisingly, under scrutiny, multiple facets of the complaints 
emerged. First there was discontent with local people from outside who 
sourced raw materials from Liushuwan but did processing at home, which 
meant that they could make money without suffering the village’s pollution. 
Second, diatribes were vented at the migrant workers who made a living at the 
expense of Liushuwan’s health, as their own homeland remained unscathed. 
The third target, although more implicit, were not outsiders but the factory 
owners.239 But the impact of the intra-village differentiation caused by rural 
industrialization was dulled by the dual position of the bosses as an employer 
and an insider. For the sake of belly and face, villagers usually did not attack 
the bosses. Moreover, the latter tried to alleviate tensions by giving money 
back to the village. In fact, the costs of public goods provision in Liushuwan, 
including the renovation of the village temple, the upgrading of the tap water 
system, and village celebration at festivals, were mostly covered by these 
private entrepreneurs.240 Here the complaints about different groups of people 
with respect to pollution were largely determined by their ascriptive positions 
within the village. Therefore, the biggest culprits were ironically the least 
criticized. Economic patronage given to fellow villagers also played an 
important role because only remedy specifically entitled to insiders conformed 
to their perception of justice and equality.241 By providing public goods for the 
community, bosses find a way to consolidate their status as insiders.  
                                                             
239 TZYWQ, personal communication, March 2, 2011 
240 In the newly decorated village temple, villagers introduced to me that the first several 
biggest donors are the most important enterprises in the village. My third time visit to the 
village coincided with the annual festival of the Earth God in the village. On the bulletin board, 
the first several largest sponsors are also the big bosses in the village.  
241 This is a legacy of Maoist period. The demand for equality among different localities and 
organizations has been largely muted because it is almost accepted as a given that individuals’ 
welfare mostly depends on whether they live and work in a favored community and enterprise 
or not. See Whyte (2011). 
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 Of course, being intimate with the polluting enterprises did not fully 
bind villagers’ hands and feet. Factional politics provided villagers with space 
to release their resentment. The fight between factional members and non-
members is no less intense than that between village insiders and outsiders. 
Petitions, protests and disruptions were unambiguously directed against the 
enterprises belonging to the opposing faction. Obviously, wives and mothers 
would not run to complain at the gate of the enterprise where their husbands 
and sons were working. Costs were too dear in getting the wrong person hurt 
when venting anger. More subtly, both villagers and enterprises, whatever the 
faction, seemed to have a tacit agreement on the petitions/protests: Villagers 
could pour out their discontent, enterprises had no real loss, and mutual attacks 
between factions could end in a draw.  
 One explanation of the failure of the strategy of involving government 
agencies was that enterprises of both factions “shangtou youren” (literally, 
have people above in the government, have political connections) to take care 
of the business.242 It was one variant of the Chinese saying “lishang wanglai” 
(courtesy called for reciprocity): The tassel fringe enterprises contributed so 
much to the tax revenue and employment of the county and thus merited a 
pardon for their polluting behaviors from the government. Or it could be seen 
as a reward for the bosses’ efforts of translating economic affluence into 
political influence (Chen, 2007). Putting the possible illegal bribery aside, 
getting into the political position by oneself might be more effective in 
obtaining the favor and circumventing the penalty. In this case, the Party 
Secretary was the party representative of the county, and the Head was the 
                                                             
242 TZWXX, personal communication, July 3, 2011 
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committee member of the county Political Consultative Conference. Besides 
the interdependence between the industry and the local government, the 
symbiotic relationship of politics and business was even complicated by 
personal entrepreneurs and officials.243  
 But there two questions left begging: Why did the enterprises not take 
any pollution reducing measures for such a long time? Donating to public 
infrastructure cost money; investing in expensive pollution control was just 
another way of spending money. The local government might shirk 
responsibility with the excuse of “cannot be found” or “not in operation,”244 
but why did these environmental officials ignore the obvious problem for so 
long?  
 In short, blame should be laid on the township government’s 
interference and the county government’s acquiescence. In view of the 
industry’s vitality and prospects, the township government had planned to 
build a tassel fringe industrial park in the early 2000s. The new industrial park 
was designed to implement centralized sewage management with waste water 
from all enterprises treated in a single plant. If possible, the treatment system 
would accommodate domestic sewage as well. Needless to say, if the plan 
worked, it would constitute an important achievement of the township 
government, becoming a role model in pollution control innovation or New 
Countryside Construction.245 However, such an ambitious project required a 
                                                             
243 On the dominance of personal network over formal legal structure, see Mayfair Mei-hui 
Yang (2002). 
244 See also discussion in Chapter Three. 
245 Constructing a new socialist countryside against a background of rising rural unrest, the 
Chinese government unveiled ambitious plans to help the 800 million people living in the 
countryside catch up economically with people in the cities. It aims to modernize the 
countryside. Sustained increase in farmers’ incomes, more industrial support for agriculture 
and faster development of public services.  
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large amount of start-up money that the township government alone could not 
afford. Hence, officials had to wait for an opportunity to aggregate resources 
from both above and below. This meant they needed to compete with 
counterparts of other townships for a place in a larger (perhaps experimental) 
program led by a higher-level government, the process of which might involve 
something scandalous. Stopping enterprises from taking pollution reduction 
measures was also part of the plan since such spending cause enterprises to 
think twice about participating in the township’s unified scheme. According to 
the township government, installing pollution treatment equipment in 
individual factories was inefficient and thus should be rejected. The county 
government gave tacit consent because the prosperous Liushuwan village was 
the most qualified under its jurisdiction for the pilot program of rural emission 
rights transaction and was highly likely to get the funding from higher-level 
authorities.246 In fact, in the latter stage, the county government took the lead 
of negotiation and coordination, which helped it to receive the central-
provincial-prefectural-county, four-level financial subsidies. And thanks to the 
county government, the two conflicting faction leaders could sit down and 
discuss all the details, from fundraising to program implementation. 
 Money was supposedly not a big problem for these wealthy private 
entrepreneurs, but fundraising as it concerned decision-making powers in the 
new joint venture did pose a problem. All agreed that the money should come 
from the village collective instead of individuals to avoid future management 
disputes, but the village had been in debt for a long time, not to mention 
collective income. For example, just in 2006 the village owed the Head more 
                                                             
246  County government documents kept in the township.  
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than 1,600,000 yuan (approximately USD 202,532 in 2006) for its tap water 
pipeline upgrading. Being in debt was common even for the villages with a 
number of rich villagers. Usually private entrepreneurs were preoccupied with 
their own businesses and did not have spare time to look after collective assets, 
given that running either agricultural or industrial companies was risky.247 As 
such, unless the village had properties for lease - a time-saving and less risky 
business - developing the collective economy in many villages was not 
prioritized. Unfortunately, Liushuwan was one of them. Finally, the village 
leaders decided to embezzle the subsidies for medical insurance temporarily as 
a stopgap and return the funds when the new plant began to make money. For 
better or for worse, this has become a common practice in villages in poor 
financial health.248  
 Gathering money from the seven yarn-dyeing factories was relatively 
easier and less controversial. On one hand, the enterprises seemed to have 
been well prepared for paying past-due liabilities that they had escaped for 
years. On the other hand, the share each enterprise was to carry was said to be 
calculated based on emission amount by the county EPB. Basically, the 
presence of the county government prevented factional politics from boiling 
over since it was important to give face to higher-level authorities if they 
wanted to consolidate the patronage.  
 After the funding was secured, implementation problems remained 
because both factions wanted their own persons in charge. Factional rivals did 
not necessarily mean not getting things done, but would probably complicate 
the process. Fortunately, in the case of Liushuwan, Liu Dengcong was a 
                                                             
247 TZLHH2, personal communication, June 13, 2011 
248 TZYWQ, personal communication, May 5, 2011 
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capable third party. An excellent crop farmer once rewarded by the central 
government, Liu Dengcong was the only grain grower in Liushuwan who 
contracted for all the farmland in the village. While both factions trusted Liu 
for his neutrality and strong abilities, a clean river motivated him since it could 
lower irrigation costs. This proved to be a win-win. Liu Dengcong 
successfully acted the role of the coordinator between the factions, ensuring 
the completion of the river cleaning project, despite not being as authoritative 
as the local government. The long-term contention over river pollution ended 
with the building of a modern sewage treatment plant. 
  This was supposed to be a great success for Liushuwan villagers. 
Ironically, the role of ordinary villagers in this case was rather insignificant: 
The government and the bosses could ignore villagers’ incessant 
petitions/protests if they did want to; village leaders could make decisions as 
serious as embezzlement of public funds without consulting with any villagers; 
village economic elites dominated the negotiation and implementation process 
without effective public participation. People said the support of the county 
and township governments was the key to the success, but it was the 
connivance of the same two levels of government should be responsible for 
the persistent pollution. It might verify the words of villagers: “The 
government was so powerful that could do whatever it wanted.”249 And as 
many analysts criticized, the petitioning system had degenerated into one that 
could help to channel the discontent and postpone the outbreak but contribute 
little to conflict resolution (Chen, 2012). Villagers’ petitions/protests were 
                                                             
249Comments from villagers from Liushuwan and other villages in the township.x      
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only meaningful as a proof of the government’s resolve to follow the will of 
the people. 
 The wealth of Liushuwan villagers was seen as another important 
factor that made the sewage treatment plant possible.250 The group of rich 
bosses had the financial strength to support the large project. More importantly, 
they could attract political resources to forge an alliance between politics and 
business. Such an alliance could be effective in doing evil as well as doing 
good - in this case, pollution production and control. And the rich rewarded 
the village in the form of public goods provision, which consoled discontented 
villagers. It fostered a sense of community that kept the conflict under control.  
 However, the sense of community might bridge the gap between the 
rich bosses and ordinary villagers to some degree, but could not heal the bitter 
division between factions. This pollution-induced contention indeed pertained 
to more factional politics than pollution. The homogeneity of both factions 
determined their similar position in a series of pollution-related issues, from 
excessive discharge, villager petitions/protests to government interference, 
which to some extent lessened the importance of pollution per se in the 
contention. If pollution or anti-pollution was not even a good excuse to push 
for the interests of respective factions, naturally it would be wantonly 
disregarded. Under the smokescreen of pollution, what really mattered was the 
wrestling between different factions. If the local government set the direction 
of the play, village factional politics determined what direction people in the 
play would move. 
 




The liushuwan miracle 
While in the case of xiaoyelian the villagers participated in the industry that 
was largely responsible for the city’s economic growth, the case of Liushuwan 
village illustrates how a village developed its own industry that spread to 
surrounding areas and solved its pollution-related disputes. Liushuwan was 
always a high-profiled village. Across the province, it was well-known firstly 
for its extraordinary wealth, then for its serious pollution, and now for its 
sewage treatment plant. Before probing into the quagmire of village politics, it 
would be useful take a look at how a typical media report would tell its 
story.251 
 The miracle of Liushuwan originated from an adventurous attempt in 
1990 when it was still a poverty-stricken village. Five villagers rounded up 
approximately 160,000 yuan (approximately USD 33,446 in 1990) and 
another twenty villagers and started the village’s first tassel fringe factory. In 
only one year, the output value of the factory had reached almost 200,000 
yuan (approximately USD 39,743 in 1991). Some of original five partners set 
up their own factories. There were six factories by 1996. These forward-
looking bosses decided to develop their own designs instead of simply doing 
OEM for others. By 1998, their products were being exported to Europe and 
America. Their success encouraged more villagers to join the industry. 
Besides tassel fringe factories, supplementary industries like yarn dyeing and 
wood lathe factories also emerged and prospered. The demonstration effect of 
Liushuwan was great. People from surrounding villages and even other 
                                                             
251 The following story is not a paraphrase of one media report, but a summary based on many 
media reports, including newspaper and TV reports. I don’t list the sources here to protect the 
privacy of all villagers involved. Since the media reports were approved by the local 
government, they could be also be seen as the government interpretation.  
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townships came to get lines and did processing at home. During the peak years 
of 2003 to 2006, nearly three thousand people were working in the factories, 
while people in household processing were more than 30,000. The tassel 
fringe factories in that area produced more than 40% of industrial output value 
of the entire township.  
 Liushuwan’s wealth, however, came with a price. The village river 
became severely contaminated because the dyeing wastewater was released 
into it without any treatment. More than ten years of unbridled discharge had 
made the river full of black mud and emanate a sickening stench. In 2007 the 
county government put Liushuwan village on the list of yi xiang cu zhi 
(promoting pollution treatment with rewards). A total 3,500,000 yuan 
(approximately USD 460,284 in 2007) including of the central, provincial, 
prefectural, county – four-level financial subsidies, village self-raised funds 
and pollution discharge fee paid by the seven yarn-dyeing factories,252 was 
invested to build a sewage treatment system consisting of the principal 
treatment part, pipeline network and river dredging. As the pilot project for 
cross-sector transaction of emission rights in rural areas, this was regarded as 
the model of sewage treatment through the joint efforts of the village and the 
enterprise. While the seven yarn-dyeing factories attained pollutant emission 
rights, the village got a plant with the treatment capacity of 500 tons per day, 
which could accommodate both industrial wastewater and domestic sewage. 
Rehabilitation of the river was notable: fishes and shrimps reappeared, and 
villagers could wash clothes in the river again. Owing to the sewage treatment 
                                                             
252 The seven yarn-dyeing factories paid 1,490,000 yuan for plant construction. The fees of 
later operation including purchasing chemicals for wastewater treatment were also shared by 
the seven plants. 
186 
 
plant, Liushuwan became a media and government darling, receiving frequent 
visits from officials to learn its experience. 
 Unsurprisingly, in a state that emphasized social harmony and 
superiority of its political system, the contentious elements of the story was 
downplayed since the public information should be positive and the 
difficulties would be overcome in due time. But this light description rightly 
reflected the sense of inevitable pollution shared by government officials and 
ordinary villagers. In Liushuwan, when pollution was not severe, it might be a 
blithe ignorance. Villagers were happy counting their money and cared about 
little else; government officials were obsessed with GDP figures and had no 
noses for pollution. As the pollution worsened, villagers did not reduce or stop 
production but paradoxically took more orders. The period of the heaviest 
pollution was exactly the time of the production’s peak. Government officials 
clearly were aware of the situation but either attempted to quiet discontent by 
lip-service or just slapped offenders on the wrist. Apparently, the ostensible 
dual pressure of the villagers and the government did not work at all. In ten 
years, none of the yarn-dyeing factories took any measures to control pollution. 




In specialized-villages, pollution is a collective act. On one hand, the massive 
discharge of waste by an entire whole village has made pollution an 
undeniable problem; on the other hand, the customary law of fa bu ze zhong 
(literally, the law does not punish all the people) dilutes its seriousness. As a 
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result, pollution-induced contention occurs incessantly, but is basically self-
regulated and relatively controllable. What matters is not pollution per se, but 
the pre-existing political, economic and social cleavages in the local 
community. Pollution-induced contention is largely subject to the vagaries of 
village politics. It occurs when the problem of pollution is doubled with other 
hidden concerns. As discussed above, attacking (factional) opponents and 
setting rules (mainly among factions) are two major purposes.  
 The strong factionalism is closely related to fierce market competition 
among homogenous products. In specialized villages, such peer competition 
within the industry is even more severe. While small private entrepreneurs are 
blamed for unscrupulously discharging pollution and treating migrant workers, 
their difficulties of running industries are largely ignored. In the early years of 
the 1978 reform, local governments relied on small enterprises and encourage 
their development regardless of pollution. As the deepening of the reform, 
now local governments would like to upgrade industrial structure. Overnight 
encouragement turned to suppression as seen in the xiao yelian case. Without 
proper incentives provided to enterprises for pollution control, simple 
suppression has only driven many small family operations into a predicament, 
not to mention that the crude way of replacing small with large has brought 
about another serious problem of pollution transfer.253 Discharging pollutants 
without treatment and escaping pollution penalties are both survival strategies, 
so is taking advantage of inevitable pollution to attack opponents and set 
                                                             
253 In China, there are three major types of pollution transfer, 1) from urban to suburban, to rural areas; 2) 
from more economically developed to less developed provinces; 3) from more economically advanced to 
less advanced areas within one province. see 
http://www.360doc.com/content/06/0423/10/2311_103533.shtml, accessed on Feb 26, 2010.  
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private rules. Although these behaviors are condemnable, it is fairer to 
examine the deep reasons behind them.   
 Stricter pollution control in recent years, in government officials’ own 
words, is “to correct the mistakes of earlier years” when decision makers 
could not foresee such a rapid economic growth and industrial expansion.254 
Many pollution problems arise today because of poor government planning or 
wrong product promotion previously. 255  The move to environmental 
protection is desirable. But as they arbitrarily decide importing a potential 
polluting industry to local communities, local governments never consult with 
concerned small entrepreneurs that are directly affected by their decisions 
when correcting so-called early mistakes. Implementing environmental law 
without addressing the needs of local communities can only cause more 
environmental and social problems.256 Villagers have good reasons to doubt 
about the sincerity of government commitment in environmental protection 
when pollution control descends to serve for political achievements. As we see 
in the Liushuwan case, to facilitate its plan of central treatment, the local 
government stopped the enterprises from installing pollution control facilities 
separately.257 
 Equally importantly, as these cases show, the resolution of conflicts 
does not rely on the implementation of the environmental law but on the logic 
of village politics. Since local governments cannot totally manipulate the latter, 
they give tacit consent to the reality of EPBs being taken advantage of in 
                                                             
254 HZWSS, personal communication, February 24, 2011 
255 Some of the problems are discussed in Chapter Three and Chapter Four.  
256 Some of the problems are discussed in Chapter Three.   
257 Also see Xinchang-Shengzhou trans-county pollution in Chapter Five.  
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village factional politics. 258  But neither villagers are empowered; they try 
every means to set the rules favorable to one’s own faction outside the formal 
institutions. This only leads to a more divided rural community, which 























                                                             






On a chilly evening early last month, a mob of more than 200 people 
gathered in this tiny eastern China village at the entrance to the 
Zhejiang Haijiu Battery Factory, a maker of lead-acid batteries for 
motorcycles and electric bikes. They shouldered through an outer brick 
wall, swept into the factory office and, in an outpouring of pure fury, 
smashed the cabinets, desks and computers inside. 
 
News had spread that workers and villagers had been poisoned by lead 
emissions from the factory, which had operated for six years despite 
flagrant environmental violations. But the truth was even worse: 233 
adults and 99 children were ultimately found to have concentrations of 
lead in their blood, up to seven times the level deemed safe by the 
Chinese government. 
 
- Sharon Lafraniere, “Lead Poisoning in China: The Hidden Scourge” 
New York Times, June 15, 2011  
More enlightened party leaders in Beijing may declare, “We have to 
clean this up,” but they still have to get the local bosses - whose 
bonuses depend largely on generating economic growth - “to assert 
environmental interests at least as strongly as economic interests,” said 
Harvey. That requires assigning real value, and giving real institutional 
power and weight, to those in the system who believe that it is just as 
important to protect the commons — air, water, land, food safety — as 
it is to grow the commons, that it is just as important to have decent 
ingredients in the pie as it is to grow the pie. 
 
— Thomas Friedman, “Too big to breathe,” New York Times, 




Columnist Thomas Friedman’s quotes seem to well explain the somewhat 
dramatic scenario described in the first news report: a cadre evaluation system 
that prioritizes economic growth over environmental protection has led to 
rampant industrial investment without regard to serious pollution, which 
induces violent resistance from the people. This line of argument, while 
accurate in sketching out some source of social tension, is incomplete and 
quite possibly wrong in its predicted outcome.  
 Many cases analyzed in this dissertation suggest that the temptation to 
depict villager response to pollution as victims resisting polluters should 
probably be resisted. Quite a number of pollution-related disputes take place 
out of the public limelight do not take pollution seriously but use it as an 
excuse to achieve other ends. Even if pollution is the real concern, we should 
still be cautious in using the term resistance, when villagers have reconfigured 
their aims and means to attain them. These variants of pollution-induced 
contention become conspicuous when we turn to study the area where local 
villagers drive rural industrialization. While the fact of local villagers also 
being perpetrators of pollution directed me to the mode of rural 
industrialization, their obsession with the polluting mode of production led me 
to investigate the mentality of villagers.  
 The above paragraph essentially illustrates the contributions of this 
study. Benefiting from the study on this particular mode of rural 
industrialization, this dissertation is able to challenge the approach of 
environmentalism to study pollution-related problems and refresh the 
understanding of contentious actions around pollution. In places when local 
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villagers drive rural industrialization, it becomes conspicuous that pollution 
may not be people’s first concern when they respond to pollution. Even if they 
protest or petition, we still need to think twice before rushing to conclude 
these contentious actions as resistance. However, beyond the single mode of 
rural industrialization, this dissertation also aims to contribute to a more 
general literature. While the fact of local villagers also being perpetrators of 
pollution directed me to the mode of rural industrialization, their obsession 
with the polluting mode of production led me to investigate the mentality of 
villagers. In what follows, I will review the mode of rural industrialization as a 
theoretical lens for future comparative research within and outside China. The 
second task is to explore the potential of the approach “state reflected in the 
society” proposed by Stern and O’Brien (2012), specifically, studying 
people’s mentality formed in their lived experience with the state. Around the 
two core ideas “mode of rural industrialization” and “mentality formation”, I 
will explain in details the contribution of this study. The last is the efforts from 
theory to practice. I will try to draw some lessons for local environmental 
policy making and implementation.  
 
Mode of Rural Industrialization 
A theoretical lens for comparison 
Thanks to scholars who got dirty in community-level field research, our 
knowledge about rural industrial pollution in specific contexts has been much 
enriched in recent years. These qualitative studies draw measured 
generalizations and place their findings in a proper context, carefully avoiding 
part-to-all mapping (Snyder, 2001b). The field still suffers, however, from a 
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lack of comparative studies. Van Rooij (2006), when discussing the cases of 
environmental compliance and violation in Kunming, Yunnan province, only 
skims the similarities or differences of his findings with others’ in his  
footnotes without systematic comparison. In his other work with Carlos Lo 
(2010), the two authors attempt to explain the variation of pollution 
enforcement in China over time and across space. They generally argue that a 
convergence of institutional factors account for such variation. These factors 
include central-level policy and law development, community pressure, local 
government commitment, organizational capacity, the role of regulated actors 
and economic conditions. The argument is comprehensive but not novel. The 
interaction among these factors in context is still not clear. Tilt (2013b) 
proposes a framework with three inter-related political domains – the politics 
of knowledge, action and regulation – to study pollution-related issues in 
China. While his synthesis points out possible directions for comparison, it 
offers little in implementing comparison.  
 This dearth of comparison is partly due to the absence of an 
appropriate theoretical lens. Much subnational analysis in the wider field of 
comparative politics respects the boundaries of subnational political units.259 
So does the China field.260 Studies along the Chinese administrative divisions 
– provinces, prefectures, counties, towns or villages abound. But in case of 
villager perception and behavior towards industrial pollution, similarities 
between provinces far apart, together with differences between neighboring 
villages, question the rigid adherence to using subnational political units as 
                                                             
259 Just name a few examples. Brace, 1993; Gray, 1994; Heller, 1999; Herrigal, 1996; Kohli, 
1987; Putnam, 1993; Snyder, 2001a; Tendler, 1997; Varshney, 2002 
260 Just use studies on China provinces as an example: Cheung, Chung & Lin eds. (1998), 
Hendrischke & Feng eds. (1999), Fitzgerald (2002). 
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cases. As Hurst (2010) advocates, socially, politically, or economically 
meaningful boundaries that are relevant to the questions at hand should be 
adopted as ways of delineating subnational units for comparison. This 
dissertation suggests the mode of rural industrialization is a potential 
theoretical framework for comparative studies.  
 Indeed, applying the mode of production to set the theoretical 
parameters has yielded certain results in Chinese labor politics. Hurst (2009) 
identifies four regional political economies in which significant SOE layoffs 
have occurred. The variations on key dimensions across the regions have their 
roots in the historical processes of industrialization and development that were 
also differentiated by region. Ching Kwan Lee’s differentiation between the 
rustbelt and the sunbelt in her detailed comparative study of forms of worker 
resistance is also based on the mode of production – the so-called slow death 
of socialism in the declining North East, and the rebirth of capitalism in the 
rising South (2010).  
 As labor politics develops on a certain industrial pattern or manner of 
industrialization, whatever we might term it, industrial pollution in rural areas 
stems from a particular mode of rural industrialization. It is logical to use the 
rural industrialization as an foundation when studying contention around 
industrial pollution. On one hand, the same mode of rural industrialization 
shares certain common features and corresponding impacts on pollution-
induced contention. On the other hand, such key features as benefit sharing or 
ascriptive position of polluting enterprises and their possible influences vary 
across different modes of rural industrialization. Mode of rural 
industrialization can be a shortcut for one to quickly grasp the essence of 
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features of research sites under study and infer the characteristics of 
contention within particular areas.  
 Moreover, the better knowledge of different modes of rural 
industrialization, the more probably we can devise a solid research design. 
Technically, the mode of rural industrialization provides a firm basis for case 
selection or sampling. Unlike choices solely relying on availability of 
information, it is easier to control many background variables when mode of 
rural industrialization is identified. 261  Either most similar cases or most 
different cases can be better compared when relevant variables are properly 
controlled. Substantially, better quality data are more likely to be collected. 
The meanings of the same term can differ greatly in different modes of rural 
industrialization. For example, the so-called villagers’ dependence on 
polluting industries refers to the latter as a source for income or welfare. 
However, various forms of income generation – self-employment (being a 
boss), direct employment (as hired labor), indirect employment (secondary 
business opportunity) or reliance after deprivation of money-making 
opportunities across diverse local political economies – imply different logics 
of contention. Likewise, whether polluting enterprises provide welfare as a 
giveback to one’s own community, an enterprise initiative, a negotiated 
compensation or an outcome of resistance also makes a great difference. 
Understanding the impact of different modes of rural industrialization can thus 
contribute to both data collection and hypothesis generation and evaluation. In 
this sense, not only systematic subnational comparison, but also intensive 
                                                             
261 We rely on availability of information, especially at the start. But this shall not be the 
yardstick for case selection. As more information such as mode of rural industrialization is 
accumulated, cases may be reselected based on criteria with theoretical underpinnings.  
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studies of single cases and large-N of many cases can benefit from this 
differentiation.  
 As a theoretical lens, the mode of rural industrialization can well 
accommodate existing research and new research agendas, which constitutes 
an important advantage for its reception and possible theoretical integration. 
Regardless of scales of action – from individual to collective - as summarized 
by Lora-Wainwright (2013b) or Tilt’s framework (2013b), the mode of rural 
industrialization serves an explicit identifier to facilitate schematic 
comparisons. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, most findings of rural 
industrial pollution in China are based on the fieldwork in areas where 
outsiders dominate rural industrialization. It will be meaningful to test those 
explanatory mechanisms suggested by existing studies in areas where local 
insiders drive rural industrialization. Mechanisms work and interact with each 
other in ways that are shaped by state-society relations in context. As the latter 
change, the former thereby change in their combination or importance. Since 
the same mechanism may have different roles in different settings, it greatly 
raises the safeguard against falsification: an argument could no longer be 
falsified simply by introducing another mechanism that also explains the same 
puzzles (Zhao, 2009). Through the work of testing the same mechanism in 
different modes of rural industrialization, we might be able to improve the 
explanations and understand how a constellation of mechanisms are situated in 
a larger picture. In this way, a theoretical framework based on the mode of 
rural industrialization has the potential to integrate studies on different types 
of pollution-induced contention.  
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Outsider/insider distinction: a possible typology 
 More knowledge about different modes of rural industrialization needs 
to be accumulated so that key dimensions of this most salient axis of 
disaggregation can be established. This dissertation employs the 
outsider/insider distinction to differentiate modes of rural industrialization. 
This choice is not only to highlight the characteristics of research sites – 
insider-driven rural industrialization, but also meant to be consistent with the 
overall explanation of varied village responses to industrial pollution. More 
importantly, it has the potential to cover more types of contention and draw a 
cross-type contention. The first variable, I propose, is the mode of rural 
industrialization differentiated by the outsider/insider distinction, which 
explicitly respects definite political boundaries – administrative division and 
hukou system. I would suggest applying the implicit side of outsider/insider 
distinction – an emotional feeling or a psychological perception as reflected in 
the dynamic status of polluters in locals’ mind. That the status of a specific 
polluter can transform between an outsider and an insider makes itself a 
possible second variable. Then we have two variables related to 
outsider/insider distinction: mode of rural industrialization (outsider-driven vs. 
insider-driven) and status of polluters in local community (outsider vs. insider). 
These two variables help to generate a two-by-two table and thereby a four-







Table 1: Variations in modes of rural industrialization and in the status 
of polluters in the local community  
                      Status of Polluters in Local Community 










 According to this typology, this dissertation discusses several scenarios 
on the first row of the table. While the cases in Chapter Six fall in type I, 
Chapter Five addresses the cases of type II, Chapter Four has both. The 
existing studies can also find their position in the table. The Huashui case 
studied by Deng (2010) and the Futian case by Tilt (2010) belong to type IV 
since outsider polluters in both cases hired migrant worker rather than locals 
and thus did not establish an insider-like relation with local communities. The 
Baocun case by Lora-Wainwright et al. (2012), an example of type III, instead, 
illustrates the transforming process in which outsider investors in some sense 
gained an insider-like status when locals could share benefits from polluting 
industries. The process, however, involved petitions, protests and negotiations, 
deeply influenced by the change of village politics. In addition, more types of 
contention can be covered, including extreme ones. For instance, we can put 
the case in which the industry even the whole village is taken over by local 
199 
 
gangsters into type II. Then corporatization of the village262 or yichang daicun 
(literally use the factory to replace the village)263 is the enhanced edition of 
insider control industrialization in type I.  
 Outside China, we can also see parallel studies. When William 
Soleckis (1996) uses paternalism and xenophobia to explain the political 
debate around local protests against pollution in a company town in the US, he 
in fact is referring to the outsider/insider distinction. Hardy Green (2010) 
compares two kinds of outsider-driven industrialization in his study of 
American company towns. The contrast between socially benign companies 
that foster local development and what he terms as Exploitationville that 
focuses on profits at the expenses of local employees’ well-being is familiar to 
scholars of China. In Dara O'Rourke’s analysis of community-driven 
regulation over pollution in Vietnam (2004), he shows that a cohesive village 
community of insiders is more effective in regulating pollution than a divided 
one which differentiates among insiders.  
 Indeed, in addition to its application within a country, given the global 
trend of overseas industrial investment, the framework based on the 
outsider/insider distinction might be useful in the transnational context as well. 
The pollution haven hypothesis about pollution transfer is an illustration of 
outsider forces driving local industrialization. 264 Dereck Hall (2002, 2009) 
argues that in the 1970s Japan took pollution export as state and corporate 
                                                             
262 The village as a whole is transformed into a group corporation. The most typical example 
is Huaxi village in Jiangsu province. It still sustains the tradition of collective economy. 
263  Hu (2007) translates it as integrate village with factory in his book. The enterprise 
gradually encroaches upon the village and controls the village-level organization and the 
administration of the whole village. The village will exist in its form but the village-level 
administrative bodies such as the Party Branch and the Village Committee have actually lost 
the power to the enterprise.  
264  The pollution haven hypothesis, or pollution haven effect, is the idea that polluting 
industries will relocate to jurisdictions with less stringent environmental regulations. 
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strategy, consciously relocating highly-polluting industries to developing 
countries. The expansion of China companies to African continent in recent 
years has also raised similar concern while it significantly promotes local 
industrialization (Alden, Large & Soares de Oliveira eds., 2008; Brautigam, 
2009; Kelley, 2012).  
 
Other approaches for differentiation 
 Certainly, this is only one possible framework based on the mode of 
rural industrialization. Others might approach this problem from the 
perspective of the ownership structure of polluting enterprises. The very 
contrast of rural industrialization built upon private entrepreneurship is that 
villages are passively industrialized due to their geographical proximity to 
some SOEs or restructured enterprises with a SOE past. While Lora-
Wainwright et al. (2012) shows the role of SOEs in national economy tends to 
make villagers subordinate to the priority of industrial development and accept 
the locality suffering as a sacrifice for the larger collective, van Rooij (2006) 
suggests that a SOE past - for example, a large number of pensioners, makes 
enterprise owners more future-oriented and thus facilitate environmental 
compliance instead. The anecdote I learnt in the fieldwork may also offer 
some clues. The village located immediately outside a thermal power plant 
whose refuse incineration project was a key program of the Ninth Five Year 
Plan of Zhejiang province. Despite worsening environment and villager 
resistance, factory managers were more worried about potential resistance 
from local, urban workers who complained about threats to their income due 
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to profit losses caused by villagers’ disruption of production. 265  Indeed, 
besides the state ownership, comparison is feasible even within private 
entrepreneurship. One can go back to the socialist legacies, examining the 
impact of different paths to private entrepreneurship on pollution-induced 
contention. The form in Zhejiang province I describe represents one type. Its 
comparables in Chapter Two - privatization through insider purchase mostly in 
Jiangsu province and reliant on foreign investment largely in Guangdong 
province are two other variants. Likewise, it can potentially integrate 
transnational cases. Let us return to the same example of China’s investment 
in Africa. Both state-led and private investors are active in local 
industrialization. With the industrial sector controlled, whether it is 
construction, resource extraction or manufacturing, the comparison between 
Chinese companies of different ownerships is possible. 
 Resource-reliant industrialization is also an illuminating perspective. 
As studies on company towns in America shows, resource towns and 
manufacturing towns develop differently (Dinius & Vergara, 2011). 
Differentiation between resource- and manufacturing-based industrialization is 
necessary for comparative studies. Economists have used provincial- and city-
level panel data to study resource curse within China (Zhang, Xing, Fan & 
Luo, 2008, Shao & Qi, 2009; Fan, Fang & Park, 2012; Ji, Magnus & Wang, 
2014). The impact of resource abundance is not limited to economic 
performance, however. Industrialization through resource mining and 
processing also shapes villagers’ mentality towards industrial pollution and 
prepares resources available for actions when pollution occurs. Many research 
                                                             
265 Interview with SXSPF, May 15, 2011 
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sites in ethnographic studies such as Futian town in Sichuan province (Tilt, 
2010) and Baocun village in Yunnan province (Lora-Wainwright et al., 2012) 
were industrialized thanks to mineral resources buried in the mountains. 
Although these studies do not dig deep from this angle, we can still see the 
impact of resources when they argue villagers tend to view the environment as 
a resource to be exploited. Additionally, as argued in Chapter Two, resource-
reliant industrialization tends to have a stronger presence of the state, which 
implies a different power relationship among parties involved. The 
abovementioned thermal plant’s genesis as a SOE and the tungsten ore owners’ 
political connections in a small village of Zhejiang province both influence the 
dynamics of pollution-induced contention (Liu, 2012).  
 Indeed, different perspectives can be combined. Take ownership and 
resource abundance as an example. The transformation of property rights in 
Chinese mining enterprises in resource-rich areas are good materials for 
natural experiments in political science. To partly respond to severe pollution 
and frequent explosion accidents, Shanxi coal industry went through a 
significant transformation of guo jin min tui (literally the state advances, the 
private sector retreats, a term to describe a phenomenon in Chinese economy). 
Six state-owned coal companies purchased 362 firms in all;266 thousands of 
small coal pits were closed. By contrast, the tungsten industry of Xiaoxi 
village in Liu Chunyan’s study (2012) underwent a conversion from state-
owned to village collective-run, and to private-controlled. The privatization of 
mining rights in 2001 incurred incessant petitioning to local governments. The 
longitudinal comparison (Gerring & McDermott, 2007) allows us to better 
                                                             
266 See http://www.china.org.cn/top10/Top_500_Enterprises_of_China/2011-
05/19/content_22685278.htm , accessed on December 20, 2013. 
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observe the impact of ownership transformation in the context of resource-
reliant industrialization.  
 
Mentality Formation 
The role of people’s lived experiences  
It is nearly impossible to talk about politics in China without touching on the 
state; its presence is pervasive. This dissertation has adopted the approach of 
state reflected in the society. That the Chinese state is fragmented is not only a 
well-recognized fact in academia (Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988; Mertha, 
2008, 2009). Chinese people know it well too. Accordingly, our research shall 
move one step further, examining how signals sent by different fragments of 
the state are received by individuals in society and further distilled into the 
latter’s common knowledge (Stern & O’Brien, 2012). In this dissertation, I 
suggest examining people’s mentality – a potential theoretical lens - since it 
dictates the way they respond to those mixed messages or use Joel Migdal’s 
words (2001, p11), “the rules for daily behavior”.   
 Like others interested in everyday politics in authoritarian regimes, this 
dissertation zeroes in the observable popular experience with the state to study 
mentality formation. Here I do not limit the experience to those that may be 
counted as life-altering events, for example, participating collective protests 
(McAdam, 1989; McCann, 1994; Tilly, 1999). The mind-transforming process 
does not necessarily take the form of shocks or sharp changes. It can take 
place imperceptibly in every bit of daily experience. In most cases discussed 
in this dissertation, local villagers are simply living their own life and 
encounter the state concerning industrial pollution in their everyday life.  
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 Likewise, the experience here ranges wider than what Gallagher and 
Wang (2011) call as users’ experience. They argue that compared to non-users, 
the users of Chinese legal system have higher level of disillusionment and 
more negative perceptions of the system’s effectiveness and fairness. Similar 
counter-effect of political participation can also be seen in petitioning in the 
Chinese countryside, which, according to Li Lianjiang (2008), devastates 
villager’s political trust in the central government. In the analysis here, besides 
direct encounters with the state such as the EIA, environmental petitioning, 
and environmental litigation, people also receive information from indirect or 
passive communication with official references like environmental education 
and media coverage which publicizes and promotes government policies and 
regulations. The lessons learnt from direct interaction with state agents, 
especially when they are in stark contrast with official preferences stated in 
speeches and written regulations, are no less profound.  
 In addition, this dissertation highlights the self-regulating and self-
disciplining effect of lived experiences, arguing that local villagers internalize 
what the state configures as feasible in dealing with industrial pollution and 
further self-regulate their behaviors. When developing his concept of 
environmentality, Agrawal (2005b) also shows that the values held by local 
villagers can be shaped to converge with those of the ruling power through 
participation of forest protection. This does not deny the learning function of 
experiences, which usually give rise to better repertoire. Sidney Tarrow (1993, 
p283, original emphasis) states that the repertoire is “not only what people do 
when they make a claim; it is what they know how to do and what society has 
come to expect them to choose to do.” As Lora-Wainwright et al. (2012) 
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explicitly use “learning to live with pollution” in their article title, Baocun 
villagers have gradually learned repertoires of acceptable actions to 
communicate discontent.  
 
Understanding contention 
 However, I contend that learning what practice is in their best interests 
is not just strategic, since local villagers in the end have become complicit in 
the state’s aims and acted in ways consonant with authoritarian rule. For 
example, the state offers money to buy stability, and citizens “cooperatively” 
make demand for compensation. Ching Kwan Lee and Yonghong Zhang 
(2013) even claim that grassroots officials and aggrieved citizens share a 
common interest in sustaining a certain level of instability. Even contentious 
protests in contemporary China are identified as loyalist, which follow the 
rules set by the state and never question the regime’s legitimacy (Bernstein & 
Lv, 2003; O’Brien & Li, 2006; Lee, 2007). Peter Lorentzen (2013) argues that 
these small-scale, narrowly economic protests indeed help the Chinese state to 
solve the informational problems of authoritarian regimes, which can enhance 
its stability rather than detracting from it.  
 Similarly, viewed in this light, rightful resistance (O’Brien & Li, 2006) 
is not a creative strategy either. I say it not in the sense that it is simply the 
continuation of a tradition that has been established in China since imperial 
times (Perry, 2001).267 The point here is that rightful resisters, whatever they 
do, remain within permissible boundaries, although at face value, savvy 
                                                             
267 For the question whether rightful resisters are sincere or strategic. In O’Brien’s “rightful 
resistance revisited” (2013), he suggests we understand it as a mixture of belief and 
calculation. In the mea time, he implicitly disagree with Lee’s (2007, p 17) argument that 
rightful resistance is mainly a form of strategic framing.   
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villagers use the authorized language of the state to articulate their grievances 
and skillfully exploit the gap between what the state promises and what is 
actually delivered. By rightfully resisting, villagers actually reinforce a well-
chosen strategy on the part of the government that tolerates protests that stay 
within bounds while policing those overstepping the boundary harshly. In 
many cases discussed in this dissertation, pollution-induced contention is not 
even resistance. However, when these claims take the forms sanctioned by the 
state, they are endorsing the government’s regulations or espoused values.  
  As such, people’s submissive resistance helps to sustain the regime, if 
not reinforce it. The contention takes the form of resistance but submits to the 
state in essence. Since Andrew Nathan (2003) proposed the idea “authoritarian 
resilience”, dozens of studies have been conducted to explain the Chinese 
political system’s adaptiveness (Yang, 2004; Shambaugh, 2008; Heilmann & 
Perry, 2011). Most, if not all adaptive literature focusing on policy process 
takes a top-down perspective. However, as argued in this dissertation, we can 
see from the below, from the perspective of signal receivers. It takes two to 
tango. Observation into how local people receive the state and adjust their 
behaviors accordingly may refresh our understanding of resilient authoritarian 
regimes. This dissertation marks a preliminary attempt in this regard. 
 Here I also would like to touch on the theoretical debate of how to 
understand claim-making contention of China in recent decades. Many assert 
that people’s claims represent a rising rights consciousness on the part of a 
restive citizenry demanding greater freedom from state control (Lee, 2007; 
O’Brien & Li, 2006; Gallagher, 2006).  On the other hand, Perry (2007, 2008 
& 2009) asserts instead that protests act according to a seasoned rules 
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consciousness that is more supportive than subversive of state authority. 
Lianjiang Li (2010) tries to solve the debate, arguing rules and rights 
consciousness in contemporary China share the common goal of stopping or 
preventing the arbitrary exercise of power, but they have different objects, 
ideational foundations and behavioral implications. While the former is rule-
enforcement-oriented, the latter points to rule making.  
 However, the findings of this dissertation seem to illustrate more facets 
of this debate. For instance, putting the unreasonable demands aside, can 
opportunistic use of pollution as an excuse be categorized as rules 
consciousness? Given the complexity of pollution-induced contention, in some 
cases, villagers do suffer injustice other than that caused by pollution. 
However, even if villagers know that the relief of certain injustice is beyond 
the responsibility of local EPBs’, many of them still try the chance of being 
attended to. It is a kind of using rules but in a wrong way. Rules consciousness 
is supposed to be encouraged among Chinese citizens. But the abuse of rules 
may only have counter effects. It not only distorts the normal space for 
applying rules but also erodes people’s trust in rule enforcement.  
 Likewise, when villagers involve the government as an important 
balancing power to set their own rules, can it be seen as rights consciousness? 
That villagers become aware of their rights and take actions to realize them is 
a positive change. But it is debatable if villagers shall do it in form of abusing 
public resources. Because of limited channels of interest articulation and 
aggregation, villagers’ rights cannot be well guaranteed through individual or 
collective forms of political participation. It is understandable that villagers 
exploit every opportunity to establish their own rules outside formal 
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institutions. Although respecting community norms or village regulations is 
necessary, rights consciousness linked to unofficial rules instead of formal 
institutions is undesirable. When the former overshadows the latter, the 
country and its people have to pay a formidably high price.  
             Whether these variants of claim making contention can be counted as 
rights consciousness or rules consciousness, I do not mean to offer a definite 
answer here. It needs a more thorough study. My aim is to demonstrate the 
diversity of claim-making contention and its potential challenge to these 
existing concepts. Taking popular protest for too much granted will cost us 
opportunity to discover more theoretical possibilities.  
 
Going down the grassroots 
 Last but not least, I would like to emphasize the significance of going 
down to grassroots politics. Initially, theoretical consideration motivated me to 
take the perspective of local villagers, but the whole writing process 
strengthened my confidence in the theoretical potential of micro-level 
evidence.  
 In reality, the translation of technical and scientific progress of 
pollution alleviation into politically feasible policy regime has been a major 
stumbling block. The existing literature on environmental governance in China 
often finds fault with local governments to explain this repeated failure. That 
local governments sacrifice the environment for GDP growth is a common 
viewpoint. Correspondingly, their policy recommendations are intended to 
change government behaviors, placing the hope of pollution control on 
enhanced environmental enforcement.  
209 
 
 This line of arguments is valuable but ignores the complex village life 
in its myriad forms. Encountered with pollution brought by industrial 
development, villagers are not faceless people who mechanically respond to 
pollution. Pollution has become part of villagers’ life, mingled with their 
social networks. When pollution-induced contention breaks out, non-pollution 
factors may override pollution itself whether villagers choose to violently 
protest against polluting enterprises or silently submit to the latter. The linear 
thought assuming pollution-induced contention is only driven by the concern 
over pollution and can be simply through pollution control contributes 
limitedly to both environmental protection and conflict resolution. 
 Thereby, I suggest grassroots politics needs to be addressed with equal 
footing to the higher-level politics. As this dissertation shows, the micro-level 
evidence warns us that we can misinterpret pollution-induced contention if we 
do not look within villages. When people are marveling at the arrival of the 
age of big data, data from grounded fieldwork can still offer a different insight 
from the increasing number of larger-scale studies that take so many things as 
pollution-induced contention at face value. Only looking inside village politics 
can we see understand how pollution becomes a smokescreen that covers or 
hides the real story and how villager actions (e.g. petitioning and protests) 
which appear similar on the surface are actually very different.  
 Furthermore, a profound understanding of grassroots politics will 
break a new ground for cross-country comparison. Even if quantitative studies 
can benefit from the micro-level evidence since it can greatly enrich the 
knowledge of measurement. With such evidence in hand, the prospect of an 




The findings in entrepreneurial countryside do not only indicate a new 
theoretical outlook, but may also inspire innovative practice in environmental 
protection. This dissertation tries to contribute to the real world politics as well. 
The followings are some policy implications we may draw from the study of 
pollution-induced contention in this particular mode of rural industrialization. 
  The first lesson is derived from the core feature of the insider-driven 
industrialization based on rural entrepreneurship – villagers as entrepreneurs – 
discussed in this study. Since villagers, as entrepreneurs, are perpetrators of 
pollution in the area, the key to pollution control is to change villager 
entrepreneurs’ behaviors. As argued in Chapter 3, whether ex ante pollution 
prevention or ex-post pollution punishment, local governments provide little 
incentive for entrepreneurs to curb pollution. Even worse, the subjective 
malice of “black-hearted bosses” instead of these objective disadvantages is 
singled out for persistent pollution in the entrepreneurial countryside. This 
kind of attribution does not contribute to the solution of environmental 
problems. Pollution control shall respect the characteristics of mode of rural 
industrialization; in this case, villager entrepreneurs want to maximize profits. 
Discharging pollutants without treatment, escaping pollution fines, or using 
pollution as an excuse to achieve other ends are all methods of profit 
maximization. It is unfair to blame villager entrepreneurs for using high 
polluting mode of production or making unreasonable demands out of 
pollution. They simply want to maximize profits including those from 
pollution. Once high-polluting mode of production is not rewarded by the 
market or the cost of violating environmental laws is formidably high, the 
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same group of villagers, who grasp every opportunity to profit from pollution, 
can also turn to greener production if the latter is more profitable. The 
government can guide entrepreneurs’ behavior by creating an environment in 
which pollution is no more profitable, either measured in terms of production 
or law violation. For the former, the rejection of not-up-to-environmental-
standard products by overseas markets serves as a good example of motivating 
villager entrepreneurs to adopt greener mode of production. For the latter, the 
stricter punishment such as paying fines by the day and detaining heavy 
polluters in the new Environmental Protection Law to be promulgated in 2015 
can test the effect of increasing the cost of law violation. 
 The second lesson concerns how to possibly reduce cunning villagers’ 
unreasonable claims that prevail in policy areas that directly affect people’s 
livelihood. As the cases in this thesis show, local EPB officials clearly know 
that dealing with such non-sense requests has wasted a lot of manpower and 
material resources. But they seem more worried that insignificant pollution-
related disputes may turn to undesirable mass incidents. This obsessive pursuit 
of social stability instead encourages villagers to frame their non-pollution-
related demands as anti-pollution claims to increase the chance of being 
attended to.  Since villagers essentially make use of local officials’ fragility to 
the overwhelming pressure of stability maintenance from the above authorities, 
the best strategy for local officials to respond to the masses below is perhaps 
going by law, in this case, focusing on pollution per se which is not fake after 
all. Even if performing one’s official duties according to law might be merely 
a strategic choice of local officials given that going by law is justifiable in 
front of higher authorities and ordinary masses, it is still desirable since its 
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opposite – public officials’ malfeasance and dereliction of duty is the source of 
many social grievances. Law enforcement focusing on pollution itself does not 
mean disregard of other factors in problem solution, but to block the channels 
that people may take advantage of pollution. For villagers, 
petitioning/protesting is also a process of learning what the local EPB’s power 
and responsibility is, and what is achievable through local EPB. If people can 
hardly profit from making trouble out of pollution, such opportunism will 
predictably decline.  
 The third lesson suggests that environmental protection needs a new 
way of thinking beyond simply enhancing law enforcement which cannot 
always achieve desired results as the cases at the grassroots show. When 
pollution breaks out, the resolution of conflicts does not rely on the 
implementation of the environmental law but on the logic of village politics. 
Local EPBs cannot manipulate village politics but have to compromise to the 
latter when enforcing the law. However, even if villagers may at times make 
use of the presence of local EPBs in their rivalry with other factions, it does 
not cover the fact that villagers are not empowered. Indeed, it is the exclusion 
of villagers in local industry planning and pollution control that makes private 
rules outside the formal institutions abound. The countryside is only left with a 
deteriorating environment and a more divided rural community.  
 For policy reference, I argue that empowering local villagers in 
environmental protection can become a new breakthrough point. In China, 
because villagers are never endowed with the power to implement 
environmental protection, they still see environmental protection as the 
responsibility of the government but none of their business. But given the 
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importance of village politics, involving villagers in environmental 
enforcement should be a complement to formal law implementation. Moreover, 
Agrawal’s study on environmentality (2005) indicates the possibility of 
converting environmentally indifferent citizens into active participators in 
environmental protection by involving them in environmental governance. 
 Realistically speaking, allowing for public participation in all stages of 
local industrial development still seems far away. But gradually including 
villagers in environmental protection is possible. Either public hearing before 
industry introduction or community-based regulation over pollution can be an 
option. The former aims to change the situation that local governments 
arbitrarily make decisions such as importing a potential polluting factory or 
prohibiting certain private production without consulting concerned villagers 
that are directly affected by their decisions. The latter tries to help villagers 
establish the sense of ownership of local environment and further make the 
community pressure work in pollution control. In reality, implementing 
environmental law without addressing the diverse needs of different 
communities has caused more environmental and social problems. Allowing 
local villagers to participate in pollution control can be an effective way to 
overcome the defects of lack of local specificity when rigidly enforcing 
environmental laws.  
 In the end, readers might have found that many problems point to the 
inherent defects of the authoritarian regime. Then comes a serious problem: 
without institutional change, is it possible to reduce pollution in rural China? 
The last lesson here makes an attempt in answering this question. One of the 
main arguments of this dissertation is that people’s lived experience with state 
214 
 
power is fundamental in mentality formation. Correspondingly, the policy 
suggestion is to provide a new experience with the government of 
environment for local villagers, so as to ultimately alter their mentality. Going 
through villager experiences in seven fields discussed in Chapter 3, 
environmental education, which does not require prior institutional reforms, is 
the most feasible option for experiment. Social psychologists have discovered 
that certain types of words and messages are more effective in encouraging 
environmental behaviors (Winter et.al, 2000; Cialdini, 2003). Moreover, with 
the support of well-grounded studies on social psychology, it implies a high 
chance of being adopted by local governments under pressure to demonstrate 
regular innovation. An improved environmental publicity initiative that draws 
on findings of social psychology can possibly make a breakthrough in 
environmental education. 
 In addition, related to the third lesson “empowering local villagers”, 
we shall also concern the way environmental education is delivered. From the 
perspective of policy implementation, the key is how to release the potential of 
local indigenous organizations as implementers of environmental education. 
International experiences suggest that educating traditional, religious, and 
local community leaders can assist in facilitating the implementation of 
environmental policies.268 In the context of rural China, Lily Tsai’s study on 
public goods provision (2007) and William Hurst et al.’s research on 
collective petitioning (2014) have shown that local informal institutions such 
as churches, temples and elder people’s associations can play an influential or 
even decisive role in grassroots governance.  





 Local governments may consider introducing these local indigenous 
organizations into the implementation of environmental education. As part of 
rural communities, local community organizations are supposed to have more 
incentives to protect their own environment than government officials - the 
sole implementer in the current system - whose political career has nothing to 
do with environmental education. Moreover, by introducing local churches, 
temples, elder people’s associations and NGOs – another alternative of service 
delivery outside local governments - into rural environmental education, we 
can explore more possibilities for effective policy implementation. In the 
meantime, the academia can play an active role in this policy experiment. 
Appropriate policies need a scientific evaluation of the effects of different 
local implementers on environmental education. 
 
Closing Remarks 
The unexpected turn of events in the field directed me to narrow my focus on 
pollution-induced contention in a particular mode of industrialization. On the 
spot where local villagers drive rural industrialization, I sought to dispel the 
myth of so-called “victims resisting polluters.” I hope this account of 
pollution-induced contention in contemporary China can be accessible and 
useful to those who might otherwise only see the occasional headline in The 
New York Times. China’s drive to be an industrial nation and its current 
environmental crisis is an important political story of our time and one that 
deserves attention beyond a narrow band of specialists. As discussed above, 
the theoretical lenses offered in this dissertation fit into a broader research 
agenda on both comparative politics and authoritarian politics. Further 
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research will confirm if the mode of rural industrialization and the formation 
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